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Cert to Ct. of Claims 
(Friedman, Cowen, Davis, 
Nichols (diss. in part), Kunzig 
Bennett, Smith) (en bane) 
Federal/Civil Timely (w/ extn) 
Petr argues that the Court of Claims 
erred in permitting a suit for damages against the United States 
~~Jhen the relevant statutes did not expressly provide for such a 
6 1'-a "'T. r;,~ tjUt'S ht~~ I~ wht t~t r s fa fuft! (. ,..eaf, ~s 
4.. -{', c1 t<C ( ~ ~ r~ IQ f'to-i1~~~f :bt fw, ( Y1 1 -th~ jov '-t Y. In~'"' ~.s-
fJ,, ,, ~ r.-ov ·£~ ~ L~ "Uf.t-.!:.~~~ ti)i '""'' The s:v: c. 
~. 
remedy. This case is straightlined with #81-1747, United States v. 
---------:7 
Duncan. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resps seek to 
recover damages from the United States for the alleged mismanagement 
of timber resources on lands allotted to individual Indians from the 
Quinault Reservation. Resps are 1,465 individuals owning interests 
in allotments, the Quinault tribe, and an unincorporated association 
of Quinault Reservation allottees. 
Between 1905 and 1935 the entire reservation was 
allotted to individual Indians under the General Allotment Act of 
1887. However, under the Allotment Act and the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, the United States holds the allotted 
-land in trust for the benefit of the Indian to whom the allotment 
has been made. Other statutes direct the Secretary of Interior to 
manage the timber resources on these lands for the benefit of the 
Indians. Under 25 u.s.c. 406 the Secretary is authorized to approve 
the sale of timber. Under 25 u.s.c. 466, the Secretary is directed 
to adhere to the principles of sustained-yield forestry on all 
Indian forest lands. And under 25 u.s.c. 406, the Secretary is 
required to consider the state of growth of the timber and the 
present and furture financial needs of the allottee and his heirs in 
making decisions respecting timber sales. Finally, the Secretary is 
authorized to deduct an administrative fee for his serviced from the 
timber revenues. 25 u.s.c. 406(a), 413. On the basis of these 
statutes, the Secretary has developed a detailed set of regulations 
governing sale and harvesting of Indian timber. 25 C.F.R. Part 141. 
Resps filed their claims in 1971, alleging that 
the Secretary: (1) failed to obtain fair market value for timber 
sold; (2) failed to manage timber on a sustained yield basis; (3) 
failed to obtain payment for some merchantable timber; (4) failed to 
develop a proper system of roads and easements, and exacted improper 
charges from allottees for roads; (5) failed to pay interest on 
certain funds; (6) paid insufficient interest on certain funds; (7) 
exacted excessive administrative fees. Resps sought money damages, 
and premised jurisdiction on the Tucker Act, 28 u.s.c. §1491, and, 
in the case of the tribal claimant, on the Indian Claims Commission 
Act, 28 u.s.c. §1505. 
In 1977, petr moved to dismiss on the basis that 
the u.s. had not consented to suit with respect to these claims. In 
Mitchell I, the Court of Claims, en bane, held that the General 
Allotment Act provided Indian allottees with a cause of action for 
money damages. This Court reversed, 445 u.s. 535 (1980), holding 
that the Allotment Act could not be understood to place upon the 
u.s. full fiduciary responsibilities with respect to the management 
of allotted lands. However, the Court indicated that the Court of 
Claims could consider on remand whether any of the additional 
legislation governing management of allotted lands would support a 
claim for money damages under the Tucker Act or its equivalent in 
§1505 for tribal claimants. 
On remand, the Court of Claims, en bane, again 
found the u.s. subject to suit, this time on the basis of the 
statutes providing for timber management (25 u.s.c. §§ 406, 407, 
66) and governing rights of way (25 u.s.c. §§318a, 323-325). In 
'-
order to find a waiver of sovereign immunity, the statute or 
regulation providing the basis for a claim must be capable of being 
fairly "interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 
Government." United States v. Testan, 424 u.s. 392, 400 (1976). It 
was not necessary, however, for the statute or regulation to 
specifically direct that a claim could be brought in the Court of 
Claims or federal district court. Nor was it necessary that the 
statute or regulation specifically authorize the payment of money; 
"non-express" indications of a right to compensation may serve as 
well. Thus, the right to compensation need not be explicitly stated 
although the "statute should fairly be read as mandating 
compensation" and that "reading should be strong and clear." For 
these principles, the court relied upon Testan and Mitchell. 
The court concluded that 25 u.s.c. §§406-407 
(timber sales), 25 u.s.c. §466 (sustained yield), and 25 u.s.c. 
§318a, 323-25 (rights of way) created a fiduciary relationship 
between the allottees and the government and that resps could 
recover for breach of these fiduciary obligations. Federal control 
of Indian timber is comprehensive. See White Mountain Apache Tribe 
v. Bracker, 448 u.s. 136 (1980). These statutes reflect a 
congressional intent to maximize Indian revenues. The court defined 
the nature of the damages resps might seek as follows: "any fall-
off from the income they would have received from their forests and 
lands if the Government had properly complied with the directives of 
the statutes and regulations, and (b) the value (or decrease in 
value) of thier property which is lost (or diminished in value) 
~hrough improper actions of Interior. But there can be no recovery 
'--
for other, consequential, 
might possibly recover 
indirect damages which a private cestui 
because of his trustee's derelictions." 
Further, the court found a right to recover damages for payment of a 
less than optimal interest rate under 25 u.s.c. § 162a. 
In dissent, Judge Nichols argued that the United 
States had not consented to be sued for mismanagement of forest 
resources and rights-of-way. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that the Court of 
Claims' finding of liability marks a significant departure from the 
rule in Testan and Mitchell. Under Testan and Mitchell waivers of 
immunity must be unequivocal. None of the statutes relied upon by 
the Court of Claims expressly provides for maintenance of a damage 
suit. Although the allottees could sue for the proceeds of timber 
sales or the sales of rights-of-way under the statutes, there is no 
statutory basis for a suit to recover proceeds that arguably should 
have been, but were not captured by the Secretary. Admittedly, the 
question is closer as to a right to recover damages for less payment 
of a less than optimal interest rate under 25 u.s.c. §162a. Yet the 
statute does not appear to compel a particular level of 
compensation. The allot tees could sue if the secretary retained 
interest actually earned, but the statute provides no right to 
recover a shortfall. 
Petr suggests that resp may seek declaratory, 
injunctive or mandamus relief against the Secretary. The mere fact 
that the statutes in this case place duties upon the Secretary does 
not provide the basis for a damages claim. The statute at issue in 
estan placed duties upon the government as well, but no damage 
claim was allowed. Moreover, it is relevant that when the statutes 
at issue in this case were adopted, Indian claimants were generally 
denied any monetary remedy against the United States. Finally, 
although the relationship between the Indian tribes and the United 
States is special, the requirement of unequivocal consent to suit 
against the u.s. is fully applicable to Indian claimants. See 
Klamath Indians v. United States, 296 u.s. 244 (1935). 
Resps track the Court of Claims opinion. They 
argue that the statutory scheme requires the Secretary to pay the 
proceeds of timber sales to the allot tees. This obligation, in 
context, "cannot fairly be read otherwise than to mandate the 
payment of those proceeds that will be produced by prudent 
management in accordance with statutory guidelines." It is clear 
that the Secretary has a duty of prudent management. It is 
inconceivable that Congress did not intend a damages remedy. 
Moreover, Testan does not dictate a different result. Unlike the 
situation in Testan or Mitchell I in this acase a special trust 
relationship has been created. 
4. DISCUSSION: I tend to a grant. Because of 
the ~ecial trust relationship, the decision below may not be 
/ 
inconsistent with Testan. Yet in the circulating opinion in Army & 
Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan, 80-1437, Testan is said to 
require the explicit authorization of damages awards. ("As Tes tan 
makes clear, jurisdiction over respondent's complaint cannot be 
premised on the asserted violation of regulations that do not 
specifically authorize awards of money damages." Page 11.) The 
tatutes here do not expressly authorize damages awards. 
There is a response. 
05/20/82 Levi Op. in petn. 
Court ................... . l-•oted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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81-1748 United States v. Mitchell 
MEMO TO FILE: 
This is the second time this case has been here. 
In 19 8 0 , 4 4 5 U • S . 5 3 5 , we rever sed the Co u r t of C 1 aims . 
This litigation, conducted since 1971, is a consolidated 
suit by some 1,400 Indians 
~--~--~ - who own interests in land 
allotments on the former reservation of the Quiault tribe 
(Pacific Northwest) • These allotments - about 80 acres -each and heavily timbered commenced in 1905. Each 
allottee received a deed containing the promise of the 
U.S. that it would hold the allotment "in trust for the 
sole use and benefit of the Indian" or his heirs. The 
~cu./=:i-
~s were so heavily timbered that farming or grazing was 
rarely possible. As a result of sales and large families, 
the reservation today is a "complex checkerboard of trust ---- """'-" .._, ... 
allotments and former trust allotments". 
In 1920, the government was authorized to sell 
timber from the allotted lands on long term, large volume 
contracts. There have been 14 such contracts, embracing 
many allotments in each. 
The Secretary of the Interior has exercised 
continuous control over the management and disposition of 
the lands and timber. Indeed, few of the Indians actually 
live on the allotted lands. Nor may an allotment owner 
-cut and sell timber without the prior permission of the 
Bureau of Indian Lands. 
It is alleged that, far from being a passive 
trust, the BIA has exercised pervasive and total control 
over the mangement and disposition of the allotted land 
and timber, and has done so for a fee. _ \ 
~~(~) 
This suit, that has involved extensive discover 
.--.,.. ~ 
depositions over many years, alleges various failures and 
neglects by the federal government, including 
-------------------mismanagement of the timber resources, failure to obtain 
fair market value for timber sold, etc. (See p. 5 of SG's 
brief) . 
"S ~ ~"/ T~!J. n the Court of Claims seeks damages 
for breach of trust. The suit is based on the statutes 
and regulation~ - dating back to 1873 - that provide for 
. -
the setting as ide of these lands and allotment to the 
individual Indians on the reservation. 
~ The respondents 
also rely on the Indian Tucker Act and on the Tucker Act 
itself. 
Question Presented 
The sole question - though framed differently by 
c-J-1 ~ the parties - is whether the u.s. is accountable in money 
~-~· damages for al~ed b~es ~~rust in connection with 
~ ~ its management of the timber on these allotted lands. 
~ The Court of Claims, to which we remanded this 
~~ case in 1980, again answered this question in the 
v1 affirmative. 
The SG's Argument 
In a long and repetitive brief, the SG fails -
as I view it now - to make an overwhelming argument for 
reversal. It concedes that the Court of Claims has 
jurisdiction, but says the statutory jurisdictional 
provisions do not "create any substantive right 
enforceable . against the u.s. They merely provide 
jurisdiction for the Court to hear such claims. u.s. v. 
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 and the earlier decision in this 
case, u.s. v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 538-540. The SG says: 
"The applicable rule is that where a claim for 
money damages is predicated upon an alleged 
statutory violation, a suit for damages may not 
be maintained against the U.S. unless the 
statute in question 'in itself ... can fairly 
be interpreted as mandating compensation by the 
federal government for the damages sustained'". 
Testan, at 402. 
The SG ~ argues that none of the statutes 
~-------------- ....__ 
relied on justifies the "inferring of a right of action" ------- -------...__. 
to recover damages for mismanagement. Then, emphasizing 
that surrender of sovereignty may not be implied and must 
' 
be expressly declared by Congress, the SG relies on 
several implied cause of action cases (e.g., Touche, Ross 
& Co.) for the settled proposition that absent an express 
damages remedy, courts must look to the intention of 
Congress. Since none of the statutes relied upon by 
plaintiffs expressly provide for a damages remedy, the SG 
says none may be inferred or implied. This will not leave 
the Indians remedyless, as they may have injunctive or 
declaratory relief though neither of these is 
specifically authorized. 
The Respondents' Brief 
My first reading leaves me under the impression 
that respondents may have the better of this case. At 
least, they have a stronger brief in addition to the 
opinion of the Court of Claims en bane. Respondents also .. v 
rely on u.s. v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 401-402 in which we 
' • 
said that' a cause of action for money damages does not lie 
unless its basis "in itself can fairly be 
interpreted as mandating compensation by the federal 
government for the damages sustained". (Br., p. 11) 
Thus, according to respondent "a waiver of 
federal sovereign immunity will be deemd to have occurred 
where the constitutional, statutory or regulatory basis of 
a claim against the United States 'can fairly be 
interpreted as mandating compensation • . • for the damage 
sustained'". 
Relying of the "many federal statutes for 
regulations governing the management and sale of Indian 
timber trusts resources", it is argued that they must be 
construed as "mandating compensation for damages incurred 
as a result of the government's mismanagement and waste of 
such trust resources". 
Testan is thus relied upon as making clear that 
an express authorization of a damage remedy is not 
required where the statutory framework may be construed as 
"mandating compensation". This is said to be appropriate 
in this case because of the statutes and regulations that 
impose such positive duties upon the government as trustee 
for the Indian owners. 
In our 1980 Mitchell I decison we reversed a 
ruling of the Court of Claims favorable to the Indians, 
holding (i) that the General Allotment Act "created only a 
limited trust relationship between the u.s. and the 
allottee that does not impose any duty upon the government 
to manage timber resources"; (ii) that the Act should not 
be read as authorizing, much less requiring, the 
government to manage timber resources for the benefit of 
the Indian allottees", and (iii) that "any right of the 
respondents to recover money damages for government 
mismanage of timber resources must therefore be found in 
some source other than the General Allotment Act". See 
respondents brief, p. 9, 10. Brennan, Marshall and 
Stevens dissented. 
Subject to reading Mitchell I (that is not at 
all clear in my memory), I judge that it focused on what 
the General Allotment Act required, rather than the 
broader question presented in this case. In any event, on 
remand, the Court of Claims by a 6-1 vote held (a) that 
the federal Indian timber management statutes and 
regulations imposed specific fiduciary duties on the U.S. 
in connection with the sale and management of Indian land, 
timber of funds held in trust; and (b) that those statute 
and regulations mandate compensation for damages sustained 
as a result of the government's breach of its prescribed 
duties; and that under the Tucker Act and the Indian 
Tucker Act, the Court of Claims had jurisdiction to 
adjudicate these claims. 
* * * 
The foregoing is dictated in our apartment with 
only the briefs before me. I need to read Testan and 
Mitchell I, and perhaps other decisions. Nor do I have 
clearly in mind the provisions of all of the statutes and 
regulations relied upon. I do have the impression, 
however, that the United States certainly occupied a 
substantial position of trust, that the individual Indians 
' ~--------------
- apart from their lack of sophistication and education -
could not manage successfully these 80-acre parcels 
scattered about the reservation. Thus, not only the 
statutes but the practical situation seem to require that 
the government exercise reasonable care in managing the 
property of these individual Indians. A failure to 
exercise such care normally gives rise to a damage remedy, 
particularly where no other remedy seems available. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
~~ z.-jzff 4~ ~, 
~~:a.~~~~ 
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BOBTAIL l3E'NdH MEMORANDUM k -
No. 81-1748 ~~ 
United States v. Mitchell 
March 1,1983 
I. Question Presented 
Is the U.S. accountable in money damages for alleged breaches 
of trust in connection with its management of forest resources situ-
ated on allotted lands of the Quinault Indian Reservation? 
L. • 
I I. .Facts 
The Quinault Reservation was established in 1873. The Reserva-
tion is heavily forested. In 1905, the federal government began to 
allot the Reservation to individual Indians. Each allottee received 
a deed, signed in t ,he name of the President, c~mise 
that the United States would hold the allotment "in trust for the 
sole use and benefit of the Indian .•. or, in the case of his decease, 
of his heirs ...• " 
The Secretary of the Interior was first authorized to approve 
the sale by the allottee of timber on any Indian land "held under a 
trust or other patent containing restrictions on alienations." 
Since 1934, Congress has required the Interior Department to adhere 
to the principles of sustained-yield forestry on all Indian forest 
lands under its supervision. And since 1964, Congress has directed 
ID to consider the state of growth of the timber and the present and 
future financial needs of the allottee and his heirs in making his 
decisions respecting timber sales. The ID is authorized to deduct 
an administrative fee for his services from the timber revenues paid 
out to the Indian allottees, and under this statutory authority, the 
ID has developed a detailed set of regulations governing sale and 
harvesting of Indian timber, and has the power to exercise day-to-
day supervision over the harvesting and management of timber. 
, j 
III. Proceedings Below 
In 1971, resps, individual Indians owning interests in the 
\.._.._...: 
allottments, brought actions for damages from the u.s. for the al-
leged mismanagement of timber resources on the allottments. Specif-





market value for timber sold~ {ii) failed to manage timber on a 
sustained-yield basis~ {iii) failed to obtain payment for some mer-
chantable timber~ {iv) failed to develop a proper system of roads 
and easements, and exacted improper charges from allottees for 
roads~ ~ failed to pay interest on certain funds~ ~ paid insuf-
ficient interest on certain funds~ and ~ exacted excessive ad-
ministrative fees from allottees. In 1979, the Ct. of Claims ruled 
·~ 
that the General Allotment Act of 1887, by itself, was a sufficient -basis to warrant its exercise of jurisdiction over r e sps' money dam-
ages claims for breach of trust. 
ftv-N This Court reversed, holding { i) that .• th :_ 4e~neral Allotment Ac~ ) 
~ v... 14 SD "created only a limited trust relationship between the United States 
~nd the allottee that does not impose any duty upon the Government 
to manage timber resources," 445 u.s., at 542~ {ii) that the Act 
"should not be read as authorizing, much less requiring, the Govern-
ment to manage timber resources for the benefit of Indian 
allottees," id., at 545~ and {iii) that "[a]ny right of the respond-
ents to recover money damages for Government mismanagement of timber 
resources must [therefore] be found in some source other than that 
Act," id., at 546. The Court expressly declined to address the 
issue whether the Government, as trustee, is accountable in damages 
for breaches of trust. Id., at 542. On remand, in its 1981 Mitch-
ell decision, the Ct. of Claims, held {i) that the federal Indian C:f-
timber management statutes, and regulations promulgated pursuant ~ ---
thereto, impose specific fiduciary duties upon the u.s. in connec-
tion with the management of Indian land, timber, and funds held in 
trust by the U.S.~ {ii) that those statutes and regulations mandate 
4. 
compensation for damages sustained as a result of the Government's 
breach of those duties; and (iii) that, under the Tucker Act and the 
Indian Tucker Act, the Ct. of Claims has jurisdiction to adjudicate 
such claims. 
IV. Summary of the Parties' Contentions 
1. Petr. The Ct. of Claims has jurisdiction under the Tucker 
Acts over individual claims for money damages founded upon an "Act 
II rr-:~~ . 1 • • d h of Congress. TheseA]urisdictiona provisions o not, owever, ere-
ate any substantive right enforceable against the U.S. They merely 
~ 
provide jurisdictibn for the court to hear such claims "whenever the ______________. 
substantive right exists." Mitchell, 445 U.S., at 538-540; United 
States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). The applicable rule is 
that where a claim for money damages is predicated upon an alleged 
statutory violation, a suit for damages may not be maintained 
against the u.s. unless the statute in question "in itself ... can 
'--
by the Federal Gov-
ernment for the damage sustained." 424 u.s., at 402. 
None of the statues from which the Ct. of Claims inferred a 
right of action to recover against the u.s. for alleged mismanage-
ment of Indian forest resources and their proceeds reflects the nee-
essary legislative mandate for the availability of the damages reme-
dy. It may be correct that a statute vesting an individual with an 
absolute right to recieve a sum certain from the u.s. grounds an 
action for at least the sum withheld in the event of nonpayment. 
Resps' claims, however, do not rest upon any such statute, and the 




statute that does not in terms create any right to payment of money 
nonetheless may support a damage action against the U.S. 
/~ Nothing in this Court's decisions respecting the special rela-
5 (? ~--------------
~tionship.between the u.s. and the Indian tribes supports creating a 
presumpt1ve monetary liability for statutory violations in Indian 
cases. The Court has on many occasions characterized the special 
relationship as a "fiduciary" or "trust" relationship, but nothing 
in this trust relationship can constitute the "affirmative statutory 
authority" necessary to maintain an action against the U.S. for the 
recovery of damages. See United States v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940). The Court has never invoked 
this doctrine to suggest that the u.s. is answerable in money dam-
ages for breaches of the standards applicable to a private fiducia-
ry. --~ ;;;Z) / r l 
B. ~ I~estan, 424 U.S., at 401-402, the Court stated: 
"Where the Unrted States is the defendant and the plain-
tiff is not suing for money improperly exacted or re-
tained, the basis of the federal claim--whether it be the 
Constitution, a statute, or a regulation--does not create 
'-\T" -a cause of action for money damages nunless, as the Court 
of Clai~ ha~ sta£ed, that 6as1s '1n 1tse!Y ... can fairly 
be !nterg~eted as mandating compensation by the Federal 
Gover~Ht==tor tne damages susfa1ned. '" "" 
----~ 
Thus, a waiver of federal sovereign immunity will be deemed to have 
occurred where the statutory basis of a claim against the U.S. "can 
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Gov-
ernment for damage sustained." The many federal statutes and regu-
lations governing the management and sale of Indian timber trust 
resources--which expressly mandate that such management and sale be 
conducted so as to convert the Indians' trust property into its full 
monetary equivalent for the benefit of the Indians and that the pro-
tl • 
ceeds of such sales be paid to them or used for their benefit--
cannot fairly be construed otherwise than as "mandating compensa-
tion" for damages incurred as a result of the Government's misman-
agement and waste of such trust resources. 
It is not required, as the Government suggests, that Congress 
have specifically contemplated and approved a suit for damages. It 
is enough that Congress intended that the beneficiaries be entitled 
to the payment of money. Given that, a suit for damages lies under 
the Tucker Act. 
Moreover, consistent with this Court's rulings in Testan and 
Mitchell I, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction to entertain and 
rule upon resps' claims because of the express trust relationships 
that the Congress has established between the u.s. and resps. Con-
gressional establishment of those relationships and the imposition, 
by statute and by regulation, of specific management responsibil-
ities upon the u.s. as trustee constituted a waiver of federal sov-
ereign immunity from suit for money damages in the event of the Gov-
ernment's breach of its trust responsibilities. The court below 
also had jurisdiction over these claims by virtue of (i) the fact 
that resps' claims are equivalent to claims for "money improperly 
exacted or retained," or (ii) the express and implied contractual 
relationships that the u.s. has entered into with resps concerning 
the timber resources. 
~IV. Discussion 
Mitchell and make clear that §~1 does not waive the 
. ~ . U.S.'s sovere1gn 1mmun1ty and that §1505 "no more confers a substan-
---------------------~ tive right against the United States to recover money damages than 
• • I~. •_/1 
I • 
does 28 u.s.c. 1491." Mitchell I, 445 U.S., at 538-540. Therefore, 
the Tucker Acts do not create any rights, but only provide jurisdic-
tion for other statutes that create the substantive right against 
the U.S. for "actual, presently due money damages." United States 
v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 3 (1969). The principle that governs claims 
for damages resting upon an alleged statutory violation was stated 
in Testan: No waiver of immunity will be found unless the particular 
statute "in itself ... can fairly be interpreted as mandating compen-
sation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained." 424 
U.S., at 402. 
The SG seeks to add a third requirement: • whether Congress in-, 
tended to permit suits to secure "compensation ••• for the damage sus-
tained." There is some basis for this. Some statutes mandating 
compensation expressly bar judicial review. See 38 u.s.c. §2ll(a) 
(veterans' benefits). In other cases, Congress may provide alterna-
tive remedies. See Nichols v. United States, 74 u.s. (7 Wall.) 122 
(1868). But, contrary to the SG's argument, the strong presumption 
'---
has to be that, where the statute mandates compensation, the claim---ant has an action against the u.s. for nonpayment, even if the stat-
ute does not expressly provide for the institution of litigation. 
The issue here is whether resps have a statutory right to payment of 
money by the U.S. 
A. Timber Management Statutes. The monetary character of a 
statutory right is a strong indication that a statute "in 
itself ..• can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation ... for 
the damages sustained." Ibid. Where the duties imposed by a stat-
ute are not essentially monetary in character, but require implemen-
tl • 
tation through conduct by federal officials, the contrary inference 
arises: that Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, creat-
ed only a substantive right enforceable through injunctive relief. 
Id., at 403. This distinction is reflected in Testan in the Court's 
recognition that where suit is maintained to require the u.s. to 
disgorge a claimant's "money improperly exacted or retained," the 
statutory predicate need not specify that a right of action for dam-
ages is created. 424 U.S., at 401. It should be emphasized, howev-
er, that the inquiry is not whether the ultimate value to resps of 
the duties imposed is financial, but whether Congress imposed a duty 
to pay money upon the u.s. 
It '' '" ,., L:":'\ The timber sale and management statutes, 25 u.s.c. ~ 407 & ,.  ,, 
466 are monetary in character. 
~ ~ ----;. 
Although nothing in these provisions 
--expressly consents to maintenance of suits against the u.s. for re-
covery of damages incurred through improvident federal management on 
Indian timber lands, §406 does authorize the sale of timber on al-
lotted Indian lands by the allottee, and §407 provides that the pro 
ceeds of such sales shall be used for the benefit of resps. It 
seems clear that these provisions would ground an action to compel 
theJ.rt·~sgorge unlawfully retained proceeds. See Testan, 424 
U.S., at 401 ("money wrongfully exacted or retained"). There is 
........ 
little basis, however, for extending that remedy to proceeds that -arguably could have been captured, but were not, by the ID. There 
------------------------is no indic~tion in the legislative history of the Act of June 25, 
--.:::::;:::• ~ 
1910 that Congress meant to consent to suit for mismanagement of 
- :::::::c:: ....... c: -::: -
Indian timber resources by enacting these provisions. 
':1. 
In 1964, the timber sale statutes were amended so as to direct 
~ 
the Secretary to adhere to principles of sustained-yield management 
on tribal lands, to permit the deduction of administrative fees by 
the ID from the proceeds of timber sales, and to prescribe a gener-
alized standard to guide the Secretary in determining whether to 
authorize sale of timber on allotted lands. While Congress clearly 
imposed certain duties on u.s. officials, the statutes do not man-
c=c --~------~------
date compensation for violation of those duties. See H.R. Resp. No. 
~ -----------------
1292, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964) (stating that "[n]o additional 
expenditure of Federal funds" was expected to be incurred by reason 
of the enactment of the legislation). 
Section 466 merely requires the ID to "make rules and regula-
tions for the operation and management of Indian forestry units on 
the principle of sustained-yield management." Here, there is simply 
no statutory directive to pay compensation. 
B. Road Building Statutes. Section 318a merely authorizes 
appropriations for building of roads on Indian reservations. Sec-
tions 323 through 325 empower the ID to grant rights-of-way over 
tribal and individual lands subject to the requirement that there be 
paid to the Secretary "such compensation as the Secretary .•. shall 
determine to be just," with the proceeds to be disposed of under the 
Secretary's regs. This provision would ground an action 
l I ~· proceeds of a right-of-way sale wrongfully withheld from 
to reco~er J '~ 
the Ind1ans (}-
over whose lands it was granted, but it does not permit damages for~ 
failure to secure more generous compensation, particularly given 
that the Secretary determines the amount of statutory compensation. 
And there is even less basis for inferring from those statutes, as 
.LU. 
did the Ct. of Claims, a right to recover damages for the 
Secretary's alleged failure to plan and build an optimal road net-
work, or properly to maintain rights of way. 
C. Interest Statute. Section 162a does not compel a particu-
lar level of compensation, but rather affords the Secretary substan-
tial discretion respecting the investments to be made with individ-
ual Indian funds. There is nothing in the statute that requires 
payment of a particular rate of interest. It is difficult to con-
elude that Congress has consented to pay damages for any amount by~ 
which the revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable / 
for the Indians the best rate." 
Resps argue that congressional establishment 
of an · st relationship constitutes a waiver of sovereign 
immunity from suit for money damages when the U.S. breaches its 
trust duties. It is true that the relationship between the U.S. and 
Indians can be viewed as a trust relationship, but it is more diffi-
cult to argue that the duties imposed by the statutes are trust du-
~ ~ 
ties. Section 406 and 407, for example, apply to more than Indian 
lands held in trust. In any case, the inquiry remains whether the 
statutes setting up any trust each "in itself ..• can fairly be inter-
preted as mandating compensation." A review of the individual stat-
~.J-utes, supra, shows that the u.s. has not consented to suit for dam-
~- ages in its mismanagement of the trust. 
~ '-E. Tucker A~Resps also argue that, when the U.S. assumes 
~complete control over an Indian's trust property and, in the exer-
cise of such control, sells the property for less than its value, or 





equivalent of the U.S. improperly 'taking from" the cestui, and the 
U.S. may be sued under the Tucker Act for such loss. For many of 
resps' claims, the retention or exaction would be of property, not 
of money, and again, resps' claims fail for lack of a statutory 
basis that establishes the wrongfulness of an exaction or nonpayment 
of money. The allegation of a violation of a non-monetary duty is ' -----------~~====~ 
insufficient to render all of resps' claims ones for money improper-
ly exacted or retained. Resps might ~ allege an unconstitution-
al taking, and thus come within the Fifth Amendment's self-executing 
right to recover damages against the U.S. under the Tucker Act. See 
Jacobs v. United States, 290 u.s. 13, 16 (1933). Resps have not 
suggested, however, that they could make such a demonstration, and 
thus their statutory "taking" theory for the most part has little 
meri~/f">'/ ~ 




In addition to alleging certain breaches of duty, 
tha<I{he u.s. failed to pay interest on certain funds 
_, \Y . 
~and exacted excessive administrative fees from allottees. The SG 
e assume that an a~tion to recover unlawfully high ad--ministrative fees may be maintained against the United States as one 
seeking recovery of 'money improperly exacted or retained.'" He 
also concedes that "failure to apply to the resps' account interest 
f( \~ 
monies actually earned~would likely give rise to a right to redress 
in damages on the theory respondents' fund had been 'wrongfully re-
~ 
tained. '" I think these claims must be recognized. The SG concedes ~ 
the va~y ;:._. t~l~ !<;.gfee ::J, but disputes the one for inter-
est. It appears to me that the SG understands resps to be making 
.LL: • 
. / 
only a claim for inadequate ~~terest; I understand them to making 
the additional argument of/ o interes~ /3!/1 'I-~~ 
F. Express Contract. The contracti authorize the BIA "to per-
form every act necessary and requisite to the consummation of [the 
sale of timber on resps' lands]." The resps also agreed that the 
proceeds would be disposed of in accordance with ID regulations, 
"including those providing for the payment of the cost of adminis-
tration." These grants of power impose some duty, not only to enter 
into the contract, but to administer it. The Ct. of Claims dis-
ll ~ 
missed this argument, stating that the powers of attorney do not -------=---
contain any express commitments against mismanagement in exercising 
---r 
the powers. I have some problem saying that there are not commit-
ments against mismanagement implied in an agency relationship, and 
once there is a contractual duty, it may be necessary to say that 
damages are av-ailable. This conclusion might follow from the fact 
that damages from contracts are different from damages grounded on a 
statute. More likely, it follows from the fact that the statutes 
that permit the BIA to receive the powers of attorney from resps 
contemplate the payment of money. In that case, it would be helpful 
to know whether the U.S. is authorized in this case to sell the tim-
ber pursuant to I am unable to tell from the 
briefs, the authorization, or Mitchell I. If under (c), I think 
""-7 :;z. resps probably have an action for failure to obtain a fair market \ V 
value for timber sold and for failure to obt~in payment for some 
merchantable timber. Otherwise, I think the express contract theory 
doe; ~Jt hel~ p. 
'' 
.L.). 
The timber sales contracts run between resps and the loggers, 
hence they are not enforceable against the · U.S. in the Ct. of 
Claims. 
G. Implied Contract. Resps argue that the express contracts, 
the trust relationship, and the statutory duties impose a implied-
in-fact contract, but I think their argument is more that there is 
an implied-in-law contract. Such a contract may not be inferred 
from the terms of the pertinent statutes and regulations. See Army 
& Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan, 50 U.S.L.W. 4563, 4565 
(June 1, 1982). Statutes and regulations also do not create an 
implied-in-fact contract. Ibid. 
VI. Summary 
I think this is a hard case. The implied causes of action can-
not be supported under Testan. The trust theory is harder to re-
fute, but Testan and Sheehan make clear that there is no cause of 
action except where the regulations or law "specifically authorize 
awards of money 
the case here. 
damages." Ibid. I am unable to say that this is 
The ~tract theories~e without merit, unless it 
--:::::::::: 
can be determined that the powers of attorney were granted to the 
Secr~tajy under §406 (c), in which case I would be ~-!-~_l in~~ay 
i~ . . . 
tnat resps could collect for mismanagement in the sale of merchant- :? 
,~4~.--------------~~~----------~, 
able timber · and for failure to obtain fair market value for timber 
~
sold. Resps also should be able to sue under the Tucker Acts for 
fL) excessive : anag = t fees and f:;-~Jlterest under the theory that 
~ A 
such money is unlawfully retained. 
~----------------------
I recommend affirming in part and reversing in part. 
~ 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
81-1748 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. 
HELEN MITCHELL ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1983] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The principal question in this case is whether the United 
States is accountable in money damages for alleged breaches 
of trust in connection with its management of forest re-
sources on allotted lands of the Quinault Indian Reservation. 
I 
A 
In the 1850s, the United States undertook a policy of re-
moving Indian tribes from large areas of the Pacific North-
west in order to facilitate the settlement of non-Indians. 1 
Pursuant to this policy, the first Governor and Superintend-
ent of Indian Affairs of the Washington Territory began ne-
gotiations in 1855 with various tribes living on the west coast 
of t~e Territory. The negotiations culminated in a treaty 
bet\Veen the United States and the Quinault and Quileute 
Tribes, 12 Stat. 971 (Treaty of Olympia). In the Treaty the 
Indians ceded to the United States a vast tract of land on the 
Olympic Peninsula in the State of Washington, and the 
'See Act of June 5, 1850, 9 Stat. 437; Appropriation Act of March 3, 
1853, 10 Stat. 226, 238; Quinault Allottee Association v. United States, 202 
Ct. Cl. 625, 62S-269, 485 F. 2d 1391, 1392 (1973), cert. denied 416 U. S. 961 
(1974). 
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United States agreed to set aside a reservation for the 
Indians. 
In 1861 a reservation of about 10,000 acres was provision-
ally chosen for the tribes. 2 This tract proved undesirable 
because of its limited size and heavy forestation. The Qui-
nault Agency superintendent subsequently recommended 
that since the coastal tribes drew their subsistence almost en-
tirely from the water, 3 they should be collected on a reserva-
tion suitable for their fishing needs. Acting on this sugges-
tion, President Grant issued an order on November 4, 1873, 
designating about 200,000 acres along the Washington coast 
as an Indian reservation. 4 The vast bulk of this land con-
sisted of rain forest covered with huge, coniferous trees. 
In 1905 the Federal Government began to allot the Qui-
nault Reservation in trust to individual Indians under the 
General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as 
amended, 25 U. S. C. § 331 et seq. 5 See also the Quinault 
Allotment Act of March 4, 1911, 36 Stat. 1345. The Govern-
ment initially determined that the forested areas of the Res-
ervation were not to be alloted because they were not suit-
able for agriculture or grazing. In 1924, however, this 
Court concluded that the character of lands to be set apart for 
2 See Halbert v. United States, 283 U. S. 753, 757 (1931). 
3 See generally United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 350-353 
(WD Wash. 1974), affd, 520 F. 2d 676 (CA91975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 
1086 (1976) (describing pre-Treaty role of fishing among Northwest 
Indians). 
• Executive Order, I C. Kappler, Indian Affairs 923 (2d ed. 1904). The 
Order declared that the reservation would be held for the use of the Qui-
nault, Quileute, Hoh, Queets, "and other tribes of fish-eating Indians on 
the Pacific Coast." Ibid. 
• Section 5 of the Act provided that the United States would hold the 
allotted land for 25 years "in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian 
to whom such allotment shall have been made." The period during which 
the United States was to hold the allotted land was extended indefinitely 
by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 2, 48 Stat. 984, 25 
u. s. c. § 462. 
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the Indians was not restricted by the General Allotment Act. 
United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446, 449 (1924). There-
after, the forested lands of the Reservation were allotted. 
By 1935 the entire Reservation had been divided into 2,340 
trust allotments, most of which were 80 acres of heavily tim-
bered land. About a third of the Reservation has since gone 
out of trust, but the bulk of the land has remained in trust 
status. 6 
The forest resources on the allotted lands have long been 
managed by the Department of the Interior, which exercises 
"comprehensive" control over the harvesting of Indian tim-
ber. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 
136, 145 (1980). The Secretary of the Interior has broad 
statutory authority over the sale of timber on reservations. 
See 25 U. S. C. § § 405--407. Sales of timber "must be based 
upon a consideration of the needs and best interests of the In-
dian owner and his heirs," §406(a), and the proceeds from 
such sales are to be used for the benefit of the Indians or 
transferred to the Indian owner, §§ 406(a), 407. Congress 
has directed the Secretary to adhere to principles of sus-
tained-yield forestry on all Indian forest lands under his su-
pervision. 25 U. S. C. § 466. Under these statutes, the 
Secretary has promulgated detailed regulations governing 
the management of Indian timber. 25 CFR Part 163 (1982). 
The Secretary is authorized to deduct an administrative fee 
for his services from the timber revenues paid to Indian allot-
tees. 25 U. S. C. §§ 406(a), 413. 
B 
The respondents are 1,465 individuals owning interests in 
allotments on the Quinault Reservation, an unincorporated 
association of Quinault Reservation allottees, and the Qui-
nault Tribe, which now holds some portions of the allotted 
6 See Mitchell v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 95, 97, 591 F . 2d 1300, 
1300-1301 (1979). 
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lands. In 1971 respondents filed four actions that were con-
solidated in the Court of Claims. Jurisdiction was based on 
28 U. S. C. §§ 1491 and 1505. Respondents sought to re-
cover damages from the United States based on allegations of 
pervasive waste and mismanagement of timber lands on the 
Quinault Reservation. More specifically, respondents 
claimed that the Government (1) failed to obtain a fair market 
value for timber sold; (2) failed to manage timber on a sus-
tained-yield basis; (3) failed to obtain any payment at all for 
some merchantable timber; (4) failed to develop a proper 
system of roads and easements for timber operations and ex-
acted improper charges from allottees for maintenance of 
roads; (5) failed to pay any interest on certain funds from tim-
ber sales held by the Government and paid insufficient inter-
est on other funds; and (6) exacted excessive administrative 
fees from allottees. Respondents assert that the alleged 
misconduct constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty owed 
them by the United States as trustee under various statutes. 
Six years after the suits were filed, the United States 
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the 
Court of Claims had no authority over claims based on a 
breach of trust. The court denied the motion, holding that 
the General Allotment Act created a fiduciary duty on the 
United States' part to manage the timber resources properly 
and thereby provided the necessary authority for recovery of 
damages against the United States. 219 Ct. Cl. 95, 591 
F. 2d 1300 (1979) (en bane). 
In United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980), this 
Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Claims, stating that 
the General Allotment Act "created only a limited trust rela-
tionship between the United States and the allottees that 
does not impose any duty upon the Government to manage 
timber resources." Id., at 542. We concluded that "[a]ny 
right of the respondents to recover money damages for Gov-
ernment mismanagement of timber resources must be found 
in some source other than [the General Allotment] Act." 
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I d., at 546. Since the Court of Claims had not considered 
respondents' assertion that other statutes render the United 
States answerable in money damages for the alleged misman-
agement in this case, we remanded the case for consideration 
of these alternative grounds for liability. See id., at 546, 
n. 7. 
On remand, the Court of Claims once again held the United 
States subject to suit for money damages on most of respond-
ents' claims. -- Ct. Cl. --, 664 F. 2d 265 (1981) (en 
bane). The court ruled that the timber management stat-
utes, 25 U. S. C. §§406, 407, and 466, various federal stat-
utes governing road building and rights of way, §§ 318 and 
323-325, statutes governing Indian funds and government 
fees, §§ 162a and 413, and regulations promulgated under 
these statutes imposed fiduciary duties upon the United 
States in its management of forested allotted lands. The 
court concluded that the statutes and regulations implicitly 
required compensation for damages sustained as a result of 
the Government's breach of its duties. Thus, the Court held 
that respondents could proceed on their claims. 
Because the decision of the Court of Claims raises issues of 
substantial importance concerning the liability of the United 
States, 7 we granted the Government's petition for certiorari. 
- U. S. - (1982). We affirm. 
II 
Respondents have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, and its 
counterpart for claims brought by Indian tribes, 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1505, known as the Indian Tucker Act. 8 The Tucker Act 
states in pertinent part: 
7 The Government has informed us that the damages claimed in this suit 
alone may amount to $100 million. Pet. for Cert. 24. 
8 Section 24 of the Indian Claims Commission Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1505, 
provides tribal claimants the same access to the Court of Claims provided 
6 
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"The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render 
judgment upon any claim against the United States 
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Con-
gress, or any regulation of an executive department, or 
upon any express or implied contract with the United 
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in 
cases not sounding in tort." 28 U. S. C. § 1491. 
It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued 
without its consent and that the existence of consent is a pre-
requisite for jurisdiction. 9 The terminology employed in 
some of our prior decisions has unfortunately generated some 
confusion as to whether the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver 
of sovereign immunity. The time has come to resolve this 
confusion. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude 
that by giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction over specified 
types of claims against the United States, 10 the Tucker Act 
constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to 
those claims. 
A 
Before 1855 no general statute gave the consent of the 
United States to suit on claims for money damages; the only 
recourse available to private claimants was to petition Con-
gress for relief. 11 In order to relieve the pressure caused by 
the volume of private bills and to avoid the delays and ineq-
uities of the private bill procedure, Congress created the 
to individual claimants by 28 U. S. C. § 1491. See United States v. Mitch-
ell, 445 U. S. 535, 538-540 (1980). 
9 See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941); 14 C. 
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice And Procedure§ 3654, at 
156-157 (1976). 
10 The Tucker Act provided concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts 
over claims not exceeding $10,000. See 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(2). 
11 See P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System 98 (2d ed. 1973); Richardson, History, Ju-
risdiction, and Practice of the Court of Claims, 17 Ct. Cl. 3, 3-4 (1882). 
81-1748-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL 7 
Court of Claims. Act of February 24, 1855, c. 122, 10 Stat. 
612. The 1855 Act empowered that court to hear claims and 
report its findings to Congress and to submit a draft of a pri-
vate bill in each case which received a favorable decision. 
§ 7, 10 Stat. 613. The limited powers initially conferred upon 
the court failed to relieve Congress from "the laborious ne-
cessity of examining the merits of private bills." Glidden 
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 553 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, 
J.). Thus, in his State of the Union Message of 1861, Presi-
dent Lincoln recommended that the court be authorized to 
render final judgments. He declared that it is "as much the 
duty of Government to render prompt justice against itself, 
in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between 
private individuals." Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., 
app. 2 (1862). Congress adopted the President Lincoln's rec-
ommendation and made the court's judgments final. Act of 
March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765. 12 
In 1886 Representative John Randolph Tucker introduced 
a bill to revise in several respects the jurisdiction and proce-
dures of the Court of Claims and to replace most provisions of 
the 1855 and 1863 Acts. H. R. 6974, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1886). The House Judiciary Committee reported that the 
bill was a "comprehensive measure by which claims against 
the United States may be heard and determined." H. R. 
Rep. No. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1886). The measure 
was designed "to give the people of the United States what 
I 
12 Section 14 of the 1863 Act provided that "no money shall be paid out of 
the treasury for any claim passed upon by the court of claims till after an 
appropriation therefor shall be estimated for by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury." 12 Stat. 768. In Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561 (1864), this 
Court dismissed an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims for want 
of jurisdiction, holding that § 14 gave the Secretary a revisory authority 
over the court inconsistent with its exercise of judicial power. Congress 
promptly repealed the provision, Act of March 17, 1866, c. 19, § 1, 14 Stat. 
9. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 554 (1962) (opinion of Har-
lan, J.). 
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every civilized nation of the world has already done-the 
right to go into the courts to seek redress against the Govern-
ment for their grievances." 18 Cong. Rec. 2680 (1887) (re-
marks of Rep. Bayne). See id., at 622 (remarks of Rep. 
Tucker); id., at 2679 (colloquy between Reps. Tucker and 
Townshend); id., at 2680 (remarks of Rep. Holman). The 
eventual enactment thus "provide[d] for the bringing of suits 
against the Government of the United States." Act of 
M~ch 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505. 
/ The Indian Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1505, has a similar 
history. An early amendment to the original enactment 
creating the Court of Claims had excluded claims by Indian 
tribes. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 767. As a 
result, Congress eventually confronted a "vast and growing 
burden" resulting from the large number of tribes seeking 
special jurisdictional acts. H. R. Rep. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 
1st Sess. 6 (1945). Congress responded by conferring juris-
diction on the Court of Claims to hear any tribal claim "of a 
character which would be cognizable in the Court of Claims if 
the claimant were not an Indian tribe." Id., at 13. As the 
House sponsor of the Act stated, an important goal of the Act 
was to ensure that it would "never again be necessary to pass 
special Indian jurisdictional acts in order to permit the Indi-
ans to secure a court adjudication on any misappropriation of 
Indian funds or of any other Indian property by Federal offi-
cials that might occur in the future." 92 Cong. Rec. 5313 
(1946) (statement of Rep. Jackson). Indians were to be 
given "their fair day in court so that they can call the various 
Government agencies to account on the obligations that the 
Federal government assumed." Id., at 5312. 13 The House 
18 See 92 Cong. Rec. 5312 (statement of Rep. Jackson) ("The Interior De-
partment itself suggested that it ought not be in a position where its em-
ployees can mishandle funds and lands of a national trusteeship without 
complete accountability.") See also Hearings on H. R. 1198 and H. R. 
1341 before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 
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Report stressed the same point: "If we fail to meet these ob-
ligations by denying access to the courts when trust funds 
have been improperly dissipated or other fiduciary duties 
have been violated, we compromise the national honor of the 
United States." H. R. Rep. No. 1466, at 4. 
For decades this Court consistently interpreted the Tucker 
Act as having provided the consent of United States to be 
sued eo nomine for the classes of claims described in the Act. 
See, e. g., Shillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163, 16~167 
(1894); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 17 (1896); Dooley v. 
United States, 182 U. S. 222, 227-228 (1901); Reid v. United 
States, 211 U. S. 529, 538 (1909); United States v. Sherwood, 
312 U. S. 584, 590 (1940); Dalehite v. United States, 346 
U. S. 15, 25, n. 10 (1953); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 
270, 273 (1957). In at least two recent decisions this Court 
explicitly stated that the Tucker Act effects a waiver of sov-
ereign immunity. Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. 
Sheehan,-- U. S. -, -- (1982); Hatzlachh Supply Co. 
v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 466 (1980) (per curiam). 
These decisions confirm the umabiguous thrust of the history 
of the Act. 
The existence of a waiver is readily apparent in claims 
founded upon "any express or implied contract with the 
United States." 28 U. S. C. § 1491. The Court of Claims' 
jurisdiction over contract claims against the government has 
long been recognized, and government liability in contract is 
viewed as perhaps "the widest and most unequivocal waiver 
of federal immunity from suit." Developments in the Law-
Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 
Harv. L. Rev. 827, 876 (1957). See also 14 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3656, 
at 202 (1976). The source of consent for such suits unmistak-
ably lies in the Tucker Act. Otherwise, it is doubtful that 
any consent would exist, for no contracting officer or other 
130 (1945) (statement of Assistant Solicitor Cohen). 
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official is empowered to consent to suit against the United 
States. 14 The same is true for claims founded upon executive ~ 
regulations. Indeed, the Act makes absolutely no distinc-
tion between claims founded upon contracts and claims 
founded upon other specified sources of law. 
In United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 398, 400 (1976), 
and in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 538, this Court 
employed language suggesting that the Tucker Act does not 
effect a waiver of sovereign immunity. Such language was 
not necessary to the decision in either case. See infra, at 
11-12. Without in any way questioning the result in either 
case, we conclude that this isolated language should be disre-
garded. If a claim falls within the terms of the Tucker Act;l / 
the United States has presumptively consented to sui!J 
B 
It nonetheless remains true that the Tucker Act "'does not 
create any substantive right enforceable against the United 
States for money damages.'" United States v. Mitchell, 445 
U. S., at 538, quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U. S., at 
398. A substantive right must be found in some other source 
of law, such as "the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or 
any regulation of an executive department." 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1491. Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal 
statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act. 
The claim must be one for money damages against the United / 
States, see United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 2-3 (1969), 
and the claimant must demonstrate that the source of sub-
stantive law he relies upon "'can fairly be interpreted as 
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the 
damages sustained."' United States v. Testan, 424 U. S., at 
"See United States v. New York Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 
660 (1957); United States, v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495, 501 (1940); Carr v. 
United States, 98 U. S. 433, 438 (1879). 
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400, quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. 
Cl. 599, 607, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1009 (1967). 16 
For example, in United States v. Testan, supra, two gov-
ernment attorneys contended that they were entitled to a 
higher salary grade under the Classification Act, 16 and to an 
award of back pay under the Back Pay Act 17 for the period 
during which they were classified at a lower grade. This 
Court concluded that neither the Classification Act nor the 
Back Pay Act could fairly be interpreted as requiring com-
pensation for wrongful classifications. See 424 U. S., at 
39~07. Particularly in light of the "established rule that 
one is not entitled to the benefit of a position until he has 
been appointed to it," id., at 402, 18 the Classification Act does 
not support a claim for money damages. While the Back Pay l 
Act does provide a basis for money damages as a remedy "in 
carefully limited circumstances" such as wrongful reductions 
in grade, id., at 404, it does not apply to wrongful classifica-
tions. I d., at 405. 
Similarly, in United States v. Mitchell, supra, this Court 
concluded that the General Allotment Act does not confer a 
right to recover money damages against the United States. 
While § 5 of the Act provided that the United States would 
hold land "in trust" for Indian allottees, 25 U. S. C. § 348, we 
held that the Act creates only a limited trust relationship. 
445 U. S., at 542. The trust language of the Act does not 
impose !ny fiduciary management duties or render the 
United States answerable for breach thereof, but only pre-
vents improvident alienation of the allotted lands and assures 
15 As the Eastport decision recognized, the substantive source of law 
may grant the claimant a right to recover damages either "expressly or by 
implication.'1 I d., at 605; 372 F. 2d, at 1007. See also Ralston Steel Corp. 
v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 119, 125, 340 F. 2d 663, 667, cert. denied, 381 
u. s. 950 (1965). 
16 5 u. s. c. § 5101. 
17 5 u. s. c. § 5596. 
18 Citing United States v. McLean, 95 U. S. 750 (1878); Ganse v. United 
States, 180 Ct. Cl. 183, 186, 376 F. 2d 900, 902 (1967). 
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thefr immunity from state taxation. I d., at 544. 
/ Thus, for claims against the United States "founded either 
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regula-
tion of an executive department," 28 U. S. C. § 1491, a court 
must inquire whether the source of substantive law can fairly 
be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 
Government for the damages sustained. In undertaking this 
inquiry, ~court need not find a separate waiver of sovereign 
immunity in the substantive rovision ·ust as a court need 
no n consent to suit in "any express or implied contract 
with the United States." Ibid. The Tucker Act itself pro-
Vid¢ the necessary consent. 
v6f course, in determining the general scope of the Tucker 
Act, this Court has not lightly inferred the United States' / 
consent to suit. See United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4-5 v 
(1969) (Court of Claims lacks authority to issue declaratory 
judgment); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 276 
(1957) (non-tolling of limitations beyond statutory provi-
sions). For example, although the Tucker Act refers to 
claims founded upon any implied contract with the United 
States, we have held that the Act does not reach claims based 
on contracts implied in law, as opposed to those implied in 
fact. Merritt v. United States, 267 U. S. 338, 341 (1925). 
In this case, however, there is simply no question that the 
Tucker Act provides the United States' consent to suit for 
claims founded upon statutes or regulations that create sub-
stantive rights to money damages. If a claim falls within 
this category, the existence of a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity is clear. The question in this case is thus analytically 
distinct: whether the statutes or regulations at issue can be 
interpreted as requiring compensation. Because the Tucker 
Act supplies a waiver of immunity for claims of this nature, 
the separate statutes and regulations need not provide a sec-
ond waiver of sovereign immunity, nor need they be con-
strued in the manner appropriate to waivers of sovereign im-
munity. See United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty 
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Co., 237 U.S. 28,32 (1915). "'The exemption of the sover-
eign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has 
been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement 
of construction where consent has been announced.' " 
United States v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, 383 (1949), 
quoting Anderson v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N. Y. 
140, 147, 153 N. E. 28, 29--30 (1926) (Cardozo, J.). 19 
III 
Respondents have based their money claims against the 
United States on various Acts of Congress and executive de-
partment regulations. We begin by describing these sources 
of substantive law. We then examine whether they can 
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages 
sustained as a result of a breach of the duties they impose. 
A 
The Secretary of the Interior's pervasive role in the sales 
of timber from Indian lands began with the Act of June 25, 
1910, ch. 431, §§ 7-8, 36 Stat. 855, 857, as amended, 25 
U. S. C. §§ 406-407. Prior to that time, Indians had no right 
to sell timber on reservation land, 20 and there existed "'no 
general law under which authority for sale of timber on In-
dian lands, whether allotted or unallotted, can be granted."' 
H. R. Rep. No. 1135, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1910) (quoting 
letter of the Secretary of the Interior). Congress recognized 
that this situation was undesirable " 'because in many in-
stances the timber is the only valuable part of the allotment 
or is the only source from which funds can be obtained for the 
support of the Indian or the improvement of his allotment.' " 
Ibid. The 1910 Act empowered the Secretary to sell timber 
19 Cf. Block v. Neal,- U.S.-,- (1983); Indian Towing Co . v. 
United States, 350 U. S. 61, 69 (1955). 
00 See United States v. Cook, 19 Wall. 591 (1874); Pine River Logging 
Co. v. United States, 186 U. S. 279 (1902); 19 Op. Atty. Gen. 194 (1888). 
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on unallotted lands and apply the proceeds of the sales for the 
benefit of the Indians, § 7, and authorized the Secretary to 
consent to sales by allottees, with the proceeds to be paid to 
the allottees or disposed of for their benefit, § 8. Congress 
thus sought to provide for harvesting timber "in such a man-
ner as to conserve the interests of the people on the reserva-
tions, namely, the Indians." 45 Cong. Rec. 6087 (1910) (re-
marks of Rep. Saunders). 
From the outset, the Interior Department recognized its 
obligation to supervise the cutting of Indian timber. In 
1911, the Department's Office of Indian Affairs promulgated 
detailed regulations covering its responsibilities in "manag-
ing the Indian forests so as to obtain the greatest revenue for 
the Indians consistent with a proper protection and improve-
ment of the forests." Office of Indian Affairs, Regulations 
and Instructions for Officers in Charge of Forests on Indian 
Reservations 4 (1911). The regulations addressed virtually 
every aspect of forest management, including the size of 
sales, contract procedures, advertisements and methods of 
billing, deposits and bonding requirements, administrative 
fee deductions, procedures for sales by minors, allowable 
heights of stumps, tree marking and scaling rules, base and 
top diameters of trees for cutting, and the percentage of 
trees to be left as a seed source. I d., at S-28. The regula-
tions applied to allotted as well as tribal lands, and the Secre-
tary's approval of timber sales on allotted lands was explicitly 
conditioned upon compliance with the regulations. !d., at 9. 
Over time, deficiencies in the Interior Department's per-
formance of its responsibilities became apparent. Accord-
ingly, as part of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, c. 
576, 484 Stat. 984, Congress imposed even stricter du · 
upon the Government with respect to Indian timber 
ment. In § 6 of the Act, now codified as 25 U. S. 
Congress expressly directed that the Interior DeparNllt!Ilr..-
manage Indian forest resources "on the principle of sus-
tained-yield management." Representative Howard, co-
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sponsor of the Act and Chairman of the House Committee on 
Indian Affairs, explained that the purpose of the provision 
was "to assure a proper and permanent management of the 
Indian Forest" under modern sustained-yield methods so as 
to "assure that the Indian forests will be permanently pro-
ductive and will yield continuous revenues to the tribes." 78 
Cong. Rec. 11730 (1934). See United States v. Anderson, 
625 F. 2d 910, 915 (CA9 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 920 
(1981). Referrin to the en the In i 
and the Government as 
Howard stated t a t e a1 ure o e1r governmental 
guardian to conserve the Indians' land and assets and the 
consequent loss of income or earning power, has been the 
principal cause of the present plight of the Indian." 78 
Cong. Rec., at 11726.21 
Regulations promulgated under the Act required the pres-
ervation of Indian forest lands in a perpetually productive 
state, forbade the clear-cutting of large contiguous areas, 
called for the development of long-term working plans for all 
major reservations, required adequate provision for new 
growth when mature timber was removed, and required the 
regulation of run-off and the minimization of erosion. 22 The 
regulatory scheme was designed to assure that the Indians 
receive "the benefit of whatever profit [the forest] is capable 
of yielding." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 
U. S., at 149 (quoting 25 CFR § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)). 
21 John Collier, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and a principal author 
of the Act, had testified that 
"there must be a constructive handling of Indian timber. We have got to 
stop the slaughtering of Indian timber lands, to operate them on a perpet-
ual yield basis and the bill expressly directs that this principle of conserva-
tion shall be applied throughout." 
Hearings on H. R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 35 (1934). 
22 The Bureau of Indian Affair's 1936 General Forest Regulations remain 
essentially unchanged within 25 CFR Part 163 (1982). 
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In 1964 Congress amended the timber provisions of the 
1910 Act, again emphasizing the Secretary of the Interior's 
management duties. Act of April30, 1964, 78 Stat. 186. As 
to sales of timber on allotted lands, the Secretary was di-
rected to consider "the needs and best interests of the Indian 
owner and his heirs." 25 U. S. C. § 406(a). In performing 
this duty, the Secretary was specifically required to take into 
account: 
"(1) the state of growth of the timber and the need for 
maintaining the productive capacity of the land for the 
benefit of the owner and his heirs, (2) the highest and 
best use of the land, including the advisability and prac-
ticality of devoting it to other uses for the benefit of the 
owner and his heirs, and (3) the present and future finan-
cial needs of the owner and his heirs." Ibid. See also 
§ 407 (timber sales on unallotted trust lands). 
The timber management statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§406--407, 
466, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 25 CFR 
Part 163 (1982), establish the "comprehensive" responsibil-
ities of the Federal Government in managing the harvest-
ing of Indian timber. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. I/ 
Bracker, 448 U. S., at 145. The Department of the Inte-
rior-through the Bureau of Indian Affairs~xercises liter- / 
ally daily supervision over the harvesting and management of 
tribal timber." ld., at 147.23 Virtually every stage of the 
process is under federal control. 24 
23 By virtue of the Act of February 14, 1920, ch. 75, § 1, 41 Stat. 415, as 
amended by the Act of March 1, 1933, ch. 158, 47 Stat. 1417, the Secretary 
of the Interior is authorized to collect "reasonable fees" from Indian timber 
sale proceeds to cover the cost of the management and sale of the Indians' 
timber. 25 U. S. C. § 413. Sections 406 and 407, as amended in 1964, 
both provide for deductions of administrative expenses "to the extent per-
missible under section 413." See also 25 CFR § 163.18 (1982). Respond-
ents have asserted that administrative fee deductions were excessive or 
improper in several respects. The Court of Claims concluded that there is 
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flhe Department exercises comparable control over grants 
of rights-of-way on Indian lands held in trust. 25 The Secre-
tary is empowered to grant rights-of-way for all purposes 
across trust land, 25 U. S. C. § 323, :Q!Ovided that he obtains 
the consent of the tribal or individual Indian landowner, 
§ 324,26 and that the Indian owners are paid appropriate com-
pensation, § 325. Regulations detail the scope of federal su-
pervision. 25 CFR Part 169 (1982). 2:1 For example, an ap-
plicant for a right-of-way must deposit with the Secretary an 
amount not less than the fair market value of the rights 
granted, plus an amount to cover potential damages associ-
ated with activity on the right-of-way. The Secretary must 
determine the adequacy of the compensation, and the 
amounts deposited must be held in a special account for dis-
tribution to Indian landowners. See 25 CFR §§ 169.12, 
169.14 (1982). 26 
"undoubted consent-to-suit from such claims that the Government illegally 
kept some of the Indians' own money or property." --Ct. Cl. --, 
--, 664 F. 2d 265, 274, citing United States v. Testan, 424 U. S., at 
400-401; Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 598, 60~, 
372 F. 2d 1002, 1007-1008 (1967). The Government does not appear to dis-
pute this conclusion. Brief for the United States 33, n. 27. 
24 The Secretary even has authority to invest tribal and individual Indian 
funds held in trust in banks, bonds, notes, or other public debt obligations 
of the United States if deemed advisable and for the best interest of the 
Indians. Act of June 24, 1938, 52 Stat. 1037, 25 U. S. C. § 162a. In this 
case the funds maintained on behalf of individual allottees were derived 
primarily from timber sales. 
25 See Act of February 5, 1948, 62 Stat. 17, codified in part at 25 U. S. C. 
§§ 323--325. See also Act of May 26, 1928, 45 Stat. 750, 25 U. S. C. § 318a 
(road building). 
211 Rights-of-way over lands of individual Indians may be granted without 
the consent of the owners under certain specific circumstances. § 324. 
27 Such regulations have a long history. See 25 CFR Part 256 (1949). 
28 See also § 169.3 (consent of Indian landowners to grants of rights-of-
way); § 169.5 (specifying required elements of agreements between Secre-
tary and applicants, including stipulation that upon termination of the 
right-of-way the applicant will restore land to its original condition so far as 
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B 
In United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 542, this Court 
recognized that the General Allotment Act creates a trust 
relationship between the United States and Indian allottees 
but concluded that the trust relationship was limited. We 
held that the Act could not be read "as establishing that the 
United States has a fiduciary responsibility for management 
of allotted forest lands." Id., at 546. In contrast to the 
bare trust created by the General Allotment Act, the stat-
utes and regulations now before us clearl 've the Federal 
Governmen res to manage Indian resources 
an an for the bene t o e n ~ans. ey ere y esta -
Ifsh a fiduciary relationship and define the contours of the 
United States' fiduciary responsibilities. 
The language of these statutory and regulatory provisions 
directly supports the existence of a fiduciary relationship. 
For example, § 8 of the 1910 Act, as amended, expressly 
mandates that sales of timber from Indian trust lands be 
based upon the Secretary's consideration of "the needs and 
best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs" and that pro-
ceeds from such sales be paid to owners "or disposed of for 
their benefit." 25 U. S. C. § 406(a). Similarly, even in its 
earliest regulations, the Government recognized its duties in 
"managing the Indian forests so as to obtain the greatest rev-
enue for the Indians consistent with a proper protection and 
improvement of the forests." Office of Indian Affairs, Regu-
lations and Instructions for Officers in Charge of Forests on 
Indian Reservations 4 (1911). Thus, the Government has 
"expressed a firm desire that the Tribe should retain the 
benefits derived from the harvesting and sale of reservation 
timber." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 
U. S., at 149.29 
'l 
is reasonably possible). As to roads on Indian reservations, responden~s ~ ~ · 
have alleged improper deduction of road maintenance costs as a charge -
against the allottees' timber payments. 
29 The pattern of pervasive federal control evident in the area of timber 
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Moreover, a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when I 
the Government assumes such elaborate control over forests -
~pro"Qerty belQpging to Indians. All of the necessary ele-
ments of a common-law trust are present: a trustee (the 
United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a 
trust corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds). 30 "[W]here 
the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervi-
sion over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relation-
ship normally exists with respect to such monies or proper-
ties (unless Congress has provided otherwise) even though 
nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying 
statute (or other fundamental document) about a trust fund, 
or a trust or fiduciary connection." Navajo Tribe of Indians 
v. United States, 224 Ct. Cl. 171, 183, 624 F. 2d 981, 987 
(1980). 
Our construction of these statutes and regulations is rein-
forced by the undisputed existence of a general trust rela-
tionship between the United States and the Indian people. 
This Court has previously emphasized "the distinctive obliga-
tion of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings 
with these dependent and sometimes exploited people." 
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296 (1942). 
This principle has long dominated the Government's dealings 
with Indians. United States v. Mason, 412 U. S. 391, 398 
(1973); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386 (1939); 
United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 117-118 
(1938); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 442 
(1926); McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458, 469 (1907); Minne-
sota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396 (1902); United States v. 
Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 382-384 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831). 
Because the statutes and regulations at issue in this case 
sales and timber management applies equally to grants of rights-of-way 
and to management of Indian funds. See supra, at 17, and n. 24. 
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clearly establish fiduciary obli~tions of the Government in ~ 
' the management and operation of Indian lands and resources, / 
they can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by 
the Federal Government for damages sustained. Given the 
existence of a trust relationship, it naturall~ follo}Y_s that the / 
Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its 
fiduciary duties. It is well established that a trustee is ac- ~ \ 
countable in damages for breaches of trust. See Restate- c:tF 
ment (Second) of the Law of Trusts §§ 205-212 (1959); G. 
Bogert, The Law of Trusts & Trustees § 862 (2d ed. 1965); 3 
A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 205 (3d ed. 1967). This Court 
and several other federal courts have consistently recognized 
that the existence of a trust relationship between the United 
States and an Indian or Indian tribe includes as a funda-
mental incident the right of an injured beneficiary to sue the 
trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the trust. 31 
The recognition of a damages remedy also furthers the pur- ~ 
poses of the statutes and regulations, which clearly require ./ 
that the Secretary manage Indian resources so as to generate 
proceeds for the Indians. It would be"anomalous\ o conclude 
that these enactments create a right to the value of certain 
resources when the Secretary lives up to his duties, but no / 
81 See, e. g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 295-300 l /~ 
(1942); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103, 109-110 (1935); I 
Moose v. United States, 674 F. 2d 1277, 1281 (CA9 1982); Whiskers v. 
United States, 600 F. 2d 1332, 1335 (CAlO (1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 
1078 (1980); Coast Indian Community v. United States, 213 Ct. Cl. 129, 
152-156, 550 F. 2d 639, 652-654 (1977); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. 
United States, 206 Ct. Cl. 340, 345, 512 F. 2d 1390, 1392 (1975); Mason v. 
United States, 198 Ct. Cl. 599, 613-616, 461 F. 2d 1364, 1372-1373 (1972), 
rev'd on other grounds, 412 U. S. 391 (1973); Navajo Tribe v. United 
States, 176 Ct. Cl. 502, 507, 364 F. 2d 320, 322 (1966); Klamath & Modoc 
Tribes, v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 483, 490-491 (1966); Menominee Tribe 
v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl. 555, 562 (1945); Menominee Tribe v. United 
States, 101 Ct. Cl. 10, 18-20 (1944); Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 
56, 60 (ND Cal. 1978); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc . v. United 
States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1243-1248 (ND Cal. 1973). 
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right to the value of the resources if the Secretary's duties 
are not performed. "Absent a retrospective damages rem-
edy, there would be little to deter federal officials from vi-
olating their trust duties, at least until the allottees managed 
to obtain a judicial decree against future breaches of trust." 
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 550 (WHITE, J., dis-~ 
senting). Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 
(1945). 
The Government ·contends that violations of duties imposed 
by the various statutes may be cured by actions for declara-
tory, injunctive or mandamus relief against the Secretary, 
although it concedes that sovereign immunity might have 
barred such suits before 1976.32 Brief of the United States at 
40. In this context, however, prospective equitable reme-
dies are totally inadequate. To begin with, the Indian allot-
tees are in no position to monitor federal management of 
their lands on a consistent basis. Many are poorly educated, 
most are absentee owners, and many do not even know the 
exact physical location of their allotments. Indeed, it was 
the very recognition of the inability of the Indians to oversee 
their interests that led to federal management in the first 
place. A trusteeship would mean little if the beneficiaries 
were required to supervise the da -to-day management of 
their estate err rus ee or else be preclu e om recov-
ery for mismanagement. 
In addition, by the time government mismanagement be-
comes apparent, the damage to Indian resources may be so 
severe that a prospective remedy may be next to worthless. 
For example, if timber on an allotment has been destroyed 
through Government mismanagement, it will take many 
years for nature to restore the timber. As this Court has 
observed, 
32 See Naganab v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 473, 475-476 (1906). In 1976 
Congress enacted a general consent to such suits. See 5 U. S. C. § 702. 
22 
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"Once logged off, the land is of little value. The land no 
longer serves the purpose for which it was by treaty set 
aside to [the allottee's] ancestors, and for which it was 
allotted to him. It can no longer be adequate to his 
needs and serve the purpose of bringing him finally to a 
state of competency and independence." 
Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1, 10 (1956). 
We thus conclude that the statutes and regulations at issue 
here can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by / 
the Federal Government for violations of Its fiduciary respon-
sibilities in the management of Indian property. The Court 
of Claims therefore has jurisdiction over respondents' claims 
for alleged breaches of trusts. 
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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The principal question in this case is whether the United 
States is accountable in money damages for alleged breaches 
of trust in connection with its management of forest re-
sources on allotted lands of the Quinault Indian Reservation. 
I 
A 
In the 1850s, the United States undertook a policy of re-
moving Indian tribes from large areas of the Pacific North-
west in order to facilitate the settlement of non-Indians. 1 
Pursuant to this policy, the first Governor and Superintend-
ent of Indian Mfairs of the Washington Territory began ne-
gotiations in 1855 with various tribes living on the west coast 
of the Territory. The negotiations culminated in a treaty 
between the United States and the Quinault and Quileute 
Tribes, 12 Stat. 971 (Treaty of Olympia). In the Treaty the 
Indians ceded to the United States a vast tract of land on the 
Olympic Peninsula in the State of Washington, and the 
1 See Act of June 5, 1850, 9 Stat. 437; Appropriation Act of March 3, 
1853, 10 Stat. 226, 238; Quinault Allottee Association v. United States, 202 
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United States agreed to set aside a reservation for the 
Indians. 
In 1861 a reservation of about 10,000 acres was provision-
ally chosen for the tribes. 2 This tract proved undesirable 
because of its limited size and heavy forestation. The Qui-
nault Agency superintendent subsequently recommended 
that since the coastal tribes drew their subsistence almost en-
tirely from the water, 3 they should be collected on a reserva-
tion suitable for their fishing needs. Acting on this sugges-
tion, President Grant issued an order on November 4, 1873, 
designating about 200,000 acres along the Washington coast 
as an Indian reservation. 4 The vast bulk of this land con-
sisted of rain forest covered with huge, coniferous trees. 
In 1905 the Federal Government began to allot the Qui-
nault Reservation in trust to individual Indians under the 
General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as 
amended, 25 U. S. C. §331 et seq. 5 See also the Quinault 
Allotment Act of March 4, 1911, 36 Stat. 1345. The Govern-
ment initially determined that the forested areas of the Res-
ervation were not to be alloted because they were not suit-
able for agriculture or grazing. In 1924, however, this 
Court concluded that the character of lands to be set apart for 
2 See Halbert v. United States, 283 U.S. 753, 757 (1931). 
3 See generally United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 350--353 
(WD Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F . 2d 676 (CA9 1975), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 
1086 (1976) (describing pre-Treaty role of fishing among Northwest 
Indians). 
• Executive Order, I C. Kappler, Indian Affairs 923 (2d ed. 1904). The 
Order declared that the reservation would be held for the use of the Qui-
nault, Quileute, Hoh, Queets, "and other tribes of fish-eating Indians on 
the Pacific Coast." Ibid. 
6 Section 5 of the Act provided that the United States would hold the 
allotted land for 25 years "in trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian 
to whom such allotment shall have been made." The period during which 
the United States was to hold the allotted land was extended indefinitely 
by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, § 2, 48 Stat. 984, 25 
u. s. c. § 462. 
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the Indians was not restricted by the General Allotment Act. 
United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446, 449 (1924). There-
after, the forested lands of the Reservation were allotted. 
By 1935 the entire Reservation had been divided into 2,340 
trust allotments, most of which were 80 acres of heavily tim-
bered land. About a third of the Reservation has since gone 
out of trust, but the bulk of the land has remained in trust 
status. 6 
The forest resources on the allotted lands have long been 
managed by the Department of the Interior, which exercises 
"comprehensive" control over the harvesting of Indian tim-
ber. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 
136, 145 (1980). The Secretary of the Interior has broad 
statutory authority over the sale of timber on reservations. 
See 25 U.S. C. §§405-407. Sales of timber "must be based 
upon a consideration of the needs and best interests of the In-
dian owner and his heirs," § 406(a), and the proceeds from 
such sales are to be used for the benefit of the Indians or 
transferred to the Indian owner, §§ 406(a), 407. Congress 
has directed the Secretary to adhere to principles of sus-
tained-yield forestry on all Indian forest lands under his su-
pervision. 25 U. S. C. §466. Under these statutes, the 
Secretary has promulgated detailed regulations governing 
the management of Indian timber. 25 CFR Part 163 (1982). 
The Secretary is authorized to deduct an administrative fee 
for his services from the timber revenues paid to Indian allot-
tees. 25 U. S. C. §§ 406(a), 413. 
B 
The respondents are 1,465 individuals owning interests in 
allotments on the Quinault Reservation, an unincorporated 
association of Quinault Reservation allottees, and the Qui-
nault Tribe, which now holds some portions of the allotted 
6 See Mitchell v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 95, 97, 591 F . 2d 1300, 
1300-1301 (1979). 
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lands. In 1971 respondents filed four actions that were con-
solidated in the Court of Claims. Jurisdiction was based on 
28 U. S. C. §§ 1491 and 1505. Respondents sought to re-
cover damages from the United States based on allegations of 
pervasive waste and mismanagement of timber lands on the 
Quinault Reservation. More specifically, respondents 
claimed that the Government (1) failed to obtain a fair market 
value for timber sold; (2) failed to manage timber on a sus-
tained-yield basis; (3) failed to obtain any payment at all for 
some merchantable timber; (4) failed to develop a proper 
system of roads and easements for timber operations and ex-
acted improper charges from allottees for maintenance of 
roads; (5) failed to pay any interest on certain funds from tim-
ber sales held by the Government and paid insufficient inter-
est on other funds; and (6) exacted excessive administrative 
fees from allottees. Respondents assert that the alleged 
misconduct constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty owed 
them by the United States as trustee under various statutes. 
Six years after the suits were filed, the United States 
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, contending that the 
Court of Claims had no authority over claims based on a 
breach of trust. The court denied the motion, holding that 
the General Allotment Act created a fiduciary duty on the 
United States' part to manage the timber resources properly 
and thereby provided the necessary authority for recovery of 
damages against the United States. 219 Ct. Cl. 95, 591 
F. 2d 1300 (1979) (en bane). 
In United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980), this 
Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Claims, stating that 
the General Allotment Act "created only a limited trust rela-
tionship between the United States and the allottees that 
does not impose any duty upon the Government to manage 
timber resources." I d., at 542. We concluded that "[a]ny 
right of the respondents to recover money damages for Gov-
ernment mismanagement of timber resources must be found 
in some source other than [the General Allotment] Act." 
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I d., at 546. Since the Court of Claims had not considered 
respondents' assertion that other statutes render the United 
States answerable in money damages for the alleged misman-
agement in this case, we remanded the case for consideration 
of these alternative grounds for liability. See id., at 546, 
n. 7. 
On remand, the Court of Claims once again held the United 
States subject to suit for money damages on most of respond-
ents' claims. -- Ct. Cl. -, 664 F. 2d 265 (1981) (en 
bane). The court ruled that the timber management stat-
utes, 25 U. S. C. §§406, 407, and 466, various federal stat-
utes governing road building and rights of way, §§ 318 and 
323--325, statutes governing Indian funds and government 
fees, §§ 162a and 413, and regulations promulgated under 
these statutes imposed fiduciary duties upon the United 
States in its management of forested allotted lands. The 
court concluded that the statutes and regulations implicitly 
required compensation for damages sustained as a result of 
the Government's breach of its duties. Thus, the Court held 
that respondents could proceed on their claims. 
Because the decision of the Court of Claims raises issues of 
substantial importance concerning the liability of the United 
States, 7 we granted the Government's petition for certiorari. 
- U. S.- (1982). We affirm. 
II 
Respondents have invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, and its 
counterpart for claims brought by Indian tribes, 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1505, known as the Indian Tucker Act. 8 The Tucker Act 
states in pertinent part: 
7 The Government has informed us that the damages claimed in this suit 
alone may amount to $100 million. Pet. for Cert. 24. 
8 Section 24 of the Indian Claims Commission Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1505, 
provides tribal claimants the same access to the Court of Claims provided 
6 
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"The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render 
judgment upon any claim against the United States 
founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Con-
gress, or any regulation of an executive department, or 
upon any express or implied contract with the United 
States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in 
cases not sounding in tort." 28 U. S. C. § 1491. 
It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued 
without its consent and that the existence of consent is a pre-
requisite for jurisdiction. 9 The terminology employed in 
some of our prior decisions has unfortunately generated some 
confusion as to whether the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver 
of sovereign immunity. The time has come to resolve this 
confusion. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude 
that by giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction over specified 
types of claims against the United States, 10 the Tucker Act 
constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to 
those claims. 
A 
Before 1855 no general statute gave the consent of the 
United States to suit on claims for money damages; the only 
recourse available to private claimants was to petition Con-
gress for relief. 11 In order to relieve the pressure caused by 
the volume of private bills and to avoid the delays and ineq-
uities of the private bill procedure, Congress created the 
to individual claimants by 28 U. S. C. § 1491. See United States v. Mitch-
ell, 445 U. S. 535, 538-540 (1980). 
9 See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941); 14 C. 
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice And Procedure § 3654, at 
156-157 (1976). 
10 The Tucker Act provided concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts 
over claims not exceeding $10,000. See 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(2). 
11 See P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System 98 (2d ed. 1973); Richardson, History, Ju-
risdiction, and Practice of the Court of Claims, 17 Ct. Cl. 3, 3-4 (1882). 
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Court of Claims. Act of February 24, 1855, c. 122, 10 Stat. 
612. The 1855 Act empowered that court to hear claims and 
report its findings to Congress and to submit a draft of a pri-
vate bill in each case which received a favorable decision. 
§ 7, 10 Stat. 613. The limited powers initially conferred upon 
the court failed to relieve Congress from "the laborious ne-
cessity of examining the merits of private bills." Glidden 
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 553 (1962) (opinion of Harlan, 
J.). Thus, in his State of the Union Message of 1861, Presi-
dent Lincoln recommended that the court be authorized to 
render final judgments. He declared that it is "as much the 
duty of Government to render prompt justice against itself, 
in favor of citizens, as it is to administer the same between 
private individuals." Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., 
app. 2 (1862). Congress adopted the President Lincoln's rec-
ommendation and made the court's judgments final. Act of 
March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765. 12 
In 1886 Representative John Randolph Tucker introduced 
a bill to revise in several respects the jurisdiction and proce-
dures of the Court of Claims and to replace most provisions of 
the 1855 and 1863 Acts. H. R. 6974, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1886). The House Judiciary Committee reported that the 
bill was a "comprehensive measure by which claims against 
the United States may be heard and determined." H. R. 
Rep. No. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1886). The measure 
was designed "to give the people of the United States what 
12 Section 14 of the 1863 Act provided that "no money shall be paid out of 
the treasury for any claim passed upon by the court of claims till after an 
appropriation therefor shall be estimated for by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury." 12 Stat. 768. In Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561 (1864), this 
Court dismissed an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims for want 
of jurisdiction, holding that § 14 gave the Secretary a revisory authority 
over the court inconsistent with its exercise of judicial power. Congress 
promptly repealed the provision, Act of March 17, 1866, c. 19, § 1, 14 Stat. 
9. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok , 370 U. S. 530, 554 (1962) (opinion of Har-
lan, J. ). 
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every civilized nation of the world has already done-the 
right to go into the courts to seek redress against the Govern-
ment for their grievances." 18 Cong. Rec. 2680 (1887) (re-
marks of Rep. Bayne). See id., at 622 (remarks of Rep. 
Tucker); id., at 2679 (colloquy between Reps. Tucker and 
Townshend); id., at 2680 (remarks of Rep. Holman). The 
eventual enactment thus "provide[ d) for the bringing of suits 
against the Government of the United States." Act of 
March 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505. 
The Indian Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1505, has a similar 
history. An early amendment to the original enactment 
creating the Court of Claims had excluded claims by Indian 
tribes. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 767. As a 
result, Congress eventually confronted a "vast and growing 
burden" resulting from the large number of tribes seeking 
special jurisdictional acts. H. R. Rep. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 
1st Sess. 6 (1945). Congress responded by conferring juris-
diction on the Court of Claims to hear any tribal claim "of a 
character which would be cognizable in the Court of Claims if 
the claimant were not an Indian tribe." I d., at 13. As the 
House sponsor of the Act stated, an important goal of the Act 
was to ensure that it would "never again be necessary to pass 
special Indian jurisdictional acts in order to permit the Indi-
ans to secure a court adjudication on any misappropriation of 
Indian funds or of any other Indian property by Federal offi-
cials that might occur in the future." 92 Cong. Rec. 5313 
(1946) (statement of Rep. Jackson). Indians were to be 
given "their fair day in court so that they can call the various 
Government agencies to account on the obligations that the 
Federal government assumed." I d., at 5312. 13 The House 
18 See 92 Cong. Rec. 5312 (statement of Rep. Jackson) ("The Interior De-
partment itself suggested that it ought not be in a position where its em-
ployees can mishandle funds and lands of a national trusteeship without 
complete accountability.") See also Hearings on H. R. 1198 and H. R. 
1341 before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 
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Report stressed the same point: "If we fail to meet these ob-
ligations by denying access to the courts when trust funds 
have been improperly dissipated or other fiduciary duties 
have been violated, we compromise the national honor of the 
United States." H. R. Rep. No. 1466, at 4. 
For decades this Court consistently interpreted the Tucker 
Act as having provided the consent of United States to be 
sued eo nomine for the classes of claims described in the Act. 
See, e. g., Shillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163, 16&-167 
(1894); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 17 (1896); Dooley v. 
United States, 182 U. S. 222, 227-228 (1901); Reid v. United 
States, 211 U. S. 529, 538 (1909); United States v. Sherwood, 
312 U. S. 584, 590 (1940); Dalehite v. United States, 346 
U. S. 15, 25, n. 10 (1953); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 
270, 273 (1957). In at least two recent decisions this Court 
explicitly stated that the Tucker Act effects a waiver of sov-
ereign immunity. Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. 
Sheehan,- U. S. -,-(1982); Hatzlachh Supply Co. 
v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 466 (1980) (per curiam). 
These decisions confirm the umabiguous thrust of the history 
of the Act. 
The existence of a waiver is readily apparent in claims 
founded upon "any express or implied contract with the 
United States." 28 U. S. C. § 1491. The Court of Claims' 
jurisdiction over contract claims against the government has 
long been recognized, and government liability in contract is 
viewed as perhaps "the widest and most unequivocal waiver 
of federal immunity from suit." Developments in the Law-
Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 
Harv. L. Rev. 827, 876 (1957). See also 14 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3656, 
at 202 (1976). The source of consent for such suits unmistak-
ably lies in the Tucker Act. Otherwise, it is doubtful that 
any consent would exist, for no contracting officer or other 
130 (1945) (statement of Assistant Solicitor Cohen). 
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official is empowered to consent to suit against the United 
States. 14 The same is true for claims founded upon executive 
regulations. Indeed, the Act makes absolutely no distinc-
tion between claims founded upon contracts and claims 
founded upon other specified sources of law. 
In United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 398, 400 (1976), 
and in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 538, this Court 
employed language suggesting that the Tucker Act does not 
effect a waiver of sovereign immunity. Such language was 
not necessary to the decision in either case. See infra, at 
11-12. Without in any way questioning the result in either 
case, we conclude that this isolated language should be disre-
garded. If a claim falls within the terms of the Tucker Act, 
the United States has presumptively consented to suit. 
B 
It nonetheless remains true that the Tucker Act "'does not 
create any substantive right enforceable against the United 
States for money damages.'" United States v. Mitchell, 445 
U. S., at 538, quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U. S., at 
398. A substantive right must be found in some other source 
of law, such as "the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or 
any regulation of an executive department." 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1491. Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal 
statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act. 
The claim must be one for money damages against the United 
States, see United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 2-3 (1969), 
and the claimant must demonstrate that the source of sub-
stantive law he relies upon "'can fairly be interpreted as 
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the 
damages sustained."' United States v. Testan, 424 U. S., at 
14 See United States v. New York Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 
660 (1957); United States, v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495, 501 (1940); Carr v. 
United States, 98 U. S. 433, 438 (1879). 
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400, quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. 
Cl. 599, 607, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1009 (1967). 15 
For example, in United States v. Testan, supra, two gov-
ernment attorneys contended that they were entitled to a 
higher salary grade under the Classification Act, 16 and to an 
award of back pay under the Back Pay Act 17 for the period 
during which they were classified at a lower grade. This 
Court concluded that neither the Classification Act nor the 
Back Pay Act could fairly be interpreted as requiring com-
pensation for wrongful classifications. See 424 U. S., at 
398-407. Particularly in light of the "established rule that 
one is not entitled to the benefit of a position until he has 
been appointed to it," id., at 402, 18 the Classification Act does 
not support a claim for money damages. While the Back Pay 
Act does provide a basis for money damages as a remedy "in 
carefully limited circumstances" such as wrongful reductions 
in grade, id., at 404, it does not apply to wrongful classifica-
tions. I d., at 405. 
Similarly, in United States v. Mitchell, supra, this Court 
concluded that the General Allotment Act does not confer a 
right to recover money damages against the United States. 
While § 5 of the Act provided that the United States would 
hold land "in trust" for Indian allottees, 25 U. S. C. § 348, we 
held that the Act creates only a limited trust relationship. 
445 U. S., at 542. The trust language of the Act does not 
impose any fiduciary management duties or render the 
United States answerable for breach thereof, but only pre-
vents improvident alienation of the allotted lands and assures 
16 As the Eastport decision recognized, the substantive source of law 
may grant the claimant a right to recover damages either "expressly or by 
implication." I d., at 605; 372 F. 2d, at 1007. See also Ralston Steel Corp. 
v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 119, 125, 340 F. 2d 663, 667, cert. denied, 381 
u. s. 950 (1965). 
16 5 u. s. c. § 5101. 
17 5 u. s. c. § 5596. 
18 Citing United States v. McLean, 95 U. S. 750 (1878); Ganse v. United 
States, 180 Ct. Cl. 183, 186, 376 F. 2d 900, 902 (1967). 
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their immunity from state taxation. I d., at 544. 
Thus, for claims against the United States "founded either 
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regula-
tion of an executive department," 28 U. S. C. § 1491, a court 
must inquire whether the source of substantive law can fairly 
be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 
Government for the damages sustained. In undertaking this 
inquiry, a court need not find a separate waiver of sovereign 
immunity in the substantive provision, just as a court need 
not find consent to suit in "any express or implied contract 
with the United States." Ibid. The Tucker Act itself pro-
vides the necessary consent. 
Of course, in determining the general scope of the Tucker 
Act, this Court has not lightly inferred the United States' 
consent to suit. See United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4-5 
(1969) (Court of Claims lacks authority to issue declaratory 
judgment); Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 276 
(1957) (non-tolling of limitations beyond statutory provi-
sions). For example, although the Tucker Act refers to 
claims founded upon any implied contract with the United 
States, we have held that the Act does not reach claims based 
on contracts implied in law, as opposed to those implied in 
fact. Merritt v. United States, 267 U. S. 338, 341 (1925). 
In this case, however, there is simply no question that the 
Tucker Act provides the United States' consent to suit for 
claims founded upon statutes or regulations that create sub-
stantive rights to money damages. If a claim falls within 
this category, the existence of a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity is clear. The question in this case is thus analytically 
distinct: whether the statutes or regulations at issue can be 
interpreted as requiring compensation. Because the Tucker 
Act supplies a waiver of immunity for claims of this nature, 
the separate statutes and regulations need not provide a sec-
ond waiver of sovereign immunity, nor need they be con-
strued in the manner appropriate to waivers of sovereign im-
munity. See United States v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Realty 
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Co., 237 U.S. 28, 32 (1915). "'The exemption of the sover-
eign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has 
been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement 
of construction where consent has been announced.'" 
United States v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, 383 (1949), 
quoting Anderson v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N. Y. 
140, 147, 153 N. E. 28, 29--30 (1926) (Cardozo, J.). 19 
III 
Respondents have based their money claims against the 
United States on various Acts of Congress and executive de-
partment regulations. We begin by describing these sources 
of substantive law. We then examine whether they can 
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages 
sustained as a result of a breach of the duties they impose. 
A 
The Secretary of the Interior's pervasive role in the sales 
of timber from Indian lands began with the Act of June 25, 
1910, ch. 431, §§ 7-8, 36 Stat. 855, 857, as amended, 25 
U. S. C. § § 40&-407. Prior to that time, Indians had no right 
to sell timber on reservation land, 20 and there existed " 'no 
general law under which authority for sale of timber on In-
dian lands, whether allotted or unallotted, can be granted."' 
H. R. Rep. No. 1135, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1910) (quoting 
letter of the Secretary of the Interior). Congress recognized 
that this situation was undesirable "'because in many in-
stances the timber is the only valuable part of the allotment 
or is the only source from which funds can be obtained for the 
support of the Indian or the improvement of his allotment.' " 
Ibid. The 1910 Act empowered the Secretary to sell timber 
19 Cf. Block v. Neal,- U.S.-,- (1983); Indian Towing Co . v. 
United States , 350 U. S. 61, 69 (1955). 
20 See United States v. Cook, 19 Wall. 591 (1874); Pine River Logging 
Co. v. United States, 186 U. S. 279 (1902); 19 Op. Atty. Gen. 194 (1888). 
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on unallotted lands and apply the proceeds of the sales for the 
benefit of the Indians, § 7, and authorized the Secretary to 
consent to sales by allottees, with the proceeds to be paid to 
the allottees or disposed of for their benefit, § 8. Congress 
thus sought to provide for harvesting timber "in such a man-
ner as to conserve the interests of the people on the reserva-
tions, namely, the Indians." 45 Cong. Rec. 6087 (1910) (re-
marks of Rep. Saunders). 
From the outset, the Interior Department recognized its 
obligation to supervise the cutting of Indian timber. In 
1911, the Department's Office of Indian Affairs promulgated 
detailed regulations covering its responsibilities in "manag-
ing the Indian forests so as to obtain the greatest revenue for 
the Indians consistent with a proper protection and improve-
ment of the forests." Office of Indian Affairs, Regulations 
and Instructions for Officers in Charge of Forests on Indian 
Reservations 4 (1911). The regulations addressed virtually 
every aspect of forest management, including the size of 
sales, contract procedures, advertisements and methods of 
billing, deposits and bonding requirements, administrative 
fee deductions, procedures for sales by minors, allowable 
heights of stumps, tree marking and scaling rules, base and 
top diameters of trees for cutting, and the percentage of 
trees to be left as a seed source. I d., at ~28. The regula-
tions applied to allotted as well as tribal lands, and the Secre-
tary's approval of timber sales on allotted lands was explicitly 
conditioned upon compliance with the regulations. Id., at 9. 
Over time, deficiencies in the Interior Department's per-
formance of its responsibilities became apparent. Accord-
ingly, as part of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, c. 
576, 484 Stat. 984, Congress imposed even stricter duties 
upon the Government with respect to Indian timber manage-
ment. In § 6 of the Act, now codified as 25 U. S. C. § 466, 
Congress expressly directed that the Interior Department 
manage Indian forest resources "on the principle of sus-
tained-yield management." Representative Howard, co-
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sponsor of the Act and Chairman of the House Committee on 
Indian Mfairs, explained that the purpose of the provision 
was "to assure a proper and permanent management of the 
Indian Forest" under modern sustained-yield methods so as 
to "assure that the Indian forests will be permanently pro-
ductive and will yield continuous revenues to the tribes." 78 
Cong. Rec. 11730 (1934). See United States v. Anderson, 
625 F. 2d 910, 915 (CA9 1980), cert. denied, 450 U. S. 920 
(1981). Referring to the relationship between the Indians 
and the Government as a "sacred trust," Representative 
Howard stated that "[t]he failure of their governmental 
guardian to conserve the Indians' land and assets and the 
consequent loss of income or earning power, has been the 
principal cause of the present plight of the Indian." 78 
Cong. Rec., at 11726.21 
Regulations promulgated under the Act required the pres-
ervation of Indian forest lands in a perpetually productive 
state, forbade the clear-cutting of large contiguous areas, 
called for the development of long-term working plans for all 
major reservations, required adequate provision for new 
growth when mature timber was removed, and required the 
regulation of run-off and the minimization of erosion. 22 The 
regulatory scheme was designed to assure that the Indians 
receive "the benefit of whatever profit [the forest] is capable 
of yielding." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 
U. S., at 149 (quoting 25 CFR § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)). 
21 John Collier, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and a principal author 
of the Act, had testified that 
"there must be a constructive handling of Indian timber. We have got to 
stop the slaughtering of Indian timber lands, to operate them on a perpet-
ual yield basis and the bill expressly directs that this principle of conserva-
tion shall be applied throughout." 
Hearings on H. R. 7902 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 35 (1934). 
22 The Bureau of Indian Affair's 1936 General Forest Regulations remain 
essentially unchanged within 25 CFR Part 163 (1982). 
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In 1964 Congress amended the timber provisions of the 
1910 Act, again emphasizing the Secretary of the Interior's 
management duties. Act of April30, 1964, 78 Stat. 186. As 
to sales of timber on allotted lands, the Secretary was di-
rected to consider "the needs and best interests of the Indian 
owner and his heirs." 25 U. S. C. § 406(a). In performing 
this duty, the Secretary was specifically required to take into 
account: 
"(1) the state of growth of the timber and the need for 
maintaining the productive capacity of the land for the 
benefit of the owner and his heirs, (2) the highest and 
best use of the land, including the advisability and prac-
ticality of devoting it to other uses for the benefit of the 
owner and his heirs, and (3) the present and future finan-
cial needs of the owner and his heirs." Ibid. See also 
§ 407 (timber sales on unallotted trust lands). 
The timber management statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§406-407, 
466, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 25 CFR 
Part 163 (1982), establish the "comprehensive" responsibil-
ities of the Federal Government in managing the harvest-
ing of Indian timber. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, 448 U. S., at 145. The Department of the Inte-
rior-through the Bureau of Indian Affairs-" exercises liter-
ally daily supervision over the harvesting and management of 
tribal timber." ld., at 147.23 Virtually every stage of the 
process is under federal control. 24 
23 By virtue of the Act of February 14, 1920, ch. 75, § 1, 41 Stat. 415, as 
amended by the Act of March 1, 1933, ch. 158, 47 Stat. 1417, the Secretary 
of the Interior is authorized to collect "reasonable fees" from Indian timber 
sale proceeds to cover the cost of the management and sale of the Indians' 
timber. 25 U. S. C. § 413. Sections 406 and 407, as amended in 1964, 
both provide for deductions of administrative expenses "to the extent per-
missible under section 413." See also 25 CFR § 163.18 (1982). Respond-
ents have asserted that administrative fee deductions were excessive or 
improper in several respects. The Court of Claims concluded that there is 
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The Department exercises comparable control over grants 
of rights-of-way on Indian lands held in trust. 25 The Secre-
tary is empowered to grant rights-of-way for all purposes 
across trust land, 25 U. S. C. § 323, provided that he obtains 
the consent of the tribal or individual Indian landowner, 
§ 324,26 and that the Indian owners are paid appropriate com-
pensation, § 325. Regulations detail the scope of federal su-
pervision. 25 CFR Part 169 (1982). '1:1 For example, an ap-
plicant for a right-of-way must deposit with the Secretary an 
amount not less than the fair market value of the rights 
granted, plus an amount to cover potential damages associ-
ated with activity on the right-of-way. The Secretary must 
determine the adequacy of the compensation, and the 
amounts deposited must be held in a special account for dis-
tribution to Indian landowners. See 25 CFR §§ 169.12, 
169.14 (1982). 28 
"undoubted consent-to-suit from such claims that the Government illegally 
kept some of the Indians' own money or property." -- Ct. Cl. --, 
--, 664 F. 2d 265, 274, citing United States v. Testan, 424 U. S., at 
400-401; Eastport S.S . Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 598, 605-606, 
372 F. 2d 1002, 1007-1008 (1967). The Government does not appear to dis-
pute this conclusion. Brief for the United States 33, n. 27. 
24 The Secretary even has authority to invest tribal and individual Indian 
funds held in trust in banks, bonds, notes, or other public debt obligations 
of the United States if deemed advisable and for the best interest of the 
Indians. Act of June 24, 1938, 52 Stat. 1037, 25 U. S. C. § 162a. In this 
case the funds maintained on behalf of individual allottees were derived 
primarily from timber sales. 
25 See Act of February 5, 1948,62 Stat. 17, codified in part at 25 U. S.C. 
§§ 323-325. See also Act of May 26, 1928, 45 Stat. 750, 25 U. S. C. § 318a 
(road building). 
28 Rights-of-way over lands of individual Indians may be granted without 
the consent of the owners under certain specific circumstances. § 324. 
27 Such regulations have a long history. See 25 CFR Part 256 (1949). 
28 See also § 169.3 (consent of Indian landowners to grants of rights-of-
way); § 169.5 (specifying required elements of agreements between Secre-
tary and applicants, including stipulation that upon termination of the 
right-of-way the applicant will restore land to its original condition so far as 
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In United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 542, this Court 
recognized that the General Allotment Act creates a trust 
relationship between the United States and Indian allot tees 
but concluded that the trust relationship was limited. We 
held that the Act could not be read "as establishing that the 
United States has a fiduciary responsibility for management 
of allotted forest lands." I d., at 546. In contrast to the 
bare trust created by the General Allotment Act, the stat-
utes and regulations now before us clearly give the Federal 
Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources 
and land for the benefit of the Indians. They thereby estab-
lish a fiduciary relationship and define the contours of the 
United States' fiduciary responsibilities. 
The language of these statutory and regulatory provisions 
directly supports the existence of a fiduciary relationship. 
For example, § 8 of the 1910 Act, as amended, expressly 
mandates that sales of timber from Indian trust lands be 
based upon the Secretary's consideration of "the needs and 
best interests of the Indian owner and his heirs" and that pro-
ceeds from such sales be paid to owners "or disposed of for 
their benefit." 25 U. S. C. § 406(a). Similarly, even in its 
earliest regulations, the Government recognized its duties in 
"managing the Indian forests so as to obtain the greatest rev-
enue for the Indians consistent with a proper protection and 
improvement of the forests ." Office of Indian Affairs, Regu-
lations and Instructions for Officers in Charge of Forests on 
Indian Reservations 4 (1911). Thus, the Government has 
"expressed a firm desire that the Tribe should retain the 
benefits derived from the harvesting and sale of reservation 
timber." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 
U. S., at 149.29 
is reasonably possible). As to roads on Indian reservations, respondents 
have alleged improper deduction of road maintenance costs as a charge 
against the allottees' timber payments. 
29 The pattern of pervasive federal control evident in the area of timber 
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Moreover, a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when 
the Government assumes such elaborate control over forests 
and property belonging to Indians. All of the necessary ele-
ments of a common-law trust are present: a trustee (the 
United States), a beneficiary (the Indian allottees), and a 
trust corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds). 30 "[W]here 
the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervi-
sion over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary relation-
ship normally exists with respect to such monies or proper-
ties (unless Congress has provided otherwise) even though 
nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying 
statute (or other fundamental document) about a trust fund, 
or a trust or fiduciary connection." Navajo Tribe of Indians 
v. United States , 224 Ct. Cl. 171, 183, 624 F. 2d 981, 987 
(1980). 
Our construction of these statutes and regulations is rein-
forced by the undisputed existence of a general trust rela-
tionship between the United States and the Indian people. 
This Court has previously emphasized "the distinctive obliga-
tion of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings 
with these dependent and sometimes exploited people." 
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296 (1942). 
This principle has long dominated the Government's dealings 
with Indians. United States v. Mason, 412 U. S. 391, 398 
(1973); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386 (1939); 
United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 117-118 
(1938); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 442 
(1926); McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458, 469 (1907); Minne-
sota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396 (1902); United States v. 
Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 382-384 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831). 
Because the statutes and regulations at issue in this case 
sales and timber management applies equally to grants of rights-of-way 
and to management of Indian funds. See supra, at 17, and n. 24. 
80 See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Trusts § 2, Comment h, at 10 
(1959). 
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clearly establish fiduciary obligations of the Government in 
the management and operation of Indian lands and resources, 
they can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by 
the Federal Government for damages sustained. Given the 
existence of a trust relationship, it naturally follows that the 
Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its 
fiduciary duties. It is well established that a trustee is ac-
countable in damages for breaches of trust. See Restate-
ment (Second) of the Law of Trusts §§ 205-212 (1959); G. 
Bogert, The Law of Trusts & Trustees § 862 (2d ed. 1965); 3 
A. Scott, The Law of Trusts § 205 (3d ed. 1967). This Court 
and several other federal courts have consistently recognized 
that the existence of a trust relationship between the United 
States and an Indian or Indian tribe includes as a funda-
mental incident the right of an injured beneficiary to sue the 
trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the trust. 31 
The recognition of a damages remedy also furthers the pur-
poses of the statutes and regulations, which clearly require 
that the Secretary manage Indian resources so as to generate 
proceeds for the Indians. It would be anomalous to conclude 
that these enactments create a right to the value of certain 
resources when the Secretary lives up to his duties, but no 
3
' See, e. g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 295-300 
(1942); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103, 109-110 (1935); 
Moose v. United States, 674 F. 2d 1277, 1281 (CA9 1982); Whiskers v. 
United States, 600 F. 2d 1332, 1335 (CAlO (1979), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 
1078 (1980); Coast Indian Community v. United States, 213 Ct. Cl. 129, 
152-156, 550 F. 2d 639, 652-654 (1977); Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. 
United States, 206 Ct. Cl. 340, 345, 512 F . 2d 1390, 1392 (1975); Mason v. 
United States, 198 Ct. Cl. 599, 613-616, 461 F. 2d 1364, 1372-1373 (1972), 
rev'd on other grounds, 412 U. S. 391 (1973); Navajo Tribe v. United 
States, 176 Ct. Cl. 502, 507, 364 F. 2d 320, 322 (1966); Klamath & Modoc 
Tribes, v. United States, 174 Ct. Cl. 483, 490-491 (1966); Menominee Tribe 
v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl. 555, 562 (1945); Menominee Tribe v. United 
States, 101 Ct. Cl. 10, 18-20 (1944); Smith v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 
56, 60 (ND Cal. 1978); Manchester Band of Pomo Indians, Inc. v. United 
States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1243-1248 (ND Cal. 1973). 
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right to the value of the resources if the Secretary's duties 
are not performed. "Absent a retrospective damages rem-
edy, there would be little to deter federal officials from vi-
olating their trust duties, at least until the allottees managed 
to obtain a judicial decree against future breaches of trust." 
United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S., at 550 (WHITE, J., dis-
senting). Cf. H. R. Rep. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 
(1945). 
The Government contends that violations of duties imposed 
by the various statutes may be cured by actions for declara-
tory, injunctive or mandamus relief against the Secretary, 
although it concedes that sovereign immunity might have 
barred such suits before 1976.32 Brief of the United States at 
40. In this context, however, prospective equitable reme-
dies are totally inadequate. To begin with, the Indian allot-
tees are in no position to monitor federal management of 
their lands on a consistent basis. Many are poorly educated, 
most are absentee owners, and many do not even know the 
exact physical location of their allotments. Indeed, it was 
the very recognition of the inability of the Indians to oversee 
their interests that led to federal management in the first 
place. A trusteeship would mean little if the beneficiaries 
were required to supervise the day-to-day management of 
their estate by their trustee or else be precluded from recov-
ery for mismanagement. 
In addition, by the time government mismanagement be-
comes apparent, the damage to Indian resources may be so 
severe that a prospective remedy may be next to worthless. 
For example, if timber on an allotment has been destroyed 
through Government mismanagement, it will take many 
years for nature to restore the timber. As this Court has 
observed, 
32 See Naganab v. Hitchcock , 202 U. S. 473, 475-476 (1906). In 1976 
Congress enacted a general consent to such suits. See 5 U. S. C. § 702. 
22 
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"Once logged off, the land is of little value. The land no 
longer serves the purpose for which it was by treaty set 
aside to [the allottee's] ancestors, and for which it was 
allotted to him. It can no longer be adequate to his 
needs and serve the purpose of bringing him finally to a 
state of competency and independence." 
Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1, 10 (1956). 
We thus conclude that the statutes and r%_lllations at i~~ue 
here Cl!Jl f~e interRreted as mandating compensation by 
the Federal Government for violations of its fiduciary respon-
sibilities in the management of Indian property. The Court 
of Claims therefore has jurisdiction over respondents' claims 
for alleged breaches of trusts. 
IV 
The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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TO: Jim DATE: June 15, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-1748 u.s. v. Mitchell 
I think your dissent effectively destroys the 
Court's opinion, and reflects your usual care and 
thoroughness. 
In the rush of this month, I have not been able 
to do what I usually think is a part of my responsibility: 
i.e., refresh my recollection by looking back at our file, 
the briefs and the Court opinion. 
To the extent that my recollection is accurate, 
I agree with your reasoning. Indeed, it is a great deal 
stronger - and better documented - that I ever thought 
possible. 
It seems so totally to undermine the Court's 
reasoning and conclusion, I do want you to be sure that we 
are fair. 
Not unexpectedly, I think the opinion is too 
long, and may be too fully documented in lengthy 
footnotes, to be as effective as a somewhat briefer 
opinion will be. I am not expecting, at this season of 
the Term, to persuade two other Justices to defect from 
TM's opinion. I am thinking, rather, about the judgment 
of the soundness of our position by the lawyers and courts 
- and commentators - who will review carefully what the 
Court has done in this case. I think their overall 
judgmentwill agree with us that the Court has gone off on 
an unprecedented tangent. 
My editing has been essentially stylistic. Only 
occasionally have I tried to identify deletions. I do 
suggest, in a further review by you and your edito,r that 
you be on the lookout for repetition that may weaken 
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FIRST DRAFT: United States v. Mitchell, No. 81-1748 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The controlling law in this case is clear. Speaking 
for the Court in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 
(1980) (Mitchell I), JUSTICE MARSHALL reaffirmed the 5 
general principle that a cause of action for damages 
against the United States "'cannot be implied but must be 
unequivocally expressed.'" Id., at 538 (quoting United 
States v. King, 395 u.s. 1, 4 (1969)). See Lehman v. 
Nakshian, 453 u.s. 156, 170 (1981) (BRENNAN, J. , 
dissenting) ~here, as here, a claim for money damages is 
predicated upon an alleged statutory violation, the rule 
is that the statute does not create a cause of action for 
damages unless the statute "in itself • • • can fairly be 
interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 15 
Government for the damage sustained." United States v. 
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402 (1976) (quoting Eastport 
Steamship Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1008-1009 
(Ct. Cl. 1967)). See, e. g., Army & Air Force Exchange 
' 
' 
Service v. Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728, 739-7 40 (1982) ( "Testan 20 '. 
'" 
[held] that the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where ~. : 
; 
2. 
damages claims against the United States have been 
authorized explicitly") (emphasis added); id., at 739 
(damages remedy available where the statutes "specifically 
authorize awards of money damages") ; id. , at 741 2 
(reaffirming that an action for damages under the Tucker 
Act may not be premised upon "regulations ••• which do not 
explicitly authorize damages awards") .'J/ In sum, whether 
the United States has created a cause of action turns upon 
the intent of Congress, not the inclinations of the 3 
courts. See United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 502 
(1940); Munro v. United States, 303 u.s. 36, 41 (1938). 
~~4.d..~ 
Today, the Court does net sotRQr to ai~eev&r the intent of 
Congress. The rights of action that the Court finds 
"mandated" by an amalgamation of federal statutes "is in 3 
cold reality but a strong and . clear wish upon the judge's 
part." United States v. Mitchell, 664 F.2d 265, 277 (Ct. 
Cl. 1981) (Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting). I 
The Court does not--and clearly cannot--contend that 
any of the statutes standing alone reflects the necessary 
, .. . . 
3. 
c:£, 
legislative mandate for 1!-he etYaila~-i.t.y of t:+t~ damages 
remedy. None of the statutes contain any "provision 
that expressly makes the United States liable" for its 4 1 
alleged mismanagement of Indian forest resources and their 
proceeds or that "grant [ s] • • • a right of action • • • with 
specificity." Testan, 424 U.S., at 399-400. Indeed, 
nothing in the timber sale statutes, 25 u.s.c. §§406, 
407, 1 466, 2 the road and right-of-way statutes, §§318a, 51 
323-325, 3 or the interest statute, §162a, 4 addresses in 
1The only monetary obligation imposed upon the 
Secretary by §406 or §407 is to pay the actual "proceeds" 
of timber sales to the owners of the land. Thus, while it 
may be that those sections would ground an action to 
compel the Secretary to disgorge unlawfully retained 
proceeds, see United States v. Testan, 424 u.s. 392, 401 
(1976) , no statutory basis ex1sts for extending that 
remedy to proceeds that arguably or ideally should have 
been, but were not, captured by the Secretary. On the 
contrary, the statutory recognition of some right to 
receive the "proceeds" of sales conducted suggests that 
this is the limit of any damages action implicitly 
authorized by Congress. See United States v. Erika, Inc., 
456 U.S. 201, 208 (1982); Middlesex County Sewerage 
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 
1, 14-15, 20-21 (1981). 
2section 466 merely requires the Secretary to "make 
rules and regulations for the operation and management of 
Indian forestry units on the principle of sustained-yield 
management." As the Court of Claims recognized, 664 F.2d 
265, 272 (1981), there plainly is no statutory directive 
to pay compensation. Rather the duty imposed upon the 
Secretary is simply to adopt appropriate regulations. 
3section 318a merely authorizes the appropriation 
of funds for building of roads on Indian reservations. It 
would be a ~ radical change in the law of sovereign 
immunity to hold that a routine authorization statute 
allows individuals who might be benefitted if the 
appropriations e made to bring an action to recover 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following pages. 
4. 
any respect the institution of damages actions against the 
United States. Nor is there any indication in the 
legislative history of the statutes that Congress intended 
to consent to damages actions for mismanagement of Indian 5 
assets by enacting these provisions. 5 The Court does not 
damages. And although §325 may ~~ctian ~  
recove:~.~mpensation wrongfully withheld from the Indians J 
Ol1'~r ~~~ J...ande ie '<Ia~ 9raRt-e(l, it does not follow that 
damages for failure to secure more generous compensation 
are available. Indeed, the explicit statutory recognition 
of the Secretary's authority to determine the amount of 
compensation militates J:'IQHerftli~ against any damages 
remedy for insufficient compensation. 
4Rather than compelling a particular level of 
compensation, §162a affords the Secretary substantial 
----------~~~~~~-lr~e•specting the investments to be made with 
individual In 1 unds. There is nothing in the statute 
that requires paymen particular rate of interest. A 
fortiori, Congress has not ~eftt~ ~e reRe~r the United 
States accountable in damages for any amount by which the 
revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable 
management zeal to get for the Indians the best rate." 
664 F.2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
5It is especially improbable that Congress intended 
to consent to monetary liability for forestry 
mismanagement on allotted lands, because, at the time in 
question, at least some, if not all, government officials 
believed that heavily forested lands were not to be 
allotted. See United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 449 
(1924) • And before 1964, §406 was a rather bare 
instrument, simply giving an Indian permission to sell his 
timber with the Secretary's permission. The legislative 
history of the 1964 amendments to §406 also fails to 
supply the necessary evidence of congressional intent. 
The House Report states that "[n]o additional expenditure 
of Federal funds" was expected to be incurred by reason of 
the enactment of the legislation. H.R. Rep. No. 1292, 
88th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1964). A letter from the 
Interior Department to the Congress urging enactment of 
the legislation explained that the standards for timber 
sales on allotted lands "should help allay disputes and 
avoid misunderstand~g." S. Rep. No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 3 (1963) • L!~ the Court at all is interested in 
~~furthering congresssional intent, it is difficult to see 
~ how litigation over damages will do i~ 
5. 
suggest otherwise. 
It ordinarily. may be correct that a statute vesting 
an individual or members of a designated class with an 
absolute right to receive a sum certain from an 61 
administrative office of the United States grounds an 
action for the recovery of damages--or at least the sum 
withheld--in the event of nonpayment. See Testan, 424 
U.S., at 400 (reserving the question and citing with 
approval Mosca v. United States, 417 F.2d 1382, 1386 
(Ct .Cl. 1969) (statute must create a "right to recover a 
certain sum"), cert. denied, 399 u.s. 911 (1970)): United 
States v. Hvoslef, 237 u.s. 1, 10 (1915) (statute 
"leave [s] no question" that refunds are to be made to 
particular claimants by an administrative officer). 7 
Monetary recovery may be had against the United States 
upon such a claim for "actual, presently due money money 
damages." United States v. King, 395 U.S., at 3 ("' [T]he 
only judgments which the Court of Claims [is] authorized 
to render against the government are judgments for 7 
money found due from the government to the [claimant] '") 
(quoting United States v. Alire, 73 u.s. (6 Wall.) 573, 
6. 
575 (1867}}. But again, the Court does not rest upon any 
such statute or right. 6 
~~dl<. 
Instead, T he Court rests upon the novel proposition 8 
t\ 
~ 
that statutes w.a4-eh do not in terms create any right to 
payment of money nonetheless may support a damage action 
~~~~ 
against the United States. '!'flat prnposi tion ia eliffictll-t 
.tp -t-{ ~ f-1.--<. 
in.Qe.e6- ~ reconcile with thia -e&I:H'b '-s decisions in Testan 
1\ ""' "' 
and Mitchell I. A nonmonetary duty, 7 without more, harely 8 
~~~k 
~ overcomef the omni~sent "presumption" that Congress has 
6The Government concedes that, because the 1964 
amendment to §406 provided for deduction of administrative 
fees from timber sale proceeds "to the extent permissible 
under [25 U.S.C. §413] ," an action to recover unlawfully 
high administrative fees may be maintained against the 
United States as one seeking recovery of "money improperly 
exacted or retained." Testan, 424 u.s., at 401. And like 
claims for excessive administration fees, respondents' 
claim for deduction of roadbuilding fees also may be 
maintainable on the theory that recovery of funds 
unlawfully retained is sought. Finally, the Government 
concedes that failure to apply to the respondents' account 
interest actually earned likely would give rise to a right 
to redress in damages on the theory that respondents' fund 
had been "wrongfully retained." Thus, to the extent that 
the judgment of the Court of Claims would permit an action 
to recover withheld fees and interest, the Government 
apparently does not seek review, and I have no occasion to 
decide the issue. 
7Although not dispositive, the monetary character 
of the statutory right is a strong indication that a 
statute "in itself can fairly be interpreted as 
mandating compensation." By contrast, where, as here, the 
duties imposed by a statute are not essentially monetary 
in character, but require implementation through conduct 
by federal officials, the contrary inference arises: that 
Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, created 
only a substantive right enforceable through injunctive 
relief. See Testan, 424 u.s., at 401, n. 5, 403. 
7. 
not consented to suit for money damages. See Eastern 
Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686 
(1927). I-t. is al~o d-iti-ici:IJ t to sqna.r . .e witl:l Th is Court~ 
~ ~~------AJ~~ ~ 
empl:lae4s in recent case~~n congressional intent ae~e 91 
ultimate standard in determing whether a private right of 
action should be inferred from a statute that does not, in 
terms, provide for such an action. 8 Those cases are 
instructive in thilit---CORtex~ for here, too, the "ultimate 
question is one of congressional intent, not one of 9~ 
whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the 
statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 u.s. 560, 578 (1979). As the 
vv-L-, 
~ recognized in Testan, courts are not free to 
1\ 
dispense with "established principles" requiring explicit 10( 
congressional authorization for maintenance of suits 
e. g., Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit 
U.S. 15, 20-23 (1982); Middlesex County, 453 
13-18; Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff 
~~~~~~I~n~c~., 451 u.s. 630, 639-640 (1981); California 
~----~C_lu_b_, 451 u.s. 287, 292-298 (1981); Northwest 
C4~1-H-w-~~ ~~ 
~~~~~~~~ 
 ~ ~ ~ 1/.1-~~~_, 
8. 
against the United States simply "because it might be 
thought that they should be responsive to a particular 
conception of enlightened governmental policy." 424 u.s., 
at 400. 9 See Shaw, 309 U.S., at 502. ~ he Court~ 
'\ 
S" /.. ?t.d) ~ r 
adduc~A ~y ~vidence that Congress 
anticipated that there would be a private remedy." 
California v. Sierra Club, 451 u.s. 287, 298 {1981). 
Thus, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" of any 
10~ 
of the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 11( 
436 u.s. 49, 59 {1978), or in their legislative histories, 
c.~J 
;-<:s-- c-aaRn "fairly be 1\ interpreted as mandating compensation" for 
the conduct alleged by respondents. Some of the statutes 
involved here, to be sure, create substantive duties that 
9 0 
the Secretary must fulfill. But this could equally be 
said of the Classification Act, considered in Testan# 
9f 
wAiefl unambiguously requires that pay classification 
1\ 
ratings of federal employees be carried out pursuant to 
the principle of "equal pay for substantially equal work." 
5 U.S.C. §5101(1) (A). Although Testan alleged a violation 
of the Act, the Court concluded that a back pay remedy was 
unavailable, rejecting the ~~tive 
'h . ~ r1g t necessarily 1~parts a damages remedy. 424 u.s., at 
400-403. The Court's conclusion in this case, however, 
; t Ae&l 
11 
12 
rests largely upon its view that an injunctive remedy is 12 
~ 
inadequate to redress the violations alleged--precisely 
the inference deemed inadmissible in Testan. 10 
tl.b:uJ 
lOM~~significant 
~~a~l~l~-~~~~sedeat is the Court's remand for further 
0 proceedings consistent with its opinion . . The compass has 
no hands. Given the strictness with which consents to 
suit by the sovereign are to be construed, United States 
v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590-591 (1941), where the 
------------~s~t~a~t~u~te upon which liability is premised creates no right 
to pay nt of a sum certain, the Court of Claims will be 
~bliged o determine the extent of liability, if any, and 
· the it s of damages that are cognizable • wi tbont aJ,::J.y "<1 
; Q.gis1atiJz.e --9.lli~. This task, unlike the factual or 
-~A/A~~~ egal determination whether a particular individual falls 
~.,- ~.,...,-- - i thin a class granted a right to payment of money by a 
~ statute, is not one to which courts are adapted. Any 
f -- 1 rules established will be of "judicial cloth, not 
legislative cloth." See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of 
Hawaii, 454 u.s. 139, 141 (1981). I assume, however, that 
the law of trusts generally will control and that all 
defenses to actions on breaches of trust, such as consent 
by the beneficiary and laches, will be fully available to 
Footnote continued on next page. 
10. 
It is the ordinary result of sovereign immunity that 
unconsented claims for money damages are barred. The fact 
that damages cannot be recovered without the 
sovereign's 
~ ~ 
consent ~Q.oes R&t support
1 
the conclusion that 
~I LAA,...-~/ ,_,_ 
COnSent has been given. Yet the Court's reasoning Js- RO 
" m~ wai~hty ~~at. If J~s~~~~r{g 
,1' I ~ 
~~riA-~~ ~ 
~that a remedy is necessary to redress'\ injury sustained, 
~~~ 
13 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity~wotlld be tob~d -ef --all - 13 
~#-/~~'· 
effec~. Moreover, "many of the federal statutes ••• that 
expressly provide money damages as a remedy against the 
United States in carefully limited circumstances would be 
rendered superfluous." Testan, 424 U.S., at 404. 
14 
prece<!etrt. 
Q ·~ ;/-;~, . - f h 
There "i'S no exam1nat1on o t e language and 14 
1\ 
the legislative history of the statutes held to give rise 
11. 




sentence: "Because the statutes and regulations at issue 15( 
in this case clearly establish fiduciary obligations of 
the Government in the management and operation of Indian 
lands and resources, they can fairly be interpreted as 
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for 




~ rests on two dubious assumptions. 'Phe Ceurt ;hrst, ,;/ 
decides that the statutes create or recognize 
fiduciary duties. 
~ 
The Court p!'ose9ds to reaso~ that 
because a private express trust normally imports a right 
15~ 
to recover damages for breach, and because injunctive 16! 
Congress necessarily must have authorized recovery of 
damages 
; r.--~A~>~ ~ 
for =fe:£!!r~erf0rmancf ~ the statutory duties. 
I - have -t-l:'o\f"b.l.e--~m~ -rhe relevancy of the first 
~~~/~ 
conclusio~ , ~thh1~ the second is simply wrong. 
The Court ;:1<:.:: ~~ ~!;:;' 11r 77' 
~npulsion be p't"'educe .,... &fty evidence that the statutory 
16~ 
12. 
duties Congress imposed 9¥ 4!: . .t.b . . . enae l Rge var1~~ov1ero~ 
~~ . 
to impose ~ duties. ¥et none ~ at ieetle were intended 
?t.ur-do ~ 
A of the timber sale or management statutes upon which 17( 
~ 
respondents rely makf' any reference wn~oeve-r to trust 
duties. Rather, the Court simply holds that the statutes 
here "clearly establish fiduciary obligations." Ante, at 
20. See also id., at 19 ("a fiduciary relationship 
J(CrJ 
necessarily arises"). I--..ac;L<m~~afHou .......... a.-.Ei-0 A Kh ere is kind of a 175 
bootstrap quality of reasoning in saying that [the United 
States'] duties expressed by law are those of a trustee, 
and, therefore, we may look at Scott on Trusts or the 
Restatement of Trusts and impose on [the Government] all 
the other consequences the law, as stated by those 180 
authorities, derives from the status of an erring 
nongovernmental trustee." 664 F.2d, at 283 (Nichols, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 'l"ft.Q.._Conrt in its eagerness to 
create a d~dy -f'or Indians overlooks tae -fcrct 
. , --1- ~~ . 
that 4!!-1 te 1 ederal ~r over Indian lands is so different 18~ 
-"'\ 
in nature and origin from that of a private trus~ that 
~ 
cautionjis warranted/\ i"i'l l:ilSi~ the -me~>e 1 aheJ "tru&t" and a-
~~~~~ 
reaeins ef Scott on Trusts to impose liability where 
13. 
~~~~~~ 
~~ . d. Ibid. 11J1'The 
~ 
trusteeship to which the Court has referred in the past 
.tl 
ha~manifested more the view that pervasive control over 
Indian life is such a high attribute of federal 
sovereignty that states cannot infringe upon that control. 
Ibid. 12 ~ The Cou~  
number of widely varying ll"There ~ft.J-e a 
relationships more or less closely resemble trusts, 
but which are not trusts, although the term 1 trust 1 is 
sometimes used loosely to cover such relationships. It is 
important to differentiate trusts from these other 
relationships, since many of the rules applicable to 
trusts are not applicable to them." Restatement {Second) 
of Trusts §4, at 15 {1959). For example, the Court often 
has described the fiduciary relationship between the 
United States and Indians as one between a guardian and a 
ward. But "[a] guardianship is not a trust." Id., §8. 
There is no explanation, however, why the Court--chooses 
one analogy and not another. I can only conclude that the 
choice was influenced by the fact that "[t]he duties of a 
trustee are more intensive than the duties of other 
fiduciaries." Id., §2, comment b. 
The Court-asserts that "[a]ll of the necessary 
elements of a common-law trust are present"--a trustee, a 
beneficiary, and a trust corpus. Ante, at 19. But 
~ two persons and a parcel of real property, without 
more, do not create a trust. Rather, "[a] trust 
arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to 
create it." Id., §2. See id., §23 {"A trust is created 
only if the settlor properry-manifests an intention to 
create a trust."); id., §25 {"No trust is created unless 
the settlor manifest"S an intention to impose enforceable 
duties."). This is the element that is missing in this 
case, and the Court does not, and cannot, find that 
Congress has manifested its intent to make the statutory 
duties upon which respondents rely trust duties. Cf. id., 
§95 {"The United States ••• has capacity to take and hold 
property in trust, but in the absence of a statute 
otherwise providing the trust is unenforceable against the 
United States •.•• "). Futhermore, a trustee can 
"reserv [ e] powers with respect to the administration of 
the trust." Id., §37. Unless the United States agrees to 
be held liable 1n damages, I der~ ~ae ho~~ the existence 
of a trust automatiG~Y means that the Gove nment ~as ROt 
~d ts immunity from damages. ~






It is I'ft&i!e -thii-R- a.c~\:labl-e that mismanagement of 
1\ 
lands is r more analogous to misgovernment 
than it is to the misfeasance of a h fstamenLMy trust. 
Ibid. Cf. Nevada v. United States, U.S • __ , __ , n. 
15 {1983) {breach of fiduciary duty to Indians "reflects 
19 
the nature of a democratic government that is charged with 201 
12The Court has invoked the fiduciary relation 
primarily {i) to preclude unauthorized state interference 
in the relations between the United States and the Indian 
tribes or other unauthorized exercise of state 
jurisdiction on Indian lands, see e. g., United States v. 
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382-384 {1886); {ii) to bar or 
nullify exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters 
affecting Indian property rights, in which the United 
States was not properly joined or represented, see, e. g., 
Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 386 {1939); 
United States v. Candelaria, 271 u.s. 432, 442 {1926); 
{iii) to interpret doubtful or ambiguous treaty language 
in favor of the Indians, see, e. g., United States v. 
Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117-118 {1938); Minnesota v. 
Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 396 {1902); {iv) to limit the 
liability of the United States for damages under the Just 
Compensation Clause where, acting as a fiduciary manager, 
it has converted the form of Indian property, see, e. g., 
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 u.s. 371, 
415-416 {1980); cf. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 u.s. 553, 
568 {1903); and {v) to emphasize the high standard of care 
that the United States is obliged to exercise in carrying 
out its duties respecting the Indians, see, e. g., United 
States v. Mason, 412 u.s. 391, 398 {1973); Seminole Nation 
v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-297 {1942). But the 
Court has never, until today, invoked the doctrine to 
.auggeat that the United States is answerable in money 
damages for breaches of the standards applicable to a 
p r iva t e f i d u cia r • Tli u r t a eM-l-v.---'t'-e-a-:l:-h~r----.tlh'!:t 
act, an a es that the existence of 
relationship between the United States 
people merely "reinforces" its nstruction of 
statutes upon which the Indi specifically rely. There 
is no indication in the~ urt's opinion, however, why this 
special relationship----should "reinforce" its conclusio 
at there are implied private rights of action. While I 
agree with the Court that the doctrine alone cannot groun 
ny righ of action for damages, I disagree with th 
ourt' assumption that the doctrine remains relevant t 
Inquiry. 
15. 
more than one responsibility"} . In my view, the Court 
today substantially retreats from JUSTICE BLACKMUN's words 
for the Court in Army & Air Force, where we "explicitly 
1\ 
rejected the argument that 'the violation of any statute 
or regulation relating to federal employment automatically 20 1 
creates a cause of action against the United States for 
money damages. ' " 456 U.S., at 739 (quoting Testan, 424 
u.s., at 401}. would have thought the issue 
remains one of congressional intent and 
respondent's claims must stand or 21 
themselves, not on some judicially implied or recogni 
But more remarkable than the implication of trust 
duties from statutory duties is the conclusion that the 
mere existence of a trust of some kind necessarily 21 
~[~ 
establishes that Congress has consented to recovery of 
13 I do not suggest that an express declaration of 
trust embodied in a statute is without . bearing in our 
inquiry. But such an explicit declaration of trust simply 
is to be considered along with all other evidence of 
legislative intent, including, most importantly, the 
language of the statute itself, in determining whether 
Congress has made the United States accountable in money 
damages for a statutory violation. And any such factor is 
irrelevant in this case, for there is no such declaration 
of trust, and the Court does not suggest otherwise. 
16. 
damages. We apparently are to accept the existence of a 
cause of action for damages on faith: "Given the existence 
of a trust relationship, it naturally follows that the 
Government should be liable in damages for the breach of 22( 
its fiduciary duties." Ante, at 20 (emphasis added). See 
also id., at 20 (damages are a "fundamental incident" of a 
trust relationship}; id. (it would be "anomalous" not to 
find a damages remedy). The Court can find no more 
support for this proposition than the dissenting opinion 22~ 
in Mitchell I. See ante, at 21.14 The Court 
why it is especially proper to infer a trust 
rise to ~en~ry liabilities in the absence of any 
indication that Congress has consented to 
opinion, the Court has 23( 
effectively reversed the "presumption," Eastern 
Transportation, 272 u.s., at 686, that absent "affirmative 
statutory authority," United States v. United States 
14The Court tries to get support out of Seminole 
Nation v. United States, supra, and United States v. Creek 
Nation, 295 u.s. 103 (1935), but both actually cut against 
the Court's theory in this case. The Court's discussion 
of the Government's fiduciary duty in Seminole Nation 
referred to a claim to compel payments expressly 
prescribed by Treaty. See 316 U.S., at 296-297. Creek 
Nation involved a taking claim. 
17. 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 u.s. 506, 514 (1940); see 
Shaw, 309 u.s., at 500 ("specific statutory consent"); 23~ 
Munro, 303 u.s., at 41 ("only by permission"), the United 
States has not consented to be sued. It has substituted a 
contrary presumption, applicable to the conduct of the 
United States in Indian af£.J.rs, that the United States 
has consented to be sued for statutory violations and 24( 
other departures from the rules that govern private 
fiduciaries. 
I do not believe that the fact that respondents are 
Indians should alter the analysis through which courts 
determine whether damages may be recovered against the 24~ 
United States for statutory violations. So far as the 
availability of money damages is concerned, Indians are 
situated no differently than any other claimant against 
the United States. It simply does not follow that, merely 
because Congress has authorized the Secretary to act in 25( 
Indian affairs, every act of Congress constitutes the 
"affirmative statutory authority" necessary to maintain an 
action for damages. On the contrary, the requirement of 
unequivocal congressional consent to suit against the 
18. 
United States is fully applicable to Indian claimants. 25~ 
See, e. q. , Klamath Indians v. United States, 296 U.S. 
244, 250 (1935); id., at 254-255 ("Regard being had to the 
nature of duties, resembling those arising out of the 
relation of guardian and ward, owed by the United States 
to Indian tribes, . • • it is clear that, in the absence of 26t 
specific authorization, they may not [complain] that the 
payment was too small.") (footnote omitted); Blackfeather 
v. United States, 190 U.S. 368, 376 (1903) • 15 In each 
case, the question is whether the particular statute 
invoked "in itself can fairly be interpreted as 
mandating compensation." Indians, like other claimants 
against the United States, must be able to identify a 
statutory basis for their claims. There has been no 
attempt here. 
15 Indeed, if the fact that respondents are Indians 
has any bearing on the question whether the statutes upon 
which the Court relies implicitly grant the right to 
recover damages against the United States, it must be the 
accompanying fact that the prevailing legal regime at the 
time most of the statues now invoked were adopted 
generally deprived Indian claimants of any monetary remedy 
against the United States. Until 1946, the Court of 
Claims could not have even entertained these claims absent 
a special jurisdictional act. Ante, at 8. Thus, it is 
most unlikely that Congress intended to create a right to 
recover damages against the United States in 1910 by 
enacting §407, in 1928 by enacting §318a, in 1934 by 
enacting §466, and in 1938 by enacting §162a. 
26~ 
On occasion I have of the 
theoretical and pract · implying 
action. This case 
~ 
~most cases .in-w~~~~~~QYLL~~~~~ewQQ~~~~~~~~n 
to play le<Jis.l.ature ,, I continue that the 27! 
Court's willingness to imply causes f action it sees as 
necessary to further perceived policy encourages 
not only "political default ongress," but "an increase 
in the governmental powe exercised by the federal 
judiciary." Cannon v. niversit of Chica o, 441 U.S. 281 
677' 743-744 (1979) OWELL, J., dissenting). Any such 
self-made expansion of our jurisdiction "runs contrary to 
the established rinciple that '[t]he jurisdiction of the 
federal cour is carefully guarded against expansion by 
judicial i terpretation . . . , American Fire & Cas. Co. v • 
Finn, u.s. 6, 17 (1951), and conflicts with the 
auth rity of Congress under Art. III to set the limits of 
eral jurisdiction." Cannon, 441 U.S., at 747. 
The Court has not endeavored to demonstrate that 
Congress actually intended to render the United States 29 , 
20. 
answerable in damages upon claims of the kind presented 
here. Nor did the Court of Claims. As would have Judge 
Davis, 
"I would hold that the mere application of a 
trust label to certain governmental functions 
respecting Indians, whether applied expressly by 
Congress or by judicial wish-fulfillment 
inference from the statutory imposition of 
trustee-like duties on the executive branch, 
does not constitute unequivocal assent to suits 
against the government for money damages when 
these duties are badly performed. It does not 
bring into play all that Scott on Trusts 
thunders against an erring testamentary trustee. 
Something more is required, such as the 
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SECOND DRAFT: United States v. Mitchell, No. 81-1748 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The controlling law in this case is clear. Speaking 
for the Court in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 
(1980) (Mitchell I), JUSTICE MARSHALL reaffirmed the 
general principle that a cause of action for damages 
against the United States "'cannot be implied but must be 
unequivocally expressed.'" Id., at 538 (quoting United 
States v. King, 395 u.s. 1, 4 (1969)). See United States 
v. Hopkins, 427 u.s. 123, 128 (1976) ("specific command of 1 
statute or authorized regulations") ; Lehman v. Nakshian, 
453 U.S. 156, 170 (1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 
Where, as here, a claim for money damages is predicated 
upon an alleged statutory violation, the rule is that the 
statute does not create a cause of action for damages 1 
unless the statute "'in itself can fairly be 
interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 
Government for the damage sustained.'" United States v. 
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 402 (1976) (quoting Eastport S.S. 
Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1008-1009 (Ct. Cl. 2 
1967)). See,~~' Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. 
--
2. 
Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728, 739-7 40 (1982) ( "Testan [held] that 
the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where damages claims 
against the United States have been authorized 
explicitly") (emphasis added); id., at 739 (damages remedy 2 1 
available where the regulations "specifically authorize 
awards of money damages"); id., at 741 (reaffirming that 
an action for damages under the Tucker Act may not be 
premised upon "regulations which do not explicitly 
authorize damages awards" ) it' In s urn, whether the United 3 
States has created a cause of action turns upon the intent 
of Congress, not the inclinations of the courts. See 
United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500 (1940) ("specific 
statutory consent"); Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36, 
41 (1938) ("only by permission"). 3 
Today, the Court appears disinterested in the intent 
J;-
of Congress. tAe Court has effectively 
-"\ 
reversed the presumption that absent "affirmative 
statutory authority," United States v. United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 u.s. 506, 514 (1940), the 4 
United States has not consented to be sued for damages. 
It has substituted a contrary presumption, applicable to 
3. 
the conduct of the United States in Indian affairs, that 
the United States has consented to be sued for statutory 
violations and other departures from the rules that govern 4~ 
private fiduciaries. I;zs dissent from the Court's 
departure from long-settled principles. 
I 
The Court does not--and clearly cannot--contend that 
any of the statutes standing alone reflects the necessary 5C 
t:UL~v(, 
legislative maRdate tar a damages remedy. None of the 
1\ 
statutes contains any "provision ••• that expressly makes 
the United States liable" for its alleged mismanagement of 
Indian forest resources and their proceeds or grants a 
right of action "with specificity." Testan, 424 u.s., at 5~ 
399, 400. Indeed, nothing in the timber-sales statutes, 
25 U.S.C. §§406, 407, 1 466, 2 the road and right-of-way 
{J-~~ 
1The only monetary obligation imposed upon the 
Secretary by §406 or §407 the actual "proceeds" 
of timber sales to the owne s of the land. Thus, while it 
r..---:m=-a::-:y;:--'1 be that those sectio s would permit an action to 
compel the Secretary to eie~o~~e unlawfully retained 
proceeds, see United States v. Testan, 424 u.S. 392, 401 
1~ (1976 no statutory basis exists for extending that ,~k J remed that arguably or ideally should have r· een, but were no , oap~!'-eO by the Secretary. On the 
contrary, the statutory recognition of a right to receive 
the "proceeds" of sales conducted suggests that this is 
the limit of any damages action implicitly authorized by 
Congress. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages. 
-;• 
4. 
statutes, §§318a, 323-325, 3 or the interest statute, 
§162a, 4 addresses in any respect the institution of 
damages actions against the United States. Nor is there 60 
any indication in the legislative history of the statutes 
that Congress intended to consent to damages actions for 
mismanagement of Indian assets by enacting these 
provisions. 5 The Court does not suggest otherwise. 
National Sea Clammers Assn., 
( 1981) • Cf. United States v. 
208 (1982) 0 
453 u.s. 1, 
Erika, Inc., 
14-15' 20-21 
456 u.s. 201, 
2section 466 merely requires the Secretary to "make 
rules and regulations for the operation and management of 
Indian forestry units on the principle of sustained-yield 
management." 
3section 318a ~ authorizes the appropriation 
of funds for building of roads on Indian reservations. It 
would be a radical change in the law of sovereign immunity 
to hold that a routine authorization statute allows 
individuals who might benefit from appropriations to bring 
an action to recover damages. And although §325 requires 
"the payment of such compensation as the Secretary of the 
Interior shall determine to be just," it does not follow 
that damages for failure to secure more generous 
compensation are available. Indeed, the explicit 
statutory recognition of the Secretary's authority to 
determine the amount of compensation militates against any 
damages remedy for insufficient compensation. See 
Plumbers & Pipefitters v. Plumbers & Pipefitters, 452 u.s. 
615, 630 (1981) (BURGER, C.J., dissenting). 
4section 162a affords the Secretary substantial 
discretion respecting investments to be made with 
individual Indian funds. There is nothing in the statute 
that requires payment of a particular rate of interest, 
much less that makes the United States accountable in 
damages for any amount by which the revenues earned fall 
short of a standard of "reasonable management zeal to get 
for the Indians the best rate." Mitchell v. United 
States, 664 F.2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
5It is ~a:Uy improbable that Congress intended 
§406 to constitute consent to monetary liability for 
forestry mismanagement on allotted lands, because, at the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
1\ 
5. 
The Court for the most part rests its decision on the 65 
I~
~ . t . th t t t t th t d t . t no~e propos1 1on a s a u es a o no 1n erms 
create a right to payment of money nonetheless may support 
a damage action against the United States. This view 
~AI~ 
 be reconciled with the decisions in Testan and 
.1\ 
Mitchell I. A nonmonetary duty, 6 without more, is 
insufficient to overcome the "presumption" that Congress 
has not consented to suit for money damages. See Eastern 
Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675, 686 
# 
(1927) ·11 This Court has had occasion in recent cases to 
time in question, it appears the Government maintained the 
position that heavily forested lands were not to be 
allotted. See United States v. Payne, 264 u.s. 446, 449 
(1924). And before 1964, §406 was a rather bare 
instrument, simply giving an Indian permission to sell his 
timber with the Secretary's permission. See ante, at 13-
14. The legislative history of the 1964 amendments to 
§406, see ante, at 16, also fails to supply the necessary 
evidence of congressional intent. The House Report states 
that "[n] o addi tiona! expenditure of Federal funds" was 
expected to be incurred by reason of the enactment of the 
legislation. H.R. Rep. No. 1292, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 
(1964). A letter from the Interior Department to the 
Congress urging enactment of the legislation explained 
only that the standards for timber sales on allotted lands 
"should help allay disputes and avoid misunderstanding." 
s. Rep. No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963). 
6Although not dis~ositive, the monetary character 
of the statutory right is a strong indication that a 
statute "in itself can fairly be interpreted as 
mandating compensation." By contrast, where, as here, the 
duties imposed by a statute are not essentially monetary 
in character, but require implementation through conduct 
by federal officials, the contrary inference arises: that 
Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, created 
only a substantive right enforceable through injunctive 
relief. See Testan, 424 u.s., at 401, n. 5, 403. 
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6. 
emphasize that congressional intent is the ultimate 7 
standard in determing whether a private right of action 
should be inferred from a statute that does not, in terms, 
provide for such an action. 7 Those cases are instructive, 
for here, too, the "ultimate question is one of 
congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks 8 
that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that 
Congress enacted into law." Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979). As we recognized in 
Testan, courts are not free to dispense with "established 
principles" requiring explicit congressional authorization 8 
for maintenance of suits against the United States simply 
"because it might be thought that they should be 
responsive to a particular conception of enlightened 
governmental policy." 424 U.S., at 400. See Shaw, 309 
U.S., at 502. The Court today adduces no "evidence that 9 
7see, ~ ..<l!_, Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit 
Union, 457 U.S. 15, 20-23 (1982); Middlesex Count~, 453 
U.S., at 13-18; Texas Industries, Inc. v. Ra cliff 
Materials, Inc., 451 u.s. 630, 639-640 (1981); California 
v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 292-298 (1981); Northwest 
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 91-95 
(1981); Universities Research Assn., Inc. v. Coutu, 450 
U.S. 754, 770-784 (1981); Transamer ica Mortgage Advisors, 
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-24 (1979) • Against the 
background of sovereign immunity, the rationale of these 
cases should apply here with particular force. 
7. 
Congress anticipated that there would be a private 
remedy." California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298 
(1981). 
The Court defends its departure from our precedents 
on the ground that the statutes and regulations upon which 9 
respondents rely need not be "construed in the manner 
appropriate to waivers of sovereign immunity." Ante, at 
v v 
v v 
/.A(;. ~~-- 1,/L..- ~ ~) 
The Court AtG6ay must b~ overruling Mitchell I, for as 
-tt;:;.. 1\ 
Cou?t~ discussion o~ the Tucker Act makes clear, see 
12. 
the 
ante, at 10-13, th~re i:s no dottbt t~RhJ~re {;;e:) "accepted 10 
the government's claim that a strict standard of 
construction, applicable to deciding whether Congress had 
enacted a waiver of sovereign immunity, should be applied 
in interpreting substantive legislation for the benefit of 
Indian people." Hughes, Can the Trustee be Sued for its 10 
Breach? The Sad Saga of United States v. Mitchell, 26 S.D. 
L. Rev. 447, 473 (1981). We expressly held that the 
General Allotment Act at issue in Mitchell I "does not 
unambiguously provide that the United States has 
undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities." 445 u.s., at 11 
542 (emphasis added) • Cf. Army & Air Force Exchange 
·. 
8. 
Service v. Sheehan, 456 u.s., at 739 ("explicitly 
reject[ing] the argument that 'the violation of any 
statute or regulation ••• automatically creates a cause of 
action against the United States for money damages'") 11 
(quoting Testan, 424 u.s., at 401). ~ to 
co!lQl_udcs that e-i-tfl.er .:rh--e- €eurt ges i.a ee= to -Foe Mi~l. I 
"unambiguously" imposing trust duties on the Government. 
? 
clarity of 
implied dama es suits 
Court makes little or no pretense that it is following 12 
doctrine th4s 8etu··L_~ore ..a-s established 
~...?:~~ d't'' 'ggt4~; 
~  j a.Aal.¥Si& -soneh:t.s- e-ss-eft:EiaB:: y of a &iAgle 
~t~~; 
1\c@ftel:u.&er:s.f sent.e.n.ee: "Because the statutes and regulations 
at issue in this case clearly establish fiduciary 
obligations of the Government in the management and 13 
operation of Indian lands and resources, they can fairly 
be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 
9. 
Government for damages sustained." Ante, at 19-20. This 
conclusion rests on two dubious assumptions. First, the 
Court decides that the statutes create or recognize 13 
fiduciary duties. It then reasons that because a private 
express trust normally imports a right to recover damages 
for breach, and because injunctive relief is perceived to 
be inadequate, Congress necessarily must have authorized 
recovery of damages for failure properly to perform the 14 
statutory duties. The relevancy of the first conclusion 
is questionable, and the other departs from our 
precedents, chiefly Testan and Mitchell I. 
here "clearly establish fiduciary obligations." Ante, at 14 
20. See also id., at 19 ("a fiduciary relationship 
t:&:szzv;u(u~ 
necessarily arises"). I agree with the dissent in the 
¢ t of Claims that "there is kind of a bootstrap quality 
of reasoning in saying that [the United States'] duties 
expressed by law are those of a trustee, and, therefore, 15 
we may look at SCOTT ON TRUSTS or the RESTATEMENT OF 
TRUSTS and impose on [the Government] all the other 
consequences the law, as stated by those authorities, 
-.• ·~· 
10. 
derives from the status of an erring nongovernmental 
trustee." Mitchell v. United States, 664 F. 2d, at 283 155 
(Ct. Cl. 1981) (Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting). 
"The federal power over Indian lands is so different in 
nature and origin from that of a private trustee ••• that 
caution is taught in using the mere label of a trust plus 
a reading of SCOTT ON TRUSTS to impose liability on claims 160 
where assent is not unequivocally expressed." Ibid. 8 The 
8 "There are a of widely varying 
relationships which more or 1 ss closely resemble trusts, 
but which are not trusts, al hough the term 1 trust 1 is 
sometimes used loosely to cove such relationships. It is 
important to differentiate trusts from these other 
relationships, since many o the rules applicable to 
trusts are not applicable to Restatement (Second) 
of Trusts §4, Introductory ote, at 15 (1959). For 
example, the Court often ha described the fiduciary 
relationship between the Unite States and Indians as one 
between a guardian and a ward. But "[a] guardianship is 
not a trust." Id., §7. There s no explanation, however, 
why the Court chooses one anal gy and not another. ~:r- cana--
oH±~~ eRat lbe choice influenced by the fact 
that "[t] he duties of a trustee are more intensive than 
the duties of other fiduciaries." Id., §2, comment b. 
The Court asserts that "[aTir of the necessary 
elements of a common-law trust are present"--a trustee, a 
beneficiary, and a trust corpus. Ante, at 19. But two 
persons and a parcel of real property, without more, do 
not create a trust. Rather, "[a] trust •.• arises as a 
result of a manifestation of an intention to create it." 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §2. See id., §23 ("A 
trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an 
intention to create a trust."); id., §25 ("No trust is 
created unless the settlor manifests an intention to 
impose enforceable duties."). This is the element that is 
missing in this case, and the Court does not, and cannot, 
find that Congress has manifested its intent to make the 
statutory duties upon which respondents rely trust duties. 
Cf. id., §95. Indeed, given the language of the statute 
at issue in Mitchell I, the case for finding that Congress 
intended to impose fiduciary obligations on the United 
States was much stronger than it is here. See 445 u.s. at 
547 (WHITE, J., dissenting). One of the authorities cited 
Footnote continued on next page. 
11. 
trusteeships to which the Court has referred in the past 
have manifested more the view that pervasive control over 
Indian life is such a high attribute of federal 
sovereignty that States cannot infringe upon that control. 16! 
Ibid. 9 The Court today turns this shield into a sword. 
In my view, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" 
of any of the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
by JUSTICE WHITE, A. Scott, Law of Trusts §95 (1967), 
specifically discusses the General Allotment Act as an 
example of the United States acting as a trustee. 
Furthermore, a trustee can "reserv[e] powers with respect 
to the administration of the trust." Id., §37. Unless 
the United States agrees to be held liable in damages, 
, 11 . L even the existence of a trust does not necessarily ~ 
AA .~I\ that the Government has surrendered its immunity from 
__vv damages. 
9The Court has invoked the fiduciary relation 
primarily (i) to preclude unauthorized state interference 
in the relations between the United States and the Indian 
tribes or other unauthorized exercise of state 
jurisdiction on Indian lands, see~~, United States v. 
Kagama, 118 u.s. 375, 382-384 (1886) ~ (11) to bar or 
nullify exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters 
affecting Indian property rights, in which the United 
States was not properly joined or represented, see,~~, 
Minnesota v. United States, 305 u.s. 382, 386 (1939) ~ 
United States v. Candelaria, 271 u.s. 432, 442-444 (1926) ~ 
(iii) to interpret doubtful or ambiguous treaty language 
in favor of the Indians, see, ~ ~, United States v. 
Shoshone Tribe, 304 u.s. 111, 117-118 (1938) ~ Minnesota v. 
H1tchcock, 185 u.s. 373, 396 (1902) ~ (iv) to determ1ne the 
liability of the United States for damages under the Just 
Compensation Clause where, acting as a fiduciary manager, 
it has converted the form of Indian property, see,~~, 
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 u.S. 371, 
415-416 (1980)~ and (v) to emphasize the high standard of 
care that the United States is obliged to exercise in 
carrying out its duties respecting the Indians, see, e. 
~, United States v. Mason, 412 u.s. 391, 398 (1973T'i"" 
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-297 
(1942). But the Court has never, until today, invoked the 
doctrine to hold that the United States is answerable in 
money damages for breaches of the standards applicable to 
a private fiduciary. 
12. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978), or in their legislative 
histories, "fairly [can] be interpreted as mandating 17( 
compensation" for the conduct alleged by respondents. 
Some of the statutes involved here, to be sure, create 
substantive duties that the Secretary must fulfill. But 
this could equally be said of the Classification Act, 
considered in Testan. It requires that pay classification 17! 
ratings of federal employees be carried out pursuant to 
"the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work." 
5 u.s.c. §510l(l)(A). Although the federal employee in 
Testan alleged a violation of the Act, the Court concluded 
that a back pay remedy was unavailable, rejecting the 18( 
argument that the substantive right necessarily implies a 
damages remedy. 424 U.S., at 400-403. 
Ignoring this holding in Testan, the Court concludes 
that the mere existence of a trust of some kind 
necessarily establishes that Congress has consented to a 18! 
of w:-a~~~~ 
dama~es on 
"Given the existence of a trust relationship, it naturally 
follows that the Government should be liable in damages 
13. 
for the breach of its fiduciary duties." Ante, at 20 19 
(emphasis added) • See also ibid. (damages are a 
"fundamental incident" of a trust relationship); ibid. (it 
would be "anomalous" not to find a damages remedy). The 
Court can find no more support for this proposition than 
the dissenting opinion in Mitchell I. See ante, at 21. 10 19 
1\ {te ';,t:s:=l::: :::;:-;_u~+':n ~ ~ 
that an injunctive remedy is inadequate to redress the 
violations 
1%e 6&,1JI.e=ccA¢ ' ·• ""' , 
alleged--precisely 
.b-
the inference deemed 
inadmissible in Testan.ll It is the ordinary result of 
~ 
lOThe Court _A ~ rsupp rt out QofA~minole 
Nation v. United States, supra, and U ited States v. Creek 
Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935), but both actually cut against 
the Court's theory in this case. The Q ; 'L 'ediscussion ~ 
of the Government's fiduciary duty in Seminole Nation 
referred to a claim to compel payments expressly 
prescribed by Treaty. See 316 U.S., at 296-297. Creek 
Nation involved a taking claim. 
11Also significant is the Court's standardless 
remand for further proceedings consistent with its 
op1n1on. Given the strictness with which consents to suit 
by the sovereign are to be construed, United States v. 
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590-591 (1941), where the statute 
upon which liability is premised creates no right to 
payment of a sum certain, the Court of Claims will be 
required, without legislative guidance, to determine the 
extent of liability, if any, and the items of damages that 
are cognizable. This task, unlike the factual or legal 
determination whether a particular individual falls within 
a class granted a right to payment of money by a statute, 
is not one to which courts are adapted. Any rules 
established will be of "judicial cloth, not legislative 
cloth." Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 u.s. 
139, 141 (1981). I assume, however, that the law of 
trusts generally will control and that all defenses to 
actions on breaches of trust, such as consent by the 
beneficiary and laches, will be fully available to the 
United States. Cf. 664 F.2d, at 274. 
.. -
14. 
sovereign immunity that unconsented claims for money 20 
damages are barred. The fact that damages cannot be 
recovered without the sovereign's consent hardly supports 
the conclusion that consent has been given. Yet this, in 
substance, is the Court's reasoning. 
d-
If tJre eotHt is 
-<I 
saying that a remedy is necessary to redress every injury 
sustained, the doctrine of sovereign immunity will have 
been drained of all meaning. Moreover, "many of the 
federal statutes ••. that expressly provide money damages 
as a remedy against the United States in carefully limited 
';>0 
circumstances would be rendered superfluous." Testan, 424 21 
u.s., at 404. 
--Hr TV 7 
._____, I 
The Court has ~~;E-Q~monstrate that 
Congress intended to render the United States 
answerable in damages upon claims of the kind presented 21 
4A-~ 
I ~hiRk:-the mere application
1 
of the label "trust" here. 
not constitute 
United damages when these 
would 22 
15. 
judgment of the Court of Claims. 
.. 
I.Jil \ 8 \Sii 18lU 8 1 Nflt 
FIRST DRAFT: United States v. Mitchell, No. 81-1748 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The controlling law in this case is clear. 
Court in United States v. Mitchell, 445 u.s. 535 
Speaking for the 
{1980} {Mitchell 
l> ,. JUSTICE MARSHALL reaffirmed the general principle that a cause 
of action for damages against the United States "'cannot be implied 
but must be unequivocally expressed.'" Id., at 538 {quoting United 
States v. King, 395 u.s. 1, 4 {1969}}. See United States v. 
Hopkins, 427 u.s. 123, 128 {1976} {"specific command of statute or 
authorized regulations"}; Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 u.s. 156, 170 
{1981} {BRENNAN, J., dissenting}. Where, as here, a claim for money 
damages is predicated upon an alleged statutory violation, the rule 
is that the statute does not create a cause of action for damages 
unless the statute "'in itself can fairly be interpreted as 
mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage 
sustained. '" United States v. Test an, 424 U.S. 392, 40 2 {1976} 
{quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1008-
1009 {Ct. Cl. 1967}}. See,~~' Army & Air Force Exchange Service 
v. Sheehan, 456 u.s. 728, 739-740 {1982} {"Testan [held] that the 
Tucker Act provides a remedy only where damages claims against the 
United States have been authorized explicitly"} {emphasis added}; 
id., at 739 {damages remedy available where the regulations 
"specifically authorize awards of money damages"}; id., at 741 
{reaffirming that an action for damages under the Tucker Act may not 
be premised upon "regulations .•• which do not explicitly authorize 
damages awards"}. 
In sum, whether the United States has created a cause of action 
2. 
turns upon the intent of Congress, not the inclinations of the 
courts. See United States v. Shaw, 309 u.s. 495, 500 (1940) 
("specific statutory consent"): Munro v. United States, 303 u.s. 36, 
41 (1938) ("only by permission"). Today, the Court appears 
disinterested in the intent of Congress. It has effectively 
reversed the presumption that absent "affirmative statutory 
authority," United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 
309 u.s. 506, 514 (1940), the United States has not consented to be 
sued for damages. It has substituted a contrary presumption, 
applicable to the conduct of the United States in Indian affairs, 
that the United States has consented to be sued for statutory 
violations and other departures from the rules that govern private 
fiduciaries. I dissent from the Court's departure from long-settled 
principles. 
I 
The Court does not--and clearly cannot--contend that any of the 
statutes standing alone reflects the necessary legislative 
authorization of a damages remedy. None of the statutes contains 
any "provision • • • that expressly makes the United States liable" 
for its alleged mismanagement of Indian forest resources and their 
proceeds or grants a right of action "with specificity." Testan, 
424 u.s., at 399, 400. Indeed, nothing in the timber-sales 
statutes, 25 U.S.C. §§406, 407,1 466,2 the road and right-of-way 
1The only monetary obligation imposed upon the Secretary 
by §406 or §407 is to pay the actual "proceeds" of timber sales 
to the owners of the land. Thus, while it may well be that those 
sections would permit an action to compel the Secretary to pay 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages. 
3. 
statutes, §§318a, 323-325,3 or the interest statute, §162a, 4 
addresses in any respect the institution of damages actions against 
the United States. Nor is there any indication in the legislative 
history of the statutes that Congress intended to consent to damages 
actions for mismanagement of Indian assets by enacting these 
provisions.5 The Court does not suggest otherwise. 
over unlawfully retained proceeds, see United States v. Testan, 
424 u.s. 392, 401 (1976), no statutory basis ex1sts for extending 
that remedy to profits that arguably or ideally should have been, 
but were not, earned by the Secretary. On the contrary, the 
statutory recognition of a right to receive the "proceeds" of 
sales conducted suggests that this is the limit of any damages 
action implicitly authorized by Congress. See Middlesex County 
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 
14-15, 20-21 (1981). Cf. United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 u.s. 
201, 208 (1982). 
2section 466 merely requires the Secretary to "make rules 
and regulations for the operation and management of Indian 
forestry units on the principle of sustained-yield management." 
3section 318a authorizes the appropriation of funds for 
building of roads on Indian reservations. It would be a radical 
change in the law of sovereign immunity to hold that a routine 
authorization statute allows individuals who might benefit from 
appropriations to bring an action to recover damages. And 
although §325 requires "the payment of such compensation as the 
Secretary of the Interior shall determine to be just," it does 
not follow that damages for failure to secure more generous 
compensation are available. Indeed, the explicit statutory 
recognition of the Secretary's authority to determine the amount 
of compensation militates against any damages remedy for 
insufficient compensation. See Plumbers & Pi~efitters v. 
Plumbers & Pipefitters, 452 U.S. 615, 630 (19 1) (BURGER, C.J., 
dissenting). 
4section 162a affords the Secretary substantial discretion 
respecting investments to be made with individual Indian funds. 
There is nothing in the statute that requires payment of a 
particular rate of interest, much less that makes the United 
States accountable in damages for any amount by which the 
revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable 
management zeal to get for the Indians the best rate." Mitchell 
v. United States, 664 F.2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages. 
4. 
The Court for the most part rests its decision on the 
implausible proposition that statutes that do not in terms create a 
right to payment of money nonetheless may support a damage action 
against the United States. This view simply cannot be reconciled 
with the decisions in Testan and Mitchell I. A nonmonetary duty, 6 
without more, is insufficient to overcome the "presumption" that 
Congress has not consented to suit for money damages. See Eastern 
Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 u.s. 675, 686 (1927). 
This Court has had occasion in recent cases to emphasize that 
congressional intent is the ultimate standard in determining whether 
a private right of action should be inferred from a statute that 
5It is improbable that Congress intended §406 to 
constitute consent to monetary liability for forestry 
mismanagement on allotted lands, because, at the time in 
question, it appears the Government maintained the position that 
heavily forested lands were not to be allotted. See United 
States v. Payne, 264 u.s. 446, 449 (1924). And before 1964, §406 
was a rather bare instrument, simply giving an Indian permission 
to sell his timber with the Secretary's permission. See ante, at 
13-14. The legislative history of the 1964 amendments to §406, 
see ante, at 16, also fails to supply the necessary evidence of 
congressional intent. The House Report states that "[n]o 
additional expenditure of Federal funds" was expected to be 
incurred by reason of the enactment of the legislation. H.R. 
Rep. No. 1292, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964). A letter from the 
Interior Department to the Congress urging enactment of the 
legislation explained only that the standards for timber sales on 
allotted lands "should help allay disputes and avoid 
misunderstanding." S. Rep. No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 
(1963~. 
Although not dispositive, the monetary character of the 
statutory right is a strong indication that a statute "in itself 
... can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation." By 
contrast, where, as here, the duties imposed by a statute are not 
essentially monetary in character, but require implementation 
through conduct by federal officials, the contrary inference 
arises: that Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, 
created only a substantive right enforceable through injunctive 
relief. See Testan, 424 U.S., at 401, n. 5, 403. 
5. 
does not, in terms, provide for such an · action. 7 Those cases are 
instructive, for here, too, the "ultimate question is one of 
congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it 
can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into 
law." Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 u.s. 560, 578 (1979). As 
we recognized in Testan, courts are not free to dispense with 
"established principles" requiring explicit congressional 
authorization for maintenance of suits against the United States 
simply "because it might be thought that they should be responsive 
to a particular conception of enlightened governmental policy." 424 
U.S., at 400. See Shaw, 309 U.S., at 502. The Court today adduces 
no "evidence that Congress anticipated that there would be a private 
remedy." California v. Sierra Club, 451 u.s. 287, 298 (1981). 
The Court defends its departure from our precedents on the 
ground that the statutes and regulations upon which respondents rely 
need not be "construed in the manner appropriate to waivers of 
sovereign immunity." Ante, at 12. The Court in effect is 
overruling Mitchell I sub silentio, for as its discussion on the 
Tucker Act makes clear, see ante, at 10-13, we there at least 
"accepted the government's claim that a strict standard of 
7see, ~~'Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 
457 u.s. 15, 20-23 (1982)~ Middlesex County, 453 U.S., at 13-18~ 
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 
639-640 (1981)~ California v. Sterra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 292-298 
(1981)~ Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 
77, 91-95 (1981) ~ Universities Research Assn., Inc. v. Coutu, 450 
U.S. 754, 770-784 (1981)~ Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 444 u.s. 11, 19-24 (1979). Against the background of 
sovereign immunity, the rationale of these cases should apply 
here with particular force. 
6. 
construction, applicable to deciding whether Congress had enacted a 
waiver of sovereign immunity, should be applied in interpreting 
substantive legislation for the benefit of Indian people." Hughes, 
Can the Trustee be Sued for its Breach? The Sad Saga of United 
States v. Mitchell, 26 S.D. L. Rev. 447, 473 {1981}. We expressly 
held that the General Allotment Act at issue in Mitchell I "does not 
unambiguously provide that the United States has undertaken full 
fiduciary responsibilities." 445 u.s., at 542 {emphasis added}. 
Cf. Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan, 456 u.s., at 739 
{"explicitly reject [ ing] the argument that 1 the violation of any 
statute or regulation • • • automatically creates a cause of action 
against the United States for money damages 1 "} {quoting Testan, 424 
U.S., at 401}. The Court hardly can view the statutes here as 
"unambiguously" imposing trust duties on the Government. 
II 
The Court makes little or no pretense that it is following 
doctrine heretofore established. Without pertinent analysis, it 
simply concludes: "Because the statutes and regulations at issue in 
this case clearly establish fiduciary obligations of the Government 
in the management and operation of Indian lands and resources, they 
can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 
Government for damages sustained." Ante, at 19-20. This conclusion 
rests on two dubious assumptions. First, the Court decides that the 
statutes create or recognize fiduciary duties. It then reasons that 
because a private express trust normally imports a right to recover 
damages for breach, and because injunctive relief is perceived to be 
inadequate, Congress necessarily must have authorized recovery of 
7. 
damages for failure properly to perform the statutory duties. The 
relevancy of the first conclusion is questionable, and the other 
departs from our precedents, chiefly Testan and Mitchell I. 
The Court simply holds that the statutes here "clearly 
establish fiduciary obligations." Ante, at 20. See also id., at 19 
{"a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises") • I agree with the 
dissent in the Court of Claims that "there is kind of a bootstrap 
quality of reasoning in saying that [the United States'] duties 
expressed by law are those of a trustee, and, therefore, we may look 
at SCOTT ON TRUSTS or the RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS and impose on [the 
Government] all the other consequences the law, as stated by those 
authorities, derives from the status of an erring nongovernmental 
trustee." Mitchell v. United States, 664 F. 2d, at 283 {Ct. Cl. 
1981) {Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting) • "The federal power 
over Indian lands is so different in nature and origin from that of 
a private trustee •.• that caution is taught in using the mere label J 
of a trust plus a reading of SCOTT ON TRUSTS to impose liability on 
claims where assent is not unequivocally expressed." Ibid. 8 The 
8 "There are a number of widely varying relationships which 
more or less closely resemble trusts, but which are not trusts, 
although the term 'trust' is sometimes used loosely to cover such 
relationships. It is important to differentiate trusts from 
these other relationships, since many of the rules applicable to 
trusts are not applicable to them." Restatement {Second) of 
Trusts §4, Introductory Note, at 15 {1959). For example, the 
Court often has described the fiduciary relationship between the 
United States and Indians as one between a guardian and a ward. 
But "[a] guardianship is not a trust." Id., §7. There is no 
explanation, however, why the Court chooses one analogy and not 
another. The choice appears to be influenced by the fact that 
"[t]he duties of a trustee are more intensive than the duties of 
other fiduciaries." Id., §2, comment b. 
The Court assertSilthat "[a]ll of the necessary elements of · a 
Footnote continued on next page. 
8. 
trusteeships to which the Court has referred in the past have 
manifested more the view that pervasive control over Indian life is 
such a high attribute of federal sovereignty that States cannot 
infringe upon that control. Ibid.9 The Court today turns this 
common-law trust are present"--a trustee, a beneficiary, and a 
trust corpus. Ante, at 19. But two persons and a parcel of real 
property, without more, do not create a trust. Rather, "[a] 
trust ••• arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention 
to create it." Restatement (Second} of Trusts, §2. See id., §23 
("A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifes~an 
intention to create a trust."}: id., §25 ("No trust is created 
unless the settlor manifests an 1ntention to impose enforceable 
duties."}. This is the element that is missing in this case, and 
the Court does not, and cannot, find that Congress has manifested 
its intent to make the statutory duties upon which respondents 
rely trust duties. Cf. id., §95: 2 A. Scott, Law of Trusts §95, 
at 772 (2d ed. 1967} ("At common law it was held that a use ••• 
could not be enforced against the Crown •••• "}. Indeed, given 
the language of the statute at issue in Mitchell I, the case for 
finding that Congress intended to impose fiduciary obligations on 
the United States was much stronger than it is here. See 445 
u.s. at 547 (WHITE, J., dissenting}. One of the authorities 
cited by JUSTICE WHITE, 2 A. Scott, supra, §95, specifically 
discusses the General Allotment Act as an example of the United 
States acting as a trustee. Furthermore, a trustee can 
"reserv[e] powers with respect to the administration of the 
trust." Id., §37. Unless the United States agrees to be held 
liable in damages, even the existence of a trust does not 
necessarily establish that the Government has surrendered its 
immunity from damages. 
9The Court has invoked the fiduciary relation primarily 
(i} to preclude unauthorized state interference in the relations 
between the United States and the Indian tribes or other 
unauthorized exercise of state jurisdiction on Indian lands, see 
~~,United States v. Kagama, 118 u.s. 375, 382-384 (1886}: 
(ii} to bar or nullify exercises of state court jurisdiction in 
matters affecting Indian property rights, in which the United 
States was not properly joined or represented, see,~~, 
Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 386 (1939}: United 
States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442-444 (1926}: (iii} to 
1nterpret doubtful or ambiguous treaty language in favor of the 
Indians, see,~~, United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 u.s. 
111, 117-118 (1938}: Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 u.s. 373, 396 
(1902}: (iv} to determ1ne the liab1l1ty of the United States for 
damages under the Just Compensation Clause where, acting as a 
fiduciary manager, it has converted the form of Indian property, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
9. 
shield into a sword. 
In my view, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" of any of 
the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 u.s. 49, 
59 (1978), or in their legislative histories, "fairly [can] be 1 
interpreted as mandating compensation" for the conduct alleged by 
respondents. Some of the statutes involved here, to be sure, create 
substantive duties that the Secretary must fulfill. But this could 
equally be said of the Classification Act, considered in Testan. It 
requires that pay classification ratings of federal employees be 1 
carried out pursuant to "the principle of equal pay for 
substantially equal work." 5 U.S.C. §5101(1) (A). Although the 
federal employee in Testan alleged a violation of the Act, the Court 
concluded that a back pay remedy was unavailable, rejecting the 
argument that the substantive right necessarily implies a damages 1 
remedy. 424 u.s., at 400-403. 
Ignoring this holding in Testan, the Court concludes that the 
mere existence of a trust of some kind necessarily establishes that 
Congress has consented to a recovery of damages. In language 
superficially resembling rejected perceptions of "natural law," the 1 
Court rules that, "[g]iven the existence of a trust relationship, it 
see,~~, United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 
371, 415-416 (1980); and (v) to emphas1ze the h1gh standard of 
care that the United States is obliged to exercise in carrying 
out its duties respecting the Indians, see,~~, United States 
v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973); Seminole Nation v. United 
States, 316 u.s. 286, 296-297 (1942). But the Court has never, 
until today, invoked the doctrine to hold that the United States 
is answerable in money damages for breaches of the standards 
applicable to a private fiduciary. 
-' . 
10. 
naturally follows that the Government should be liable in damages 
for the breach of its fiduciary duties." Ante, at 20 (emphasis 
added). See also ibid. (damages are a "fundamental incident" of a 
trust relationship): ibid. (it would be "anomalous" not to find a 1 
damages remedy) • The Court can find no more support for this 
proposition than the dissenting opinion in Mitchell I. See . ante, at 
21.10 
It is fair to say that the Court is influenced by its view that 
an injunctive remedy is inadequate to redress the violations 1 
alleged--precisely the inference deemed inadmissible in Testan .11 
It is the ordinary result of sovereign immunity that unconsented 
claims for money damages are barred. The fact that damages cannot 
10The Court reaches for support in Seminole Nation v. 
United States, supra, and United States v. Creek Nation, 295 u.s. 
103 (1935), but both cases cut against the Court's theory in this 
case. The discussion of the Government's fiduciary duty in 
Seminole Nation referred to a claim to compel payments expressly 
prescribed by Treaty. See 316 u.s., at 296-297. Creek Nation 
involved a taking claim. 
11Also significant is the Court's standardless remand for 
further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Given the 
strictness with which consents to suit by the sovereign are to be 
construed, United States v. Sherwood, 312 u.s. 584, 590-591 
(1941), where the statute upon wh1ch liability is premised 
creates no right to payment of a sum certain, the Court of Claims 
will be required, without legislative guidance, to determine the 
extent of liability, if any, and the items of damages that are 
cognizable. This task, unlike the factual or legal determination 
whether a particular individual falls within a class granted a 
right to payment of money by a statute, is not one to which 
courts are adapted. Any rules established will be of "judicial 
cloth, not legislative cloth." Weinberger v. Catholic Action of 
Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139, 141 (1981). I assume, however, that the 
law of trusts generally will control and that all defenses to 
actions on breaches of trust, such as consent by the beneficiary 
and laches, will be fully available to the United States. Cf. 
664 F.2d, at 274. 
11. 
be recovered without the sovereign's consent hardly supports the 
conclusion that consent has been given. Yet this, in substance, is 1 
the Court's reasoning. If it is saying that a remedy is necessary 
to redress every injury sustained, the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity will have been drained of all meaning. Moreover, "many of 
the federal statutes ••• that expressly provide money damages as a 
remedy against the United States in carefully limited circumstances 1 
would be rendered superfluous." Testan, 424 u.s., at 404. 
III 
The Court has made no effort to demonstrate that Congress 
intended to render the United States answerable in damages upon 
claims of the kind presented here. The mere application by a court 1 
of the label "trust" cannot properly justify disregard of an 
immunity from damages the Government has never waived. I would 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Claims. 
SECOND DRAFT: United States v. Mitchell, No. 81-1748 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The controlling law in this case is clear. Speaking 
for the Court in United States v. Mitchell, 445 u.s. 535 
(1980) (Mitchell I), JUSTICE MARSHALL reaffirmed the 
general principle that ~cause of action for damag~ 
/ 
unequivocally expressed.'" Id., at 538 (quoting United 
States v. King, 395 u.s. 1, 4 (1969)). See Lehman v. 
Nakshian, 453 u.s. 156, 170 (1981) (BRENNAN, J. , 
dissenting). Where, as here, a claim for money damages is 
predicated upon an alleged statutory violation, the rule 
is that the statute does not create a cause of action for 
( 
damages unless the statute ~n itself ••• can fairly be 







Government for the damage sustained jf United States v. 
Testan, 424 u.s. 392, 402 (1976) (quoting Eastport 
J3: 
~mshi~ Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1008-1009 
See, ~· Army & Air Force Exchange (Ct. Cl. 1967)). 
Service v. Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728, 739-7 40 (1982) ( "Testan 
[held] that the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where 
damages claims against the United States have been 
authorized explicitly") (emphasis added): id., at 739 
(~v/JioltS 
(damages remedy available where the s.t:atYt&a "specifically 
authorize awards of money damages"): id., at 741 
(reaffirming that an action for damages under the Tucker 
Act may not be premised upon "regulations •.• which do not 
explicitly authorize damages awards"). 
In sum, whether the United States has created a cause 






inclinations of the courts. See United States v. Shaw, 
309 U.S. 495, 502 (1940) ~ Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 
36, 41 (1938). Today, the Court appears disinterested in 
the intent of Congress. The right1r of action that the 
Court finds "mandated" by an amalgamation of federal 
statutes "is in cold reality but a strong and clear wish 
~ ~v~ j . n the judge's part." UDJ.ted St ates v. Mi tchell, 664 
F.2d 265, 277 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (Nichols, J., concurring and 
dissenting). I dissent from what I ~ersei•Je ~}the 
Court's departure from long-settled principles. 
I 
The Court does not--and clearly cannot--contend that 
any of the statutes standing alone reflects the necessary 
legislative mandate for a damages remedy. None of the 
statutes contains any "provision •.. that expressly makes 
/ 
4. 
the United States liable" for its alleged mismanagement of 
Indian forest resources and 
5 ~~ ~ 0\ '(~kf 
. 0 
Testan, 424 u.s., at 399~00. 
eir proceeds or that 
~ (:;ti f)'l 
11with specificity." 
Indeed, nothing in the 
.j j / 
timberA sales statutes, 25 U.S.C. §§406, 407, 1 466, 2 the 
1The only monetary obligation imposed upon the 
Secretary by §406 or §407 is to pay the actual "proceeds" J 
of timber sales to the owners of the land. Thus, while it woJ 
may be that those sections w.oul.d ~roYAfi an action to e.r•;f 
compel the Secretary to disgorgeunlawfully retained P 
J proceeds, see United States v. Test an, 424 U.S. 392, 401 
(1976), no statutory basis exists for extending that 
remedy to proceeds that arguably or ideally should have 
been, but were not, captured by the Secretary. On the 
contrary, the statutory recognition of ~ right to ~ 
receive the "proceeds" of sales conducted s'hggests that 
this is the limit of any damages action implicitly 
puthorized by Congress. See United States v. Erika, Inc., 
~56 u.s. 201, 208 (1982); ~iddlesex County Sewerage 
~ ~uthority v. National Sea Clammers As~ia\ioR , 453 u.s. 
1, 14-15, 20-21 (1981). lt. ". 
2section 466 merely requires the S;;-retary to "make 
rules and regulations for the operation and management of 
Indian forestry units on the principle of sustained-yield 





right-of-way ~tutes, §§318a, 323-325, 3 or the road and 
interest statute, §162a, 4 addresses in any respect the 
institution of damages actions against the United States. 
Nor is there any indication in the legislative history of 
the statutes that Congress intended to consent to damages 
3section 318a merely authorizes th appropriation 
of funds for building of roads on Indian eservations. It 
would be a radical change in the law of vereign immunity 
to hold that a routine authorizati statute allows 
s who might ~ benefi appropriations 
to r 1ng a damages. And '(0" .. 
eompeiist:tt~~ 2~~:r;oR~£1:llly wi t hheld from the !Reia R-. , it does ("J,.,._ 
not follow that damages for failure to secure more ~~~( 
generous compensation are available. Indeed, the explicit -~~ 
statutory recognition of the Secretary's authority to ~~~ 
determine the amount of compensation militates against any .., .. s 
damages remedy for insufficient compensation. 
> "'*· ~ f '11. 4-Ra.ther t han compelliR~ a par t tCI:ll:a!'" leOe"l t5f 
cemrJe-t'i&a~eR...., Sl6.2.a a~~~s the Secretary substantial 
discretion respecting investments to be made with 
individual Indian funds. There is nothing in the statute 
that requires payment of a particular rate of interest. A 
fortiori, Congress has not agreed to hold the UniteCf 
States accountable in damages for any amount by which the 
revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable 
management zeal to get for the Indians the best rate." 1 ::w 2: 5~;;t~981). 
_..;.---- -- ) 
actions for mismanagement of Qdian 
these provisions. 5 The Court does not suggest otherwise~ 
5It is especially improbable that Congress intende 
to consent to monetary liability for forestry 
mismanagement on allotted lands, because, at the time in 
question, at least some, if not all, government officials 
believed that heavily forested lands were not to be 
allotted. See United States v. Payne, 264 u.s. 446, 449 
(1924}. And before 1964, §406 was a rather bare 
instrument, simply giving an Indian permission to sell his 
timber with the Secretary's permission. The legislative 
history of the 1964 amendments to §406 also fails to 
supply the necessary evidence of congressional intent. 
The House Report states that "[n]o additional expenditure 
of Federal funds" was expected to be incurred by reason of ) 
the enactment of the legislation. H.R. Rep. No. 1292, 
88th Cong., 2d Sess.~ 2 (1964}. A letter from the 
Interior Department tcf the Congress urging enactment of 
the legislation explained~t the standards for timber J 
sales on allotted lands "sh uld help allay disputes and 
avoid~isunderstanding." S. ep. \No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess ;/ 3 (1963}. tV\) 
('~ ~ ~5J 6It ordi ily may be correct that a statute 
'f"no.'" v(t~J vesting an indiv ual or me ers of a designated class 
~. cy rJ..J with an absolute rl ht to r ceive a sum certain from an 
'~~ ~~ administrative office of e United States grounds an 
· \c,r<" action for the recover o damages--or at least the sum 
1"\t withheld-- in the event f nonpayment. See Test an, 424 
U.S., at 400 ( reserv i the question} • But aga1n, the 
Court does not rest on any such statute or right. The 
Government, on the ther n nd, concedes that an action to 
recover unlawfull high adm"nistrative fees and to recover 
for the failur to pay an interest may be maintained 
against the ited States as one seeking recovery of 
"money impro erly exacted or etained." 'PestaR , J -;.4 u.s ., 
J at 401. us, to the exten that the judgment of the 
Footnote contin d on next page. 
J 
7. ~ J 
;,~-
'"<f~ 
l The Court rests its discussion on the novel 
proposition that statutes that do not in terms create any 
right to payment of money nonetheless may support a damage 
action against the United States. This view hardly can be 
reconciled with the decisions in Testan and Mitchell I. A 
nonmonetary duty, 7 without more, is insufficient to 
overcome the "presumption" that Congress has not consented 
to suit for money damages. See Eastern Transportation Co. 
v. United States, 272 u.s. 675, 686 (1927). This Court 
Court of Claims would permi an action to recover withheld 
fees and interest, the Go rnment apparently does not seek 
review, and I have no oc asion to decide the issue. 
7Although not dispositive, the monetary character 
of the statutory right is a strong indication that a 
statute "in itself can fairly be interpreted as 
mandating compensation." By contrast, where, as here, the 
duties imposed by a statute are not essentially monetary 
in character, but require implementation through conduct 
by federal officials, the contrary inference arises: that 
Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, created 
only a substantive right enforceable through injunctive 
relief. See Testan, 424 U.S., at 401, n. 5, 403. ~ 
j 
8. 
has had occasion in recent cases to emphasize that 
congressional intent is the ultimate standard in determing 
whether a private right of action should be inferred from 
a statute that does not, in terms, provide for such an 
action. 8 Those cases are instructive, for here, too, the 
"ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one 
of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the 
statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 u.s. 560, 578 {1979). As we 
recognized in Testan, courts are not free to dispense with 
/ 8see, e. t;., Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit / 
Union, 45 7 U :S: 15, 20-23 {1982) : Middlesex County, 453 
u.s., at 13-18: Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff V""/ 
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-640 {1981): California ./ _ 
v. Sierra Club, 451 u.s. 287, 292-298 {1981): Northwest / 
Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77L 91-95 tl 
{1981): Universities Research Assn., Inc. v. C1tu, 450 
/
U.S. , -784 {1981): Transamerica Mortgage z( visors, 
Inc. v. Lew , 444 u.s. 11, 19-24 {1979). Against the 
background of sovereign immunity, the rationale of these 
cases should apply here with particular force. 
9. 
"established principles" requiring explicit congressional 
authorization for maintenance of suits against the United 
States simply "because it might be thought that they 
should be responsive to a particular conception of ~ 
enlightened governmental policy." 9 424 u.s., at 400. See 
~Shaw, 309 u.s., at 502. The Court today adduces no 
"evidence that Congress anticipated that there would be a 
j private remedy." California v. Sierra Club, 451 u.s. 287, 
9The Court's that injunctive relief is 
insufficient to vindicate he statutory rights of the 
respondents is the kind of policy judgment that properly l 
should be left to the 1 gislature. Cf. Universities 
Research Assn., Inc., 450 .s., at 769, and n. 19, 776-
777, 782-783. Nor has th Court satisfactorily explained 
why injunctive relief is thought to be inadequate. The 
Court states that a trus eship "would mean little if the 
beneficiaries were requ · ed to supervise the day-to-day 
management of their es te by their trustee or else be 
precluded from recovery " Ante, at 21. It is not clear 
what the Court's analy is would be if it did not assume 




~us, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" of any 
of the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 
436 u.s. 49, 59 (1978}, or in their legislative histories, 
"fairly [can] be interpreted as mandating compensation" 
for the conduct alleged by respondents. Some of the 
statutes involved here, to be sure, create substantive 
duties that the Secretary must fulfill. But this could 
equally be said of the Classification Act, considered in 
Testan. It ~Rambigae~gl~requires that pay classification 
ratings of federal employees be carried out pursuant to 
'
1 
the principle of /equal pay for substantially equal work • " 
j 5 u.s.c. §5101(1} (A}. Although the federal employee in 
Testan alleged a violation of the Act, the Court concluded 
that a back pay remedy was unavailable, rejecting the 
·. 
. . 
argument that the substantive 
damages remedy. 424 u.s., at 
11. 
right necessarily implies a 
400-403~he Court's 
conclusion in this case, however, rests largely upon its 
view that an injunctive remedy is inadequate to redress 
the violations alleged--precisely the inference deemed 
inadmissible in Testan.10 
It is the ordinary result of sovereign immunity that 
10Also significant is the Court's standardless 
remand for further roceedi~onsistent with its 
opin10 . he compass has no h~ Given the strictness 
Jwi th whic ents to suit -G--- . . sovereign are to be construed, United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590-591 (1941), where the statute upon which liability is 
premised creates no right to payment of a sum certain, the 
Court of Claims will. be required, without legislative 
guidance, to determine the extent of liability, if any, 
and the items of damages that are cognizable. This task, 
unlike the factual or legal determination whether a 
particular individual falls within a class granted a right 
to payment of money by a statute, is not one to which 
courts are adapted. Any rules established will be of 
j "judicial cloth, not legislative cloth." ~ Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 u.s. 139, 141 (1981). I 
assume, however, that the law of trusts generally will 
control and that all defenses to actions on breaches of 
trust, such as consent by the beneficiary and laches, will 
be fully available to the United States. 
' .; " 
12. 
unconsented claims for money damages are barred. The fact 
that damages cannot be recovered without the sovereign's 
consent hardly supports the conclusion that consent has 
been given. Yet this, in substance, is the Court's 
reasoning. If., as call he ar~nea"r the Court is saying that 
a remedy is necessary to redress every injury sustained, 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity will have been drained 
of all meaning. Moreover, "many of the federal statutes 
that expressly provide money damages as a remedy 
against the United States in carefully limited 
circumstances would be rendered superfluous." Testan, 424 / 
u.s., at 404. 
II 
The Court makes little or no pretense that it is 
following doctrine this Court heretofore has established. 
13. 
Its opinion contains no examination of the language and 
the legislative history of the statutes held to give rise 
to monetary liability to determine whether Congress 
intended to grant a cause of action for damages. The 
Court's analysis consists essentially of a single 
conclusory sentence: "Because the statutes and regulations 
at issue in this case clearly establish fiduciary 
obligations of the Government in the management and 
operation of Indian lands and resources, they can fairly 
be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal 
~~-
Government for damages sustained." Ante, att 20. This 
conclusion rests on two dubious assumptions. First, the 
Court decides that the statutes create or recognize 
fiduciary duties. It then reasons that because a private 
express trust normally imports a right to recover damages 
A 
for breach, and because injunctive relief is perceived to 
~inadequate, Congress have authorized 
\ 
recovery of damages for failure properly to perform the 
statutory duties. The relevancy of the f rst conclusion 
is questionable, a 
) 
I 
The Court points to statutory 
duties Congress imposed were intended to impose fiduciary 
-duties. Nor do any of the timber sales or management 
(\ 
statutes upon which respondents rely make any reference to 
such duties. Rather, the Court simply holds that the 
/ statutes here "clearly establish fiduciary obligations." 
Ante, at 20. See also id., at 19 J:_'a fidu~y t£.t_ ~;_.. 
j relationship necessarily arises") .J... •~ere is ~d¥.~ 
bootstrap quality of reasoning in saying that [the United 
States'] duties expressed by law are those of a trustee, 
15. 
and, therefore, we may look a r the 
impose on [the Government] all 
the other consequences the law, as stated by those 
authorities, derives from the ~ t~~us 
Mt~ li 
nongovernmental trustee." ~d, at 283 (Nichols, J. ' 
concurring and dissenting). Federal authority over Indian 
lands is so different in nature and origin from that of a 
private trust that caution surely is warranted before 
labeling an obligation assumed by the Government a "trust" 
and then relying on Scott on Trusts to impose liability 
where none has been authorized. Ibid.ll ~ 
11"There are a number of widely varying 
relationships which more or less closely resemble trusts, 
but which are not trusts, although the term 1 trust 1 is 
sometimes used loosely to cover such relationships. It is 
important to differentiate trusts from these other 
relationships, since many of the rules applicable to 
trusts are not applicable to them." Restatement (Second) 
of Trusts §4, at 15 (1959). For example, the Court often 
Footnote continued on next page. 
., 
16. 
The trusteeships to which the Court has referred in 
the past have manifested more the view that pervasive 
control over Indian life is such a high attribute of 
has described the fiduciary relationship between the 
United States and Indians as one between a guardian and a 7 
ward. But "[a] guardianship is not a trust." Id., §.r.-" 
There is no explanation, however, why the Court-choo~s .I 
one analogy and not another. I can only conclude that the 
choice was influenced by the fact that "[t]he duties of a 
trustee are more intensive than the duties of other ;I 
fiduciaries." Id., §2, comment b. 
J 
The Court---asserts that "[a] 11 of the necessary 
elements of a common-law trust are present"--a trustee, a 
beneficiary, and a trust corpus. Ante, at 19. But two 
persons and a parcel of real property, without more, do 
not create a trust. Rather, "[a] trust ••• arises as a / 
result of a manifestation of an intention to create it." 
~, §2. See id., §23 ("A trust is created only if the ./ 
~ sgttlor proper~ manifests an intention to create a 
trust."); id., §25 ("No trust is created unless the 
~~ t"- /( settlor manifests an intention to impose enforceable ~ 
t .,A ) 0 duties.") • This is the element that is missing in this 
cJ~ case, and the Court does not, and cannot, find that 
~ Congress has manifested its intent to make the statutory 
\vJ~ ' duties upon which respondents rely trust duties. Cf. id. , 
[195 ("The United States •.. has capacity to take and hold ; · property in trust, but in the absence of a statute 
/. 
otherwise providing the trust is unenforceable against the 
United States r .. .. ") . F~hermore, a trustee can r 
'reserv [ e] powers with respe6\: to the administration of 
./ the trust." Id., §37. Unless the United States agrees to/ 
be held liabre-ln damages, even the existence of a trust 
does not necessarily mean that the Government has 
surrendered its immunity from damages. 
17. 
federal sovereignty that cannot infringe upon that 
control. Ibid. 12 The Court today turns this shield into 
a sword. ; ( t i~hat mismanagement of Indian 
lands is more analogous to misgovernment than it is to the 
12The Court has invoked the fiduciary relation 
primarily (i) to preclude unauthorized state interference 
in the relations between the United States and the Indian 
) tribes or other unauthorized ran;,ercise of state 4 jurisdiction on Indian lands, see e. ., United States v. 1 
Kagama, 118 u.s. 375, 382-384 (18 6); (ii) to bar or 
nullify exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters 
affecting Indian property rights, in which the United 
~tates was not properly joined or represented, see, e. ~ ., ~ 
Minnesota v. United States, 305 u.s. 382, 386 (m-9); 444 
/ United States v. Candelaria, 271 u.s. 432, 442~-
( 111) to 1nterpret doubtful or ambiguous treaty language 
) in favor of the Indians, see, e. ,_q., United States v. j ~hoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117~1938); Minnesota v. 
itchcock, 185 u.s. 373, 396 (1902); (iv) to l1m1t the 
liability of the United States for damages under the Just 
Compensation Clause where, acting as a fiduciary ma~er, J 
"t has converted the form of Indian property, see, e •• , 
ni ted States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 
'? · 415-416 (1980); cf. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 u.s. 553, / 
~ 568 (1903); and (v) to emphasize the high standard of care 
that the United States is obliged to exercise ~n carrying 
/ out its duties respecting the Indians, see, ~, United r 
~
V States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 (1973); Seminole Nation 
v. United States, 316 u.s. 286, 296-297 (1942). But the 
Court has never, until today, invoked the doctrine to hold 
that the United States is answerable in money damages for 
breaches of the standards applicable to a private 
fiduciary. 
18. 
misfeasance of a common-law trust. Ibid. Cf. Nevada v. 
United States, u.s. __ , __ , n. 15 (1983) (breach of -------
fiduciary duty to Indians "reflects the nature of a 
democratic government that is charged with more than one 
responsibility"). In my view, the Court today 
substantially retreats from JUSTICE BLACKMUN's words for 
{ 
the Court in Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan,~ 
supra, where we "explicitly rejected the argument that 
• • • 
'the violation of any statute or regulation ~elatiR~ ~o 




fQ der a J em[Uo~~automatically creates a cause of actio ~· 
j against the United States for money damages.'" 
at 739 (quoting Testan, 424 u.s., at 401). 
456 u.s., 
But more remarkable than the implication of trust 
duties from statutory duties is the conclusion that the 
mere existence of a trust of some kind necessarily 
{//"t 
establishes that Congress consented to a recovery of 
damages. We apparently are the existence of a 
cause of action for damages on faith: "Given the existence 
of a trust relationship, it 
Government should be liable in 
j its fiduciary duties." Ante, 
mages for the breach of 
0 (emphasis added) • See 
..; 
·l~,fl. . .....--
also  (damages are 
/ 
incident" of a 
,b;l 
trust relationship)~ iQ... (it would be "anomalous" not to 
find a damages remedy). The Court can find no more 
support for this proposition than t e dissenting opinion 
I 
in Mitchell I. See ante, at 21. 13 opinion, the 
13The Court tries to get support out of Seminole J 
Nation v. United States, supra, and United States v. Creek 
Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935), but both actually cut against 
the Court's theory in this case. The Court's discussion 
of the Government's fiduciary duty in Seminole Nation ~ 
referred to a claim to compel payments expressly 
prescribed by Treaty. See 316 u.S., at 296-297. Creek 
~ation involved a taking claim • 
20. 
Court has effectively reversed the ~esumption~aoto<R 
4'.r ansportation-~2.2-U.S., at 6S~that absent "affirmative 
statutory authority," United States v. United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 u.s. 506, j ~S-h_a_w __ ,_ 3_0_9_ u- .-s- .- ,- a-t_ 5_0_0_ (_'_' s_p_e_c_i_f_i_c _______ __. 
J 
/ 
States has not consented to be sued. It has substituted a 
contrary presumption, applicable to the conduct of the 
United States in Indian affairs, that the United States 
has consented to be sued for statutory violations and 
other departures from the rules that govern private 
fiduciaries. 
$ 
The Court has not endeavored to demonstrate that 
Congress actually intended to render the United States 
answerable in damages upon claims of the kind presented 
• 
21 • 
here. I think the mere application of the label "trust" 
to a few governmental functions respecting Indians does 
not constitute unequivocal consent to suits against the 
United States for money damages when these duties~ 
badly performed. I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Claims. 
JUN 1 9 1983 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-1748 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. 
HELEN MITCHELL ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The controlling law in this case is clear. Speaking for the 
Court in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980) 
(Mitchell 1), JUSTICE MARSHALL reaffirmed the general 
principle that a cause of action · for damages against the 
United States " 'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally 
expressed."' !d., at 538 (quoting United States v. King , 395 
U. S. 1, 4 (1969)). See United States v. Hopkins, 427 U. S. 
123, 128 (1976) ("specific command of statute or authorized 
regulations"); Lehman v. Nakshian , 453 U. S. 156, 170 
(1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Where, as here, a claim 
for money damages is predicated upon an alleged statutory 
violation, the rule is that the statute does not create a cause 
of action for damages unless the statute "'in itself . . . can 
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Fed-
eral Government for the damage sustained."' United States 
v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 402 (1976) (quoting Eastport S.S. 
Corp. v. United States, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1008-1009 (Ct. Cl. 
1967)). See, e. g., Army & Air Force E xchange Service v. 
Sheehan, 456 U. S. 728, 739-740 (1982) ("Testan [held] that 
the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where damages 
claims against the United States have been authorized explic-
itly") (emphasis added); id., at 739 (damages remedy avail-
able where the regulations "specifically authorize awards of 
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money damages"); id., at 741 (reaffirming that an action for 
damages under the Tucker Act may not be premised upon 
"regulations . . . which do not explicitly authorize damages 
awards"). 
In sum, whether the United States has created a cause of 
action turns upon the intent of Congress, not the inclinations 
of the courts. See United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495, 500 
(1940) ("specific statutory consent"); Munro v. United States, 
303 U. S. 36, 41 (1938) ("only by permission"). Today, the 
Court appears disinterested in the intent of Congress. It 
has effectively reversed the presumption that absent "affir-
mative statutory authority," United States v. United States 
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514 (1940), the 
United States has not consented to be sued for damages. It 
has substituted a contrary presumption, applicable to the 
conduct of the United States in Indian affairs, that the 
United States has consented to be sued for statutory viola-
tions and other departures from the rules that govern private 
fiduciaries. I dissent from the Court's departure from long-
settled principles. 
I 
The Court does not-and clearly cannot-contend that any 
of the statutes standing alone reflects the necessary legisla-
tive authorization of a damages remedy. None of the stat-
utes contains any "provision . . . that expressly makes the 
United States liable" for its alleged mismanagement of Indian 
forest resources and their proceeds or grants a right of action 
"with specificity." Testan, 424 U. S., at 399, 400. Indeed, 
nothing in the timber-sales statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§ 406, 407, 1 
' The only monetary obligation imposed upon the Secretary by § 406 or 
§ 407 is to pay the actual "proceeds" of timber sales to the owners of the 
land. Thus, while it may well be that those sections would permit an ac-
tion to compel the Secretary to pay over unlawfully retained proceeds, see 
United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 401 (1976), no statutory basis exists 
for extending that remedy to profits that arguably or ideally should have 
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466,2 the road and right-of-way statutes, §§318a, 323-325,3 
or the interest statute, § 162a, 4 addresses in any respect the 
institution of damages actions against the United States. 
Nor is there any indication in the legislative history of the 
statutes that Congress intended to consent to damages ac-
tions for mismanagement of Indian assets by enacting these 
provisions. 5 The Court does not suggest otherwise. 
been, but were not, earned by the Secretary. On the contrary, the statu-
tory recognition of a right to receive the "proceeds" of sales conducted sug-
gests that this is the limit of any damages action implicitly authorized by 
Congress. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea 
Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 14-15, 20-21 (1981). Cf. United States v. 
Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201, 208 (1982). 
2 Section 466 merely requires the Secretary to "make rules and regula-
tions for the operation and management of Indian forestry units on the 
principle of sustained-yield management." 
3 Section 318a authorizes the appropriation of funds for building of roads 
on Indian reservations. It would be a radical change in the law of sover-
eign immunity to hold that a routine authorization statute allows individ-
uals who might benefit from appropriations to bring an action to recover 
damages. And although § 325 requires "the payment of such compensa-
tion as the Secretary of the Interior shall determine to be just," it does not 
follow that damages for failure to secure more generous compensation are 
available. Indeed, the explicit statutory recognition of the Secretary's au-
thority to determine the amount of compensation militates a a· t 
damages remedy for insufficient compensation. See Plumbers & 
Pipefitters v. Plumbers & Pipefitters, 452 U. S. 615, 30 (1981) (BURGER, 
C. J., dissenting). 
' Section 162a affords the Secretary substantial discretion respecting in-
vestments to be made with individual Indian funds. There is nothing in 
the statute that requires payment of a particular rate of interest, much less 
that makes the United States accountable in damages for any amount by 
which the revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable manage-
ment zeal to get for the Indians the best rate." Mitchell v. United States, 
664 F. 2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
• It is improbable that Congress intended § 406 to constitute consent to 
monetary liability for forestry mismanagement on allotted lands, because, 
at the time in question, it appears the Government maintained the position 
that heavily forested lands were not to be allotted. See United States v. 
Payne, 264 U. S. 446, 449 (1924). And before 1964, § 406 was a rather 
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The Court for the most part rests its decision on the im-
plausible proposition that statutes that do not in terms create 
a right to payment of money nonetheless may support a dam-
age action against the United States. This view simply can-
not be reconciled with the decisions in Testan and Mitchell I. 
A nonmonetary duty, 6 without more, is insufficient to over-
come the "presumption" that Congress has not consented to 
suit for money damages. See Eastern Transportation Co. v. 
United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927). 
This Court has had occasion in recent cases to emphasize 
that congressional intent is the ultimate standard in deter-
mining whether a private right of action should be inferred 
from a statute that does not, in terms, provide for such an 
action. 7 Those cases are instructive, for here, too, the "ulti-
bare instrument, simply giving an Indian permission to sell his timber with 
the Secretary's permission. See ante, at 13-14. The legislative history of 
the 1964 amendments to § 406, see ante, at 16, also fails to supply the nec-
essary evidence of congressional intent. The House Report states that 
"[n]o additional expenditure of Federal funds" was expected to be incurred 
by reason of the enactment of the legislation. H. R. Rep. No. 1292, 88th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964). A letter from the Interior Department to the 
Congress urging enactment of the legislation explained only that the stand-
ards for timber sales on allotted lands "should help allay disputes and avoid 
misunderstanding." S. Rep. No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963). 
6 Although not dispositive, the monetary character of the statutory 
right is a strong indication that a statute "in itself ... can fairly be inter-
preted as mandating compensation." By contrast, where, as here, the du-
ties imposed by a statute are not essentially monetary in character, but re-
quire implementation through conduct by federal officials, the contrary 
inference arises: that Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, cre-
ated only a substantive right enforceable through injunctive relief. See 
Testan, 424 U. S., at 401, n. 5, 403. 
7 See, e. g., Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 
20-23 (1982); Middlesex County, 453 U. S., at 13-18; Texas Industries, 
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630,639-640 (1981); California 
v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 292-298 (1981); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. 
Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 91-95 (1981); Universities Research 
Assn., Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754, 770-784 (1981); Transamerica Mort-
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mate question is one of congressional intent, not one of 
whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statu-
tory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Touche Ross 
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578 (1979). As we recog-
nized in Testan, courts are not free to dispense with "estab-
lished principles" requiring explicit congressional authoriza-
tion for maintenance of suits against the United States 
simply "because it might be thought that they should be re-
sponsive to a particular conception of enlightened govern-
mental policy." 424 U. S., at 400. See Shaw, 309 U. S., at 
502. The Court today adduces no "evidence that Congress 
anticipated that there would be a private remedy." Califor-
nia v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 298 (1981). 
The Court defends its departure from our precedents on 
the ground that the statutes and regulations upon which re-
spondents rely need not be "construed in the manner appro-
priate to waivers of sovereign immunity." Ante, at 12. The 
Court in effect is overruling Mitchell I sub silentio, for as its 
discussion on the Tucker Act makes clear, see ante, at 10-13, 
we there at least "accepted the government's ... claim that a 
strict standard of construction, applicable to deciding 
whether Congress had enacted a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity, should be applied in interpreting substantive legislation 
for the benefit of Indian people." Hughes, Can the Trustee 
be Sued for its Breach? The Sad Saga of United States v. 
Mitchell, 26 S. D. L. Rev. 447, 473 (1981). We expressly 
held that the General Allotment Act at issue in Mitchell I 
"does not unambiguously provide that the United States has 
undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities." 445 U. S., at 542 
(emphasis added). Cf. Army & Air Force Exchange Service 
v. Sheehan, 456 U. S., at 739 ("explicitly reject[ing] the argu-
ment that 'the violation of any statute or regulation . . . auto-
gage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 19-24 (1979). Against the 
background of sovereign immunity, the rationale of these cases should 
apply here with particular force. 
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matically creates a cause of action against the United States 
for money damages'") (quoting Testan, 424 U. S., at 401). 
The Court hardly can view the statutes here as "unambigu-
ously" imposing trust duties on the Government. 
II 
The Court makes little or no pretense that it is following 
doctrine heretofore established. Without pertinent analysis, 
it simply concludes: "Because the statutes and regulations at 
issue in this case clearly establish fiduciary obligations of the 
Government in the management and operation of Indian 
lands and resources, they can fairly be interpreted as man-
dating compensation by the Federal Government for dam-
ages sustained." Ante, at 19-20. This conclusion rests on 
two dubious assumptions. First, the Court decides that the 
statutes create or recognize fiduciary duties. It then rea-
sons that because a private express trust normally imports a 
right to recover damages for breach, and because injunctive 
relief is perceived to be inadequate, Congress necessarily 
must have authorized recovery of damages for failure prop-
erly to perform the statutory duties. The relevancy of the 
first conclusion is questionable, and the other departs from 
our precedents, chiefly Testan and Mitchell I. 
The Court simply holds that the statutes here "clearly es-
tablish fiduciary obligations." Ante, at 20. See also id., at 
19 ("a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises"). I agree 
with the dissent in the Court of Claims that "there is kind of a 
bootstrap quality of reasoning in saying that [the United 
States'] duties expressed by law are those of a trustee, and, 
therefore, we may look at SCOTT ON TRUSTS or theRE-
STATEMENT OF TRUSTS and impose on [the Govern-
ment] all the other consequences the law; as stated by those 
authorities, derives from the status of an ~rring nongovern-
mental trustee." Mi6eheU v. U'l'/Jited-~64 F. 2d, at 283 
(Ct. Cl. 1981) (Nichols, J., concurring and dissenting). "The 
federal power over Indian lands is so different in nature and 
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ongm from that of a private trustee . . . that caution is 
taught in using the mere label of a trust plus a reading of 
SCOTT ON TRUSTS to impose liability on claims where as-
sent is not unequivocally expressed." Ibid. 8 · The trustee-
ships to which the Court has referred in the past have mani-
8 "There are a number of widely varying relationships which more or 
less closely resemble trusts, but which are not trusts, although the term 
'trust' is sometimes used loosely to cover such relationships. It is impor-
tant to differentiate trusts from these other relationships, since many of 
the rules applicable to trusts are not applicable to them." Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts § 4, Introductory Note, at 15 (1959). For example, the 
Court often has described the fiduciary relationship betw,een the__1illit.ed.. 
States and Indians as one between a guardian and a ward. ~ ard­
ianship is not a trust." I d., § 7. There is no explanation, however, why 
the Court chooses one analogy and not another. The choice appears to be 
influenced by the fact that "[t]he duties of a trustee are more intensive 
than the duties of other fiduciaries." I d., § 2, comment b. 
The Court asserts that "[a]ll of the necessary elements of a common-law 
trust are present"-a trustee, a beneficiary, and a trust corpus. Ante, at 
19. But two persons and a parcel of real property, without more, do not 
create a trust. Rather, "[a] trust ... arises as a result of a manifestation 
of an intention to create it." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 2. See 
id., § 23 ("A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an inten-
tion to create a trust."); id., § 25 ("No trust is created unless the settlor 
manifests an intention to impose enforceable duties."). This is the ele-
ment that is missing in this case, and the Court does not, and cannot, find '+ that Congress has manifeste · · tutory duties upon 
~ ~· ents rely trust duties. Cf. id., 95; A. Scot 
/.1, .. 
1 
-1 s 5 772 (2d ed. 1967) ("At commo · e t at a use .. . 
'llfV""' could n e enforced against the Cro .... "). Indeed, gi lan-
/ guage of the statute at issue in Mitchel , the case for finding that Con-
'7 gress intended to impose fiduciary obligations on the United States was 
"' .. -#' • - much strongerf han it is here. See 445 u. s. at HITE J., dissent-
/' ~~ ing). One oft e authorities cited by JUSTICE HITE, 2 . cott, supra, 
-:A § 95, specifically discusses the General Allotment Act as an ex le of the 
!"' United States acting as a trustee. Furthermore, a trustee can "re [e) 
powers with respect to the administration of the trust." I d., § 37. U nl;-e-ss--
the United States agrees to be held liable in damages, even the existence of 
a trust does not necessarily establish that the Government has surrendered 
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fested more the view that pervasive control over Indian life is 
such a high attribute of federal sovereignty that States can-
not infringe upon that control. Ibid. 9 The Court today 
turns this shield into a sword. 
In my view, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" of any of 
the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U. S. 49, 59 (1978), or in their legislative histories, "fairly 
[can] be interpreted as mandating compensation" for the con-
duct alleged by respondents. Some of the statutes involved 
here, to be sure, create substantive duties that the Secretary 
must fulfill. But this could equally be said of the Classifica-
tion Act, considered in Testan. It requires that pay classifi-
cation ratings of federal employees be carried out pursuant to 
"the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work." 5 
U. S. C. § 5101(1)(A). Although the federal employee in 
Testan alleged a violation of the Act, the Court concluded 
that a backf ay remedy was unavailable, rejecting the argu-
9 The Court has invoked the fiduciary relation primarily (i) to preclude 
unauthorized state interference in the relations between the United States 
and the Indian tribes or other unauthorized exercise of state jurisdiction on 
Indian lands, see e. g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 382-384 
(1886); (ii) to bar or nullify exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters 
affecting Indian property rights, in which the United States was not prop-
erly joined or represented, see, e. g., Minnesota v. United States, 305 
U. S. 382, 386 (1939); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 442-444 
(1926); (iii) to interpret doubtful or ambiguous treaty language in favor of 
the Indians, see, e. g., United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 
117-118 (1938); Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396 (1902); (iv) to 
determine the liability of the United States for damages under the Just 
Compensation Clause where, acting as a fiduciary manager, it has con-
verted the form of Indian property, see, e. g., United States v. Sioux Na-
tion of Indians, 448 U. S. 371, 415-416 (1980); and (v) to emphasize the 
high standard of care that the United States is obliged to exercise in carry-
ing out its duties respecting the Indians, see, e. g., United States v. Ma-
son, 412 U. S. 391, 398 (1973); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 
286, 296-297 (1942). But the Court has never, until today, invoked the 
doctrine to hold that the United States is answerable in money damages for 
breaches of the standards applicable to a private fiduciary. 
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ment that the substantive right necessarily implies a dam-
ages remedy. 424 U. S., at 400-403. 
Ignoring this holding in Testan, the Court concludes that 
the mere existence of a trust of some kind necessarily estab-
lishes that Congress has consented to a recovery of damages. 
In language superficially resembling rejected perceptions of 
"natural law," the Court rules that, "[g]iven the existence of 
a trust relationship, it naturally follows that the Government 
should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary du-
ties." Ante, at 20 (emphasis added). See also ibid. (dam-
ages are a "fundamental incident" of a trust relationship); 
ibid. (it would be "anomalous" not to find a damages remedy). 
The Court can find no more support for this proposition than 
d ........_ ; the dissenting opinion in Mitchell I. See ante, at 21.'
0 
1 '~ _It is fair to say that the Court is influenced by its view that 
~ an injunctive remedy is inadequate to redress the violations 
L. ~ alleged-precisely the inference deemed inadmissible in 
1v··" Testan." It is the ordinary result of sovereign immunity 
'
0 The Court reaches for support in Seminole Nation v. United States, 
supra, and United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103 (1935), but both 
cases cut against the Court's theory in this case. The discussion of the 
Government's fiduciary duty in Seminole Nation referred to a claim to 
compel payments expressly prescribed by Treaty. See 316 U. S., at 
296-297. Creek Nation involved a taking claim. 
11 Also significant is the Court's standardless remand for further pro-
ceedings consistent with its opinion. Given the strictness with which con-
sents to suit by the sovereign are to be construed, United States v. Sher-
wood, 312 U. S. 584, 590-591 (1941), where the statute upon which liability 
is premised creates no right to payment of a sum certain, the Court of 
Claims will be required, without legislative guidance, to determine the ex-
tent of liability, if any, and the items of damages that are cognizable. This 
task, unlike the factual or legal determination whether a particular individ-
ual falls within a class granted a right to payment Of money by a statute, is 
not one to which courts are adapted. Any rules established will be of "ju-
dicial cloth, not legislative cloth." Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Ha-
waii, 454 U. S. 139, 141 (1981). I assume, however, that the law of trusts 
generally will control and that all defenses to actions on breaches of trust, 
such as consent by the beneficiary and laches, will be fully available to the 
7 
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that unconsented claims for money damages are barred. 
The fact that damages cannot be recovered without the sov-
ereign's consent hardly supports the conclusion that consent 
has been given. Yet this, in substance, is the Court's rea-
soning. If it is saying that a remedy is necessary to redress 
every injury sustained, the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
will have been drained of all meaning. Moreover, "many of 
the federal statutes . . . that expressly provide money dam-
ages as a remedy against the United States in carefully lim-
ited circumstances would be rendered superfluous." Testan, 
424 U. S., at 404. 
III 
The Court has made no effort to demonstrate that Con-
gress · intended to render the United States answerable in 
damages upon claims of the kind presented here. The mere 
application by a court of the label "trust" cannot properly jus-
tify disregard of an immunity from damages the Government 
has never waived. I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Claims. 
United States. Cf. 664 F. 2d, at 274. 
I • 
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APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
[June - , 1983] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST joins, ' 
dissenting. 
The controlling law in this case is clear. Speaking for the 
Court in United States v . . Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980) 
(Mitchell 1), JUSTICE MARSHALL reaffirmed the general 
principle that a cause of action for damages against the 
United States "'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally 
expressed."' !d., at 538 (quoting United States v. King, 395 
U. S. 1, 4 (1969)). See United States v. Hopkins, 427 U. S. 
123, 128 (1976) ("specific command of statute or authorized 
regulations"); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 170 
(1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Where, as here, a claim 
for money damages is predicated upon an alleged statutory 
violation, the rule is that the statute does not create a cause 
of action for damages unless the statute "'in itself ... can 
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Fed-
eral Government for the damage sustained.'" United States 
v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 402 (1976) (quoting Eastport S.S. 
Corp. v. United States, 372 F. 2d 1002, ·1008-1009 (Ct. Cl. 
1967)). See, e. g., Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. 
Sheehan, 456 U. S. 728, 739-740 (1982) ("Testan [held] that 
the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where damages 
claims against the United States have been authorized explic-
itly") (emphasis added); id., at 739 (damages remedy avail-
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able where the regulations "specifically authorize awards of 
money damages"); id., at 741 (reaffirming that an action for 
damages under the Tucker Act may not be premised upon 
"regulations ... which do not explicitly authorize damages 
awards"). In sum, whether the United States has created a 
cause of action turns upon the intent of Congress, not the in-
clinations of the courts. See United States v. Shaw, 309 
U. S. 495, 500 (1940) ("specific statutory consent"); Munro v. 
United States, 303 U. S. 36, 41 (1938) ("only by permission"). l 
Today, the Court appears disinterested in the intent of r 
Congress. It has effectively reversed the presumption that 
absent "affirmative statutory authority," United States v. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514 
(1940), the United States has not consented to be sued for 
damages. It has substituted a contrary presumption, appli-
cable to the conduct of the United States in Indian affairs, 
that the United States has consented to be sued for statutory 
violations and other departures from the rules that govern 
private fiduciaries. I dissent from the Court's departure 
from long-settled principles. 
I 
The Court does not-and clearly cannot-contend that any 
of the statutes standing alone reflects the necessary legisla-
tive authorization of a damages remedy. None of the stat-
utes contains any "provision ... that expressly makes the 
United States liable" for its alleged mismanagement of Indian 
forest resources and their proceeds or grants a right of action 
"with specificity." Testan, 424 U. S., at 399, 400. Indeed, 
nothing in the timber-sales statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§ 406, 407/ 
'The only monetary obligation imposed upon the Secretary by § 406 or 
§ 407 is to pay the actual "proceeds" of timber sales to the owners of the 
land. Thus, while it may well be that those sections would permit an ac-
. tion to compel the Secretary to pay over unlav.rfully retained proceeds, see 
United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 401 (1976), no statutory basis exists 
for extending that remedy to profits that arguably or ideally should have 
81-1748--DISSENT 
UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL 3 
466/ the road and right-of-way statutes, §§ 318a, 323-325,3 
or the interest statute, § 162a, 4 addresses in any respect the 
institution of damages actions against the United States. 
Nor is there any indication in the legislative history of the 
statutes that Congress intended to consent to damages ac-
tions for mismanagement of Indian assets by enacting these 
provisions. 5 The Court does not suggest otherwise. 
been, but were not, earned by the Secretary. On the contrary, the statu-
tory recognition of a right to receive the "proceeds" of sales conducted sug-
gests that this is the limit of any damages action implicitly authorized by 
Congress. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea 
Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 14-15, 20-21 (1981). Cf. United States v. 
Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201, 208 (1982). 
'Section 466 merely requires the Secretary to "make rules and regula-
tions for the operation and management of Indian forestry units on the 
principle of sustained-yield management." 
3 Section 318a authorizes the appropriation of funds for building of roads 
on Indian reservations. It would be a radical change in the law of sover-
eign immunity to hold that a routine authorization statute allows individ-
uals who might benefit from appropriations to bring an action to recover 
damages. And although § 325 requires "the payment of such· compensa-
tion as the Secretary of the Interior shall determine to be just," it does not 
follow that damages for failure to secure more generous compensation are 
available. Indeed, the explicit statutory recognition of the Secretary's au-
thority to determine the amount of compensation militates against any 
damages remedy for insufficient compensation. See Texas Industries, I· 
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 644-645 (1981); Plumbers & ~ 
Pipefitters v. Local 334, 452 U. S. 615, 630 (1981) (BURGER, C. J., 
dissenting). 
• Section 162a affords the Secretary substantial discretion respecting in-
vestments to be made with individual Indian funds. There is nothing in 
the statute that requires payment of a particular rate of interest, much less 
that makes the United States accountable in damages for any amount by 
which the revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable manage-
ment zeal to get for the Indians the best rate." Mitchell v. United States, 
664 F. 2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
5 It is improbable that Congress intended § 406 to constitute consent to 
monetary liability for forestry mismanagement on allotted lands, because 
before 1924, the Government maintained the position that heavily forested 
lands were not to be allotted. See United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446; 
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The Court for the most part rests its decision on the im-
plausible proposition that statutes that do not in terms create 
a right to payment of money nonetheless may support a dam-
age action against the United States. This view simply can-
not be reconciled with the decisions in Testan and Mitchell I. 
A nonmonetary duty, 6 without more, is insufficient to over-
come the "presumption" that Congress has not consented to 
suit for money damages. See Eastern Transportation Co. v. 
United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927). 
This Court has had occasion in recent cases to emphasize 
that congressional intent is the ultimate standard in deter-
mining whether a private right of action should be inferred 
from a statute that does not, in terms, provide for such an 
action. i Those cases are instructive, for here, too, the "ulti-
449 (1924); Brief for Petitioner 3 And before 1964, § 406 was a rather 
bare instrument, simply giving an~~ian permission to sell his timber with 
the Secretary's permission. See ante, at 13--14. The legislative history of 
the 1964 amendments to § 406, see ante, at 16, also fails to supply the nec-
essary evidence of congressional intent. The House Report states that 
"[n]o additional expenditure of Federal funds" was expected to be incurred 
by reason of the enactment of the legislation. H. R. Rep. No. 1292, 88th 
Con g., 2d Sess. 2 (1964). A letter from the Interior Department to the 
Congress urging enactment of the legislation explained only that the stand-
ards for timber sales on allotted lands "should help allay disputes and avoid 
misunderstanding." S. Rep. No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963). 
6 Although not dispositive, the monetary character of a statutory right 
is a strong indication that a statute "in itself ... can fairly be interpreted 
as mandating compensation." By contrast, where, as here, the duties im-
posed by a statute are not essentially monetary in character, but require 
implementation through conduct by federal officials, the contrary inference 
arises: that Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, created only a 
substantive right enforceable through injunctive relief. See Testan, 424 
U. S., at 401, n. 5, 403. 
'See, e. g., Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15, 
20-23 (1982); Middlesex County, 453 U. S., at 13--18; Texas Industries, 451 
U. S., at 639-040; California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 292--298 (1981); 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 91-95 (1981); 
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mate question is one of congressional intent, not one of 
whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statu-
tory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Touche Ross 
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578 (1979). As we recog-
nized in Testan, courts are not free to dispense with "estab-
lished principles" requiring explicit congressional authoriza-
tion for maintenance of suits against the United States 
simply "because it might be thought that they should be re-
sponsive to a particular conception of enlightened govern-
mental policy." 424 U. S., at 400. See Shaw, 309 U. S., at 
502. The Court today adduces no "evidence that Congress 
anticipated that there would be a private remedy." Califor-
nia v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 298 (1981). 
The Court defends its departure from our precedents on 
the ground that the statutes and regulations upon which re-
spondents rely need not be "construed in the manner appro-
priate to waivers of sovereign immunity." Ante, at 12. The 
Court in effect is overruling Mitchell I sub silentio, for as its 
discussion on the Tucker Act makes clear, see ante, at 10-13, 
we there at least "accepted the government's ... claim that a 
strict standard of construction, applicable to deciding 
whether Congress had enacted a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity, should be applied in interpreting substantive legislation 
for the benefit of Indian people." Hughes, Can the Trustee 
be Sued for its Breach? The Sad Saga of United States v. 
Mitchell, 26 S. D. L. Rev. 447, 473 (1981). We expressly ~ 
held that the General Allotment Act at issue in Mitchell I 
"does not unambiguously provide that the United States has 
undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities." 445 U. S., at 542 
(emphasis added). Cf. Army & Air Force Exchange Service 
v. Sheehan, 456 U. S., at 739 ("explicitly reject[ing] the argu-
ment that 'the violation of any statute or regulation ... auto-
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc . v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 1S-24 
(1979). Against the background of sovereign immunity, the rationale of 
these cases should apply here with particular force. 
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matically creates a cause of action against the United States 
for money damages"') (quoting Testan, 424 U. S., at 401). 
The Court hardly can view the statutes here as "unambigu-
ously" imposing trust duties on the Government. 
II 
The Court makes little or no pretense that it is following 
doctrine heretofore established. Without pertinent analysis, 
it simply concludes: "Because the statutes and regulations at 
issue in this case clearly establish fiduciary obligations of the 
Government in the management and operation of Indian 
lands and resources, they can fairly be interpreted as man-
dating compensation by the Federal Government for dam-
ages sustained." Ante, at 19-20. This conclusion rests on 
two dubious assumptions. First, the Court decides that the 
statutes create or recognize fiduciary duties. It then rea-
sons that because a private express trust normally imports a 
right to recover damages for breach, and because injunctive 
relief is perceived to be inadequate, Congress necessarily 
must have authorized recovery of damages for failure to per-~ 
form the statutory duties properly. The relevancy of the 
first conclusion is questionable, and the other departs from 
our precedents, chiefly Testan and Mitchell I. 
The Court simply asserts that the statutes here "clearly es-
tablish fiduciary obligations." Ante, at 20. See also id., at 
19 ("a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises"). I agree 
with the dissent in the Court of Claims that "there is kind of a 
bootstrap quality of reasoning in saying that [the United 
States'] duties expressed by law are those of a trustee, and, 
therefore, we may look at SCOTT ON TRUSTS or theRE-
STATEMENT OF TRUSTS and impose on [the Govern-
ment] all the other consequences the law, as stated by those 
authorities, derives from the status of an erring nongovern-
mental trustee." 664 F. 2d 265, 283 (Nichols, J., concurring 
and dissenting). "The federal power over Indian lands is so 
different in nature and origin from that of a private trustee 
81-1748-DISSENT 
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that caution is taught in using the mere label of a trust 
plus a reading of SCOTT ON TRUSTS to impose liability on 
claims where assent is not unequivocally expressed." lbid. 8 
The trusteeships to which the Court has referred in the past 
' "There are a number of widely varying relationships which more or 
less closely resemble trusts, but which are not trusts, although the term 
'trust' is sometimes used loosely to cover such relationships. It is impor-
tant to differentiate trusts from these other relationships, since many of 
the rules applicable to trusts are not applicable to them." Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts § 4, Introductory Note, at 15 (1959). For example, the 
Court often has described the fiduciary relationship between the United 
States and Indians as one between a guardian and a ward. See, e. g., 
Klamath Indians v. United States, 296 U. S. 244, 254 (1935); United States 
v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 383 (1886). But "[a] guardianship is not a 
trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 7. There is no explanation, 
however, why the Court chooses one analogy and not another. The choice 
appears to be influenced by the fact that "[t]he duties of a trustee are more 
intensive than the duties of other fiduciaries." I d., § 2, comment b. 
The Court asserts that "[a]ll of the necessary elements of a common-law 
trust are present"-a trustee, a beneficiary, and a trust corpus. Ante, at 
19. But two persons and a parcel of real property, without more, do not 
create a trust. Rather, "[a] trust ... arises as a result of a manifestation 
of an intention to create it.·~ Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 2. See 
id., § 23 ("A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an inten-
tion to create a trust."); id., § 25 ("No trust is created unless the settlor 
manifests an intention to impose enforceable duties."). This is the ele-
ment that is missing in this case, and the Court does not, and cannot, find 
that Congress has manifested its intent to make the statutory duties upon 
which respondents rely trust duties. Cf. id., § 95; 2 A. Scott, Law of 
Trusts § 95, at 772 (2d ed. 1967) ("At common law it was held that a use ... 
could not be enforced against the Crown .... "). 
Indeed, given the language of the statute at issue in Mitchell I, the case 
for finding that Congress intended to impose fiduciary obligations on the 
United States was much stronger there than it is here. See 445 U. S., at 
547 (WHITE~-'J., dissenting). One of the authorities cited by JUSTICE 
WHITE, 2 A.' Scott, supra, § 95, specifically discusses the General Allotment 
Act as an example of the United States acting as a trustee. Furthermore, 
. a trustee can "reserv[e] powers with respect to the administration of the 
trust." Restatement (Second) of T-rusts, § 37. Unless the United States 
agrees to be held liable in damages, even the existence of a trust does not 
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have manifested more the view that pervasive control over 
Indian life is such a high attribute of federal sovereignty that 
States cannot infringe upon that control. Ibid. 9 The Court 
today turns this shield into a sword. 
In my view, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" of any of 
the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U. S. 49, 59 (1978), or in their legislative histories, "fairly 
[can] be interpreted as mandating compensation" for the con-
duct alleged by respondents. Some of the statutes involved 
here, to be sure, create substantive duties that the Secretary 
must fulfill. But this could equally be said of the Classifica-
tion Act, considered in Testan. It requires that pay classifi-
cation ratings of federal employees be carried out pursuant to 
"the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work." 5 
U. S. C. § 5101(1)(A). Although the federal employee in 
necessarily establish that the Government has surrendered its immunity 
from damages. 
• The Court has invoked the fiduciary relation primarily (i) to preclude 
unauthorized state interference in the relations between the United States 
and the Indian tribes or other unauthorized exercise of state jurisdiction on 
Indian lands, see e. g., Kagama, 118 U. S., at 382-384; (ii) to bar or nullify I 
exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters affecting Indian property 
rights, in which the United States was not properly joined or represented, 
see, e. g., Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386 (1939); United 
States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 442-444 (1926); (iii) to interpret doubt-
ful or ambiguous treaty language in favor of the Indians, see, e. g., United 
States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 117-118 (1938); Minnesota v. 
Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396 (1902); (iv) to determine the liability of the 
United States for damages under the Just Compensation Clause where, 
acting as a fiduciary manager, it has converted the form of Indian prop-
erty, see, e. g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 
415-416 (1980); and (v) to emphasize the high standard of care that the 
United States is obliged to exercise in carrying out its duties respecting the 
Indians, see, e. g., United States v. Mason, 412 U. S. 391, 398 (1973); Sem-
inole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 29~297 (1942). But the 
Court has never, until today, invoked the doctrine to hold that the United 
States is answe:r;able in money damages for breaches of the standards appli-
cable to a private fiduciary. 
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Testan alleged a violation of the Act, the Court concluded 
that a back-pay remedy was unavailable, rejecting the argu-
ment that the substantive right necessarily implies a dam-
ages remedy. 424 U. S., at 400-403. 
Ignoring this holding in Testan, the Court concludes that 
the mere existence of a trust of some kind necessa1·ily estab-
lishes that Congress has consented to a recovery of damages. 
In effect we are told to accept on faith the existence of a dam-
ages cause of action: "Given the existence of a trust relation-
ship, it naturally follows that the Government should be lia-
ble in damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties." Ante, 
at 20 (emphasis added). See also ibid. (damages are a "fun-
damental incident" of a trust relationship); ibid. (it would be 
"anomalous" not to find a damages remedy). The Court can 
find no more support for this proposition than the dissenting 
opinion in Mitchell I. See ante, at 21. 10 
It is fair to say that the Court is influenced by its view that 
an injunctive remedy is inadequate to redress the violations 
alleged- precisely the inference deemed inadmissible in 
Testan. 11 It is the ordinary result of sovereign immunity 
10 The Court reaches for support in Seminole Nation v. United States, 
supra, and United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103 (1935), but both 
cases cut against the Court's theory in this case. The discussion of the 
Government's fiduciary duty in Serni1wle Nation refelTed to a claim to 
compel payments expressly prescribed by Treaty. See 316 U. S., at · 
296-297. Creek Nation involved a ta!Dng claim. 
11 Also significant is the Court's standardless remand for further pro-
ceedings consistent with its opinion. Where the statute upon which liabil-
ity is premised creates no right to payment of a sum certain, the Court of 
Claims will be required, without legislative guidance, to det.ennine the ex-
tent of liability, if any, and the items of damages that are cognizable. This 
task, unlike the factual or legal determination whether a particular individ-
ual falls within a class granted a right to payment of money by a statute, is 
not one to which courts are adapted. Any rules established will be of "ju-
dicial cloth, not legislative cloth." Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Ha-
waii, 454 U. S. 139, 141 (1981). I assume, however, that the law of trusts 
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that unconsented claims for money damages are barred. 
The fact that damages cannot be recovered without the sov-
ereign's consent hardly supports the conclusion that consent 
has been given. Yet this, in substance, is the Court's rea-
soning. If it is saying that a remedy is necessary to redress 
every injury sustained, the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
will have been drained of all meaning. Moreover, "many of 
the federal statutes . . . that expressly provide money dam-
ages as a remedy against the United States in carefully lim-
ited circumstances would be rendered superfluous." Testan, 
424 U. S., at 404. 
III 
The Court has made no effort to demonstrate that Con-
gress intended to render the United States answerable in 
damages upon claims of the kind presented here. The mere 
application by a court of the label "trust" cannot properly jus-
tify disregard of an immunity from damages the Government 
has never waived. I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Claims. 
such as consent by the beneficiary and laches, will be fully available to the 
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dissenting. 
The controlling law in this case is clear. Speaking for the . . 
Court in United States v. ,Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980) 
(Mitchell /), JUSTICE MARSHALL reaffirmed the general 
principle that a cause of action for damages against the 
United States" 'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally 
expressed."' /d., at 538 (quoting United States v. King, 395 ~ 
U. S. 1, 4 (1969)). See United States v. Hopkins, 427 U. S. 
123, 128 (1976) ("specific command of statute or authorized 
regulations"); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 170 
(1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 'Where, as here, a claim 
for money damages is predicated upon an alleged statutory 
violation, the rule is that the statute does not create a cause 
of action for damages unless the statute "'in itself ... can 
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Fed-
eral Government for the damage sustained."' United States 
v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 402 (1976) (quoting Eastport S.S. 
Corp. v. United States, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1008--1009 (Ct. Cl. 
1967)). See, e. g., Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. 
Sheehan, 456 U. S. 728, 739-740 (1982) ("Testan [held] that 
the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where damages 
claims against the United States have been authorized explic-
itly") (emphasis added); id., at 739 (damages remedy avail-
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able where the regulations "specifically authorize awards of 
money damages"); id., at 741 (reaffirming that an action for 
damages under the Tucker Act may not be premised upon 
"regulations ... which do not explicitly authorize damages 
awards") . In sum, whether the United States has created a 
cause of action turns upon the intent of Congress, not the in-
clinations of the courts. See United States v. Shaw, 309 
U. S. 495, 500 (1940) ("specific statutory consent"); Munro v. 
United States, 303 U. S. 36, 41 (1938) ("only by permission"). l 
Today, the Court appears disinterested in the intent of f 
Congress. It has effectively reversed the presumption that 
absent "affirmative statutory authority," United States v. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514 
(1940), the United States has not consented to be sued for 
damages. It has substituted a contrary presumption, appli-
cable to the conduct of the United States in Indian affairs, 
that the United States has consented to be sued for statutory 
violations and other departures from the rules that govern 
private fiduciaries. I dissent from the Court's departure 
from long-settled principles. 
I 
The Court does not-and clearly cannot-contend that any 
of the statutes standing alone reflects the necessary legisla-
tive authorization of a damages remedy. None of the stat-
utes contains any "provision . . . that expressly makes the 
United States liable" for its alleged mismanagement of Indian 
forest resources and their proceeds or grants a right of action 
"with specificity." Testan, 424 U. S., at 399, 400. Indeed, 
nothing in the timber-sales statutes, 25 U.S. C. §§406, 407, 1 
'The only monetary obligation imposed upon the Secretary by § 406 or 
§ 407 is to pay the actual "proceeds" of timber sales to the owners of the 
land. Thus, while it may well be that those sections would permit an ac-
. tion to compel the Secretary to pay over unlawfully retained proceeds, see 
United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 401 (1976), no statutory basis exists 
for extending that remedy to profits that arguably or ideally should have 
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466/ the road and right-of-way statutes, §§ 318a, 323-325,3 
or the interest statute, § 162a,4 addresses in any respect the 
institution of damages actions against the United States. 
Nor is there any indication in the legislative history of the 
statutes that Congress intended to consent to damages ac-
tions for mismanagement of Indian assets by enacting these 
provisions. 5 The Court does not suggest otherwise. 
been, but were not, earned by the Secretary. On the contrary, the statu-
tory recognition of a right to receive the "proceeds" of sales conducted sug-
gests that this is the limit of any damages action implicitly authorized by 
Congress. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea 
Clammers Assn ., 453 U. S. 1, 14-15, 20-21 (1981). Cf. United States v. 
Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201, 208 (1982). 
2 Section 466 merely requires the Secretary to "make rules and regula-
tions for the operation and management of Indian forestry units on the 
principle of sustained-yield management. " 
3 Section 318a authorizes the appropriation of funds for building of roads 
on Indian reservations. It would be a radical change in the law of sover-
eign immunity to hold that a routine authorization statute allows individ-
uals who might benefit from appropriations to bring an action to recover 
damages. And although § 325 requires "the payment of such ·compensa-
tion as the Secretary of the Interior shall determine to be just," it does not 
follow that damages for failure to secure more generous compensation are 
available. Indeed, the explicit statutory recognition of the Secretary's au-
thority to determine the amount of compensation militates against any 
damages remedy for insufficient compensation. See Texas Industries, I· 
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 644-645 (1981); Plumbers & -
Pipefitters v. Local 334, 452 U.S. 615, 630 (1981) (BURGER, C. J., 
dissenting) . 
'Section 162a affords the Secretary substantial discretion respecting in-
vestments to be made with individual Indian funds . There is nothing in 
the statute that requires payment of a particular rate of interest, much less 
that makes the United States accountable in damages for any amount by 
which the revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable manage-
ment zeal to get for the Indians the best rate." Mitchell v. United States, 
664 F. 2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
5 It is improbable that Congress intended § 406 to constitute consent to 
monetary liability for forestry mismanagement on allotted lands, because 
before 1924, the Government maintained the position that heavily forested 
lands were not to be allotted. See United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446; 
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The Court for the most part rests its decision on the im-
plausible proposition that statutes that do not in terms create 
a right to payment of money nonetheless may support a dam-
age action against the United States. This view simply can-
not be reconciled with the decisions in Testan and Mitchell I. 
A nonmonetary duty, 6 without more, is insufficient to over-
come the "presumption" that Congress has not consented to 
suit for money damages. See Eastern Transportation Co. v. 
United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927). 
This Court has had occasion in recent cases to emphasize 
that congressional intent is the ultimate standard in deter-
mining whether a private right of action should be inferred 
from a statute that does not, in terms, provide for such an 
action. i Those cases are instructive, for here, too, the "ulti-
449 (1924); Brief for Petitioner 3,t-., ,_fnd before 1964, § 406 was a rather 
bare instrument, simply giving an' Indian permission to sell his timber with 
the Secretary's permission. See ante, at 13-14. The legislative history of 
the 1964 amendments to § 406, see ante, at 16, also fails to supply the nec-
essary evidence of congressional intent. The House Report states that 
"[n]o additional expenditure of Federal funds" was expected to be incurred 
by reason of the enactment of the legislation. H. R. Rep. No. 1292, 88th 
Con g., 2d Sess. 2 (1964). A letter from the Interior Department to the 
Congress urging enactment of the legislation explained only that the stand-
ards for timber sales on allotted lands "should help allay disputes and avoid 
misunderstanding." S. Rep. No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1963). 
6 Although not dispositive, the monetary character of a statutory right 
is a strong indication that a statute "in itself . .. can fairly be interpreted 
as mandating compensation." By contrast, where, as here, the duties im-
posed by a statute are not essentially monetary in character, but require 
implementation through conduct by federal officials, the contrary inference 
arises: that Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, created only a 
substantive right enforceable through injunctive relief. See Testan, 424 
U. S., at 401, n. 5, 403. 
7 See, e. g., Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 
2D-23 (1982); Middlesex County, 453 U. S., at 13-18; Texas Industries, 451 
U. S., at 639--640; California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 292--298 (1981); 
Northwest Airlines, Inc . v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 91- 95 (1981); 
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mate question is one of congressional intent, not one of 
whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statu-
tory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Touche Ross 
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578 (1979). As we recog-
nized in Testan, courts are not free to dispense with "estab-
lished principles" requiring explicit congressional authoriza-
tion for maintenance of suits against the United States 
simply "because it might be thought that they should be re-
sponsive to a particular conception of enlightened govern-
mental policy." 424 U. S., at 400. See Shaw, 309 U. S., at 
502. The Court today adduces no "evidence that Congress 
anticipated that there would be a private remedy." Califor-
nia v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 298 (1981). 
The Court defends its departure from our precedents on 
the ground that the statutes and regulations upon which re-
spondents rely need not be "construed in the manner appro-
priate to waivers of sovereign immunity." Ante, at 12. The 
Court in effect is overruling Mitchell I sub silentio, for as its 
discussion on the Tucker Act makes clear, see ante, at 10-13, 
we there at least "accepted the government's ... claim that a 
strict standard of construction, applicable to deciding 
whether Congress had enacted a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity, should be applied in interpreting substantive legislation 
for the benefit of Indian people." Hughes, Can the Trustee 
be Sued for its Breach? The Sad Saga of United States v. 
Mitchell, 26 S. D. L. Rev. 447, 473 (1981). We expressly 
held that the General Allotment Act at issue in Mitchell I 
"does not unambiguously provide that the United States has 
undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities." 445 U. S., at 542 
(emphasis added). Cf. Army & Air Force Exchange Service 
v. Sheehan, 456 U. S., at 739 ("explicitly reject[ing] the argu-
ment that 'the violation of any statute or regulation ... auto-
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 19-24 
(1979). Against the background of sovereign immunity, the rationale of 
these cases should apply here with particular force. 
/ 
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matically creates a cause of action against the United States 
for money damages"') (quoting Testan, 424 U. S., at 401). 
The Court hardly can view the statutes here as "unambigu-
ously" imposing trust duties on the Government. 
II 
The Court makes little or no pretense that it is following 
doctrine heretofore established. Without pertinent analysis, 
it simply concludes: "Because the statutes and regulations at 
issue in this case clearly establish fiduciary obligations of the 
Government in the management and operation of Indian 
lands and resources, they can fairly be interpreted as man-
dating compensation by the Federal Government for dam-
ages sustained." Ante, at 19-20. This conclusion rests on 
two dubious assumptions. First, the Court decides that the 
statutes create or recognize fiduciary duties. It then rea-
sons that because a private express trust normally imports a 
right to recover damages for breach, and because injunctive 
relief is perceived to be inadequate, Congress necessarily 
must have authorized recovery of damages for failure to per-~ 
form the statutory duties properly. The relevancy of the 
first conclusion is questionable, and the other departs from 
our precedents, chiefly Testan and Mitchell I. 
The Court simply asserts that the statutes here "clearly es-
tablish fiduciary obligations." Ante, at 20. See also id., at 
19 ("a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises"). I agree 
with the dissent in the Court of Claims that "there is kind of a 
bootstrap quality of reasoning in saying that [the United 
States'] duties expressed by law are those of a trustee, and, 
therefore, we may look at SCOTT ON TRUSTS or theRE-
STATEMENT OF TRUSTS and impose on [the Govern-
ment] all the other consequences the law, as stated by those 
authorities, derives from the status of an erring nongovern-
mental trustee." 664 F. 2d 265, 283 (Nichols, J., concurring 
and dissenting). "The federal power over Indian lands is so 
different in nature and origin from that of a private trustee 
81-1741>---DISSENT 
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that caution is taught in using the mere label of a trust 
plus a reading of SCOTT ON TRUSTS to impose liability on 
claims where assent is not unequivocally expressed." lbid. 8 
The trusteeships to which the Court has referred in the past 
• "There are a number of widely varying relationships which more or 
less closely resemble trusts, but which are not trusts, although the term 
'trust' is sometimes used loosely to cover such relationships. It is impor-
tant to differentiate trusts from these other relationships, since many of 
the rules applicable to trusts are not applicable to them." Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts§ 4, Introductory Note, at 15 (1959). For example, the 
Court often has described the fiduciary relationship between the United 
States and Indians as one between a guardian and a ward. See, e. g., 
Klamath Indians v. United States, 296 U. S. 244, 254 (1935); United States 
v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 383 (1886). But "[a] guardianship is not a 
trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 7. There is no explanation, 
however, why the Court chooses one analogy and not another. The choice 
appears to be influenced by the fact that "[t]he duties of a trustee are more 
intensive than the duties of other fiduciaries." I d., § 2, comment b. 
The Court asserts that "[a]ll of the necessary elements of a common-law 
trust are present"- a trustee, a beneficiary, and a trust corpus. Ante, at 
19. But two persons and a parcel of real property, v.'ithout more, do not 
create a trust. Rather, "[a] trust ... arises as a result of a manifestation 
of an intention to create it.'~ Re tatement (Second) of Trusts, § 2. See 
id., § 23 ("A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an inten-
tion to create a trust."); id., § 25 ("No trust is created unless the settlor 
manifests an intention to impose enforceable duties."). This is the ele-
ment that is missing in this case, and the Court does not, and cannot, find ~ 
that Congress has manifested its intent to make the statutory duties upon 
which respondents rely trust duties. Cf. id., § 95; 2 A. Scott, Law of 
Trusts § 95, at 772 (2d ed. 1967) ("At common Jaw it was held that a use . . . 
could not be enforced against the Crown .... "). 
Indeed, given the language of the statute at issue in Mitchell I, the case 
for finding that Congress intended to impose fiduciary obligations on the 
G 
United States was much stronger there than it is here. See 445 U. S., at 
547 (WHITE/.'.J., dissenting). One of the authorities cited by JUSTICE 
WHITE, 2 A.' Scott, supra, § 95, specifically discusses the General Allotment 
Act as an example of the United States acting as a trustee. Furthermore, 
. a trustee can "reserv[e] powers with respect to the administration of the 
trust." Restatement (Second) of T-rusts, § 37. Unless the United States 
agrees to be held liable in damages, even the existence of a trust does not 
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have manifested more the view that pervasive control over 
Indian life is such a high attribute of federal sovereignty that 
States cannot infringe upon that control. Ibid. 9 The Court 
today turns this shield into a sword. 
In my view, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" of any of 
the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U. S. 49, 59 (1978), or in their legislative histories, "fairly 
[can] be interpreted as mandating compensation" for the con-
duct alleged by respondents. Some of the statutes involved 
here, to be sure, create substantive duties that the Secretary 
must fulfill. But this could equally be said of the Classifica-
tion Act, considered in Testan. It requires that pay classifi-
cation ratings of federal employees be carried out pursuant to 
"the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work." 5 
U. S. C. § 5101(1)(A). Although the federal employee in 
necessarily establish that the Government has surrendered its immunity 
from damages. 
'The Court has invoked the fiduciary relation primarily (i) to preclude 
unauthorized state interference in the relations between the United States 
and the Indian tribes or other unauthorized exercise of state jurisdiction on 
Indian lands, see e. g., Kagama, 118 U. S., at 382-384; (ii) to bar or nullify I 
exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters affecting Indian property 
rights, in which the United States was not properly joined or represented, 
see, e. g., Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386 (1939); United 
States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 442-444 (1926); (iii) to interpret doubt-
ful or ambiguous treaty language in favor of the Indians, see, e. g., United 
States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 117-118 (1938); Minnesota v. 
Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396 (1902); (iv) to determine the liability of the 
United States for damages under the Just Compensation Clause where, 
acting as a fiduciary manager, it has converted the form of Indian prop-
erty, see, e. g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U. S. 371, 
415-416 (1980); and (v) to emphasize the high standard of care that the 
United States is obliged to exercise in carrying out its duties respecting the 
Indians, see, e. g., United States v. Mason, 412 U. S. 391, 398 (1973); Sem-
inole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296-297 (1942). But the 
Court has never, until today, invoked the doctrine to hold that the United 
States is answe~;able in money damages for breaches of the standards appli-
cable to a private fiduciary. 
_, 
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Testan alleged a violation of the Act, the Court concluded 
that a back-pay remedy was unavailable, rejecting the argu-
ment that the substantive right necessarily implies a dam-
ages remedy. 424 U. S., at 400-403. 
Ignoring this holding in Testan, the Court concludes that 
the mere existence of a trust of some kind necessarily estab-
lishes that Congress has consented to a recovery of damages. 
In effect we are told to accept on faith the existence of a dam-
ages cause of action: "Given the existence of a trust relation-
ship, it naturally follows that the Government should be lia-
ble in damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties." Ante, 
at 20 (emphasis added). See also ibid. (damages are a "fun-
damental incident" of a trust relationship); ibid. (it would be 
"anomalous" not to find a damages remedy). The Court can 
find no more support for this proposition than the dissenting 
opinion in Mitchell I . See ante, at 21. 10 
It is fair to say that the Court is influenced by its view that 
an injunctive remedy is inadequate to redress the violations 
alleged-precisely the inference deemed inadmissible in 
Testan .11 It is the ordinary result of sovereign immunity 
'
0 The Court reaches for support in Seminole Nation v. United States, 
supra, and United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103 (1935), but both 
cases cut against the Court's th eory in this case. The discussion of the 
Government's fiduciary duty in Semi1wle Nation referred to a claim to 
compel payments expressly prescribed by Treaty. See 316 U. S., at · 
296-297. Creek Nation involved a taking claim. 
" Also significant is the Court's standardless remand for further pro-
ceedings consistent with its opinion. Where the statute upon which liabil-
ity is prerrused creates no right to payment of a sum certain, the Court of 
Claims will be required, -without legislative guidance, to determine the ex-
tent of liability, if any, and the items of damages that are cognizable. This 
task, unlike the factual or legal determination whether a particular individ-
ual falls within a class granted a right to payment of money by a statute, is 
not one to which courts are adapted. Any rules established will be of "ju-
dicial cloth, not legislative cloth." Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Ha-
waii, 454 U. S. 139, 141 (1981). I assume, however, that the law of trusts 
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that unconsented claims for money damages are barred. 
The fact that damages cannot be recovered without the sov-
ereign's consent hardly supports the conclusion that consent 
has been given. Yet this, in substance, is the Court's rea-
soning. If it is saying that a remedy is necessary to redress 
every injury sustained, the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
will have been drained of all meaning. Moreover, "many of 
the federal statutes ... that expressly provide money dam-
ages as a remedy against the United States in carefully lim-
ited circumstances would be rendered superfluous." Testan, 
424 U.S., at 404. 
III 
The Court has made no effort to demonstrate that Con-
gress intended to render the United States answerable in 
damages upon claims of the kind presented here. The mere 
application by a court of the label "trust" cannot properly jus-
tify disregard of an immunity from damages the Government 
has never waived. I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Claims. 
such as consent by the beneficiary and laches, will be fully available to the 
United States. Cf. 664 F. 2d, at 274. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE REHNQUIST and 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting. 
The controlling law in this case is clear. Speaking for the 
Court in United States v. Mitchell, 445 U. S. 535 (1980) 
(Mitchell I), JUSTICE MARSHALL reaffirmed the general 
principle that a cause of action for damages against the 
United States "'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally 
expressed."' I d., at 538 (quoting United States v. King, 395 
U. S. 1, 4 (1969)). See United States v. Hopkins, 427 U. S. 
123, 128 (1976) ("specific command of statute or authorized 
regulations"); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156, 170 
(1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Where, as here, a claim 
for money damages is predicated upon an alleged statutory 
violation, the rule is that the statute does not create a cause 
of action for damages unless the statute "'in itself . . . can 
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Fed-
eral Government for the damage sustained."' United States 
v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 402 (1976) (quoting Eastport S.S. 
Corp. v. United States, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1008-1009 (Ct. Cl. 
1967)). See, e. g., Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. 
Sheehan, 456 U. S. 728, 739--740 (1982) ("Testan [held] that 
the Tucker Act provides a remedy only where damages 
claims against the United States have been authorized explic-
itly") (emphasis added); id., at 739 (damages remedy avail-
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able where the regulations "specifically authorize awards of 
money damages"); id., at 741 (reaffirming that an action for 
damages under the Tucker Act may not be premised upon 
"regulations ... which do not explicitly authorize damages 
awards"). In sum, whether the United States has created a 
cause of action turns upon the intent of Congress, not the in-
clinations of the courts. See United States v. Shaw, 309 
U. S. 495, 500 (1940) ("specific statutory consent"); Munro v. 
United States, 303 U. S. 36, 41 (1938) ("only by permission"). 
Today, the Court appears disinterested in the intent of 
Congress. It has effectively reversed the presumption that 
absent "affirmative statutory authority," United States v. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514 
(1940), the United States has not consented to be sued for 
damages. It has substituted a contrary presumption, appli-
cable to the conduct of the United States in Indian affairs, 
that the United States has consented to be sued for statutory 
violations and other departures from the rules that govern 
private fiduciaries. I dissent from the Court's departure 
from long-settled principles. 
I 
The Court does not-and clearly cannot-contend that any 
of the statutes standing alone reflects the necessary legisla-
tive authorization of a damages remedy. None of the stat-
utes contains any "provision . . . that expressly makes the 
United States liable" for its alleged mismanagement of Indian 
forest resources and their proceeds or grants a right of action 
"with specificity." Testan, 424 U. S., at 399, 400. Indeed, 
nothing in the timber-sales statutes, 25 U. S. C. §§ 406, 407, 1 
1 The only monetary obligation imposed upon the Secretary by § 406 or 
§ 407 is to pay the actual "proceeds" of timber sales to the owners of the 
land. Thus, while it may well be that those sections would permit an ac-
tion to compel the Secretary to pay over unlawfully retained proceeds, see 
United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 401 (1976) , no statutory basis exists 
for extending that remedy to profits that arguably or ideally should have 
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466/ the road and right-of-way statutes, §§ 318a, 323-325,3 
or the interest statute, § 162a," addresses in any respect the 
institution of damages actions against the United States. 
Nor is there any indication in the legislative history of the 
statutes that Congress intended to consent to damages ac-
tions for mismanagement of Indian assets by enacting these 
provisions. 5 The Court does not suggest otherwise. 
been, but were not, earned by the Secretary. On the contrary, the statu-
tory recognition of a right to receive the "proceeds" of sales conducted sug-
gests that this is the limit of any damages action implicitly authorized by 
Congress. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea 
Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 14-15, 20-21 (1981). Cf. United States v. 
Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 208 (1982). 
2 Section 466 merely requires the Secretary to "make rules and regula-
tions for the operation and management of Indian forestry units on the 
principle of sustained-yield management." 
3 Section 318a authorizes the appropriation of funds for building of roads 
on Indian reservations. It would be a radical change in the law of sover-
eign immunity to hold that a routine authorization statute allows individ-
uals who might benefit from appropriations to bring an action to recover 
damages. And although § 325 requires "the payment of such compensa-
tion as the Secretary of the Interior shall determine to be just," it does not 
follow that damages for failure to secure more generous compensation are 
available. Indeed, the explicit statutory recognition of the Secretary's au-
thority to determine the amount of compensation militates against any 
damages remedy for insufficient compensation. See Texas Industries, 
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 644--645 (1981); Plumbers & 
Pipejitters v. Local 331,., 452 U. S. 615, 630 (1981) (BURGER, C. J., 
dissenting). 
'Section 162a affords the Secretary substantial discretion respecting in-
vestments to be made with individual Indian funds. There is nothing in 
the statute that requires payment of a particular rate of interest, much less 
that makes the United States accountable in damages for any amount by 
which the revenues earned fall short of a standard of "reasonable manage-
ment zeal to get for the Indians the best rate." Mitchell v. United States, 
664 F. 2d 265, 274 (Ct. Cl. 1981). 
5 It is improbable that Congress intended § 406 to constitute consent to 
monetary liability for forestry mismanagement on allotted lands, because 
before 1924, the Government maintained the position that heavily forested 
.lands were not to be allotted. See United States v. Payne, 264 U. S. 446, 
• 
81-174&-DISSENT 
4 UNITED STATES v. MITCHELL 
The Court for the most part rests its decision. on the im-
plausible proposition that statutes that do not in terms create 
a right to payment of money nonetheless may support a dam-
age action against the United States. This view simply can-
not be reconciled with the decisions in Testan and Mitchell I. 
A nonmonetary duty, 6 without more, is insufficient to over-
come the "presumption" that Congress has not consented to 
suit for money damages. See Eastern Transportation Co. v. 
United States, 272 U. S. 675, 686 (1927). 
This Court has had occasion in recent cases to emphasize 
that congressional intent is the ultimate standard in deter-
mining whether a private right of action should be inferred 
from a statute that does not, in terms, provide for such an 
action. 7 Those cases are instructive, for here, too, the "ulti-
449 (1924); Brief for Petitioner 3, n. 2. And before 1964, § 406 was a 
rather bare instrument, simply giving an Indian permission to sell his tim-
ber with the Secretary's permission. See ante, at 13--14. The legislative 
history of the 1964 amendments to§ 406, see ante, at 16, also fails to supply 
the necessary evidence of congressional intent. The House Report states 
that "[n]o additional expenditure of Federal funds" was expected to be in-
curred by reason of the enactment of the legislation. H. R. Rep. No. 
1292, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964). A letter from the Interior Depart-
ment to the Congress urging enactment of the legislation explained only 
that the standards for timber sales on allotted lands "should help allay dis-
putes and avoid misunderstanding." S. Rep. No. 672, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 3 (1963). 
• Although not dispositive, the monetary character of a statutory right 
is a strong indication that a statute "in itself ... can fairly be interpreted 
as mandating compensation." By contrast, where, as here, the duties im-
posed by a statute are not essentially monetary in character, but require 
implementation through conduct by federal officials, the contrary inference 
arises: that Congress, by its silence as to a damages remedy, created only a 
substantive right enforceable through injunctive relief. See Testan, 424 
U. S., at 401, n. 5, 403. 
7 See, e. g., Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15, 
20-23 (1982); Middlesex County, 453 U. S., at 13--18; Texas Industries, 451 
U.S., at 639-640; California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287,292-298 (1981); 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 91-95 (1981); 
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mate question is one of congressional intent, not one of 
whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statu-
tory scheme that Congress enacted into law." Touche Ross 
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578 (1979). As we recog-
nized in Testan, courts are not free to dispense with "estab-
lished principles" requiring explicit congressional authoriza-
tion for maintenance of suits against the United States 
simply "because it might be thought that they should be re-
sponsive to a particular conception of enlightened govern-
mental policy." 424 U. S., at 400. See Shaw, 309 U. S., at 
502. The Court today adduces no "evidence that Congress 
anticipated that there would be a private remedy." Califor-
nia v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 298 (1981). 
The Court defends its departure from our precedents on 
the ground that the statutes and regulations upon which re-
spondents rely need not be "construed in the manner appro-
priate to waivers of sovereign immunity." Ante, at 12. The 
Court in effect is overruling Mitchell I sub silentio, for as its 
discussion on the Tucker Act makes clear, see ante, at 10-13, 
we there at least "accepted the government's ... claim that a 
strict standard of construction, applicable to deciding 
whether Congress had enacted a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity, should be applied in interpreting substantive legislation 
for the benefit of Indian people." Hughes, Can the Trustee 
be Sued for its Breach? The Sad Saga of United States v. 
Mitchell, 26 S. D. L. Rev. 447, 473 (1981). We expressly 
held that the General Allotment Act at issue in Mitchell I 
"does not unambiguously provide that the United States has 
undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities." 445 U. S., at 542 
(emphasis added). Cf. Army & Air Force Exchange Service 
v. Sheehan, 456 U. S., at 739 ("explicitly reject[ing] the argu-
Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754, 770-784 (1981); 
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 19-24 
(1979). Against the background of sovereign immunity, the rationale of 
these cases should apply here with particular force. 
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ment that 'the violation of any statute or regulation . . . auto-
matically creates a cause of action against the United States 
for money damages'") (quoting Testan, 424 U. S., at 401). 
The Court hardly can view the statutes here as "unambigu-
ously" imposing trust duties on the Government. 
II 
The Court makes little or no pretense that it is following 
doctrine heretofore established. Without pertinent analysis, 
it simply concludes: "Because the statutes and regulations at 
issue in this case clearly establish fiduciary obligations of the 
Government in the management and operation of Indian 
lands and resources, they can fairly be interpreted as man-
dating compensation by the Federal Government for dam-
ages sustained." Ante, at 19-20. This conclusion rests on 
two dubious assumptions. First, the Court decides that the 
statutes create or recognize fiduciary duties. It then rea-
sons that because a private express trust normally imports a 
right to recover damages for breach, and because injunctive 
relief is perceived to be inadequate, Congress necessarily 
must have authorized recovery of damages for failure to per-
form the statutory duties properly. The relevancy of the 
first conclusion is questionable, and the other departs from 
our precedents, chiefly Testan and Mitchell I. 
The Court simply asserts that the statutes here "clearly es-
tablish fiduciary obligations." Ante, at 20. See also id., at 
19 ("a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises"). I agree 
with the dissent in the Court of Claims that "there is kind of a 
bootstrap quality of reasoning in saying that [the United 
States'] duties expressed by law are those of a trustee, and, 
therefore, we may look at SCOTT ON TRUSTS or the RE-
STATEMENT OF TRUSTS and impose on [the Govern-
ment] all the other consequences the law, as stated by those 
authorities, derives from the status of an erring nongovern-
mental trustee." 664 F. 2d 265, 283 (Nichols, J., concurring 
and dissenting). "The federal power over Indian lands is so 
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different in nature and origin from that of a private trustee 
. . . that caution is taught in using the mere label of a trust 
plus a reading of SCOTT ON TRUSTS to impose liability on 
claims where assent is not unequivocally expressed." lbid. 8 
8 "There are a number of widely varying relationships which more or 
less closely resemble trusts, but which are not trusts, although the term 
'trust' is sometimes used loosely to cover such relationships. It is impor-
tant to differentiate trusts from these other relationships, since many of 
the rules applicable to trusts are not applicable to them." Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts§ 4, Introductory Note, at 15 (1959). For example, the 
Court often has described the fiduciary relationship between the United 
States and Indians as one between a guardian and a ward. See, e. g., 
Klamath Indians v. United States, 296 U. S. 244, 254 (1935); United States 
v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 383 (1886). But "[a] guardianship is not a 
trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 7. There is no explanation, 
however, why the Court chooses one analogy and not another. The choice 
appears to be influenced by the fact that "[t]he duties of a trustee are more 
intensive than the duties of other fiduciaries." I d., § 2, comment b. 
The Court asserts that "[a]ll of the necessary elements of a common-law 
trust are present"-a trustee, a beneficiary, and a trust corpus. Ante, at 
19. But two persons and a parcel of real property, without more, do not 
create a trust. Rather, "[a] trust ... arises as a result of a manifestation 
of an intention to create it." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 2. See 
id., § 23 ("A trust is created only if the settlor properly manifests an inten-
tion to create a trust."); id., § 25 ("No trust is created unless the settlor 
manifests an intention to impose enforceable duties."). This is the ele-
ment that is missing in this case, and the Court does not, and cannot, find 
that Congress has manifested its intent to make the statutory duties upon 
which respondents rely trust duties. Cf. id., § 95; 2 A. Scott, Law of 
Trusts§ 95, at 772 (2d ed. 1967) ("At common law it was held that a use ... 
could not be enforced against the Crown .... "). 
Indeed, given the language of the statute at issue in Mitchell I, the case 
for finding that Congress intended to impose fiduciary obligations on the 
United States was much stronger there than it is here. See 445 U. S., at 
547 (WHITE, J., dissenting). One of the authorities cited by JUSTICE 
WHITE, 2 A. Scott, supra, § 95, specifically discusses the General Allotment 
Act as an example of the United States acting as a trustee. Furthermore, 
a trustee can "reserv[e] powers with respect to the administration of the 
trust." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 37. Unless the United States 
agrees to be held liable in damages, even the existence of a trust does not 
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The trusteeships to which the Court has referred in the past 
have manifested more the view that pervasive control over 
Indian life is such a high attribute of federal sovereignty that 
States cannot infringe upon that control. Ibid. 9 The Court 
today turns this shield into a sword. 
In my view, it is clear that "[n]othing on the face" of any of 
the statutes at issue, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 
U. S. 49, 59 (1978), or in their legislative histories, "fairly 
[can] be interpreted as mandating compensation" for the con-
duct alleged by respondents. Some of the statutes involved 
here, to be sure, create substantive duties that the Secretary 
must fulfill. But this could equally be said of the Classifica-
tion Act, considered in Testan. It requires that pay classifi-
cation ratings of federal employees be carried out pursuant to 
"the principle of equal pay for substantially equal work." 5 
necessarily establish that the Government has surrendered its immunity 
from damages. 
9 The Court has invoked the fiduciary relation primarily (i) to preclude 
unauthorized state interference in the relations between the United States 
and the Indian tribes or other unauthorized exercise of state jurisdiction on 
Indian lands, see e. g., Kagama, 118 U. S., at 382-384; (ii) to bar or nullify 
exercises of state court jurisdiction in matters affecting Indian property 
rights, in which the United States was not properly joined or represented, 
see, e. g., Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386 (1939); United 
States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 442-444 (1926); (iii) to interpret doubt-
ful or ambiguous treaty language in favor of the Indians, see, e. g., United 
States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U. S. 111, 117-118 (1938); Minnesota v. 
Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 396 (1902); (iv) to determine the liability of the 
United States for damages under the Just Compensation Clause where, 
acting as a fiduciary manager, it has converted the form of Indian prop-
erty, see, e. g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U. S. 371, 
415-416 (1980); and (v) to emphasize the high standard of care that the 
United States is obliged to exercise in carrying out its duties respecting the 
Indians, see, e. g., United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391,398 (1973); Sem-
inole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296-297 (1942). But the 
Court has never, until today, invoked the doctrine to hold that the United 
States is answerable in money damages for breaches of the standards appli-
cable to a private fiduciary. 
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U. S. C. § 5101(1)(A). Although the federal employee in 
Testan alleged a violation of the Act, the Court concluded 
that a back-pay remedy was unavailable, rejecting the argu-
ment that the substantive right necessarily implies a dam-
ages remedy. 424 U. S., at 400-403. 
Ignoring this holding in Testan, the Court concludes that 
the mere existence of a trust of some kind necessarily estab-
lishes that Congress has consented to a recovery of damages. 
In effect we are told to accept on faith the existence of a dam-
ages cause of action: "Given the existence of a trust relation-
ship, it naturally follows that the Government should be lia-
ble in damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties." Ante, 
at 20 (emphasis added). See also ibid. (damages are a "fun-
damental incident" of a trust relationship); ibid. (it would be 
"anomalous" not to find a damages remedy). The Court can 
find no more support for this proposition than the dissenting 
opinion in Mitchell /. See ante, at 21. 10 
It is fair to say that the Court is influenced by its view that 
an injunctive remedy is inadequate to redress the violations 
alleged-precisely the inference deemed inadmissible in 
Testan. 11 It is the ordinary result of sovereign immunity 
'
0 The Court reaches for support in Seminole Nation v. United States, 
supra, and United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103 (1935), but both 
cases cut against the Court's theory in this case. The discussion of the 
Government's fiduciary duty in Seminole Nation referred to a claim to 
compel payments expressly prescribed by Treaty. See 316 U. S., at 
296-297. Creek Nation involved a taking claim. 
"Also significant is the Court's standardless remand for further pro-
ceedings consistent with its opinion. Where the statute upon which liabil-
ity is premised creates no right to payment of a sum certain, the Court of 
Claims will be required, without legislative guidance, to determine the ex-
tent of liability, if any, and the items of damages that are cognizable. This 
task, unlike the factual or legal determination whether a particular individ-
ual falls within a class granted a right to payment of money by a statute, is 
not one to which courts are adapted. Any rules established will be of "ju-
dicial cloth, not legislative cloth." Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Ha-
waii, 454 U. S. 139, 141 (1981). I assume, however, that the law of trusts 
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that unconsented claims for money damages are barred. 
The fact that damages cannot be recovered without the sov-
ereign's consent hardly supports the conclusion that consent 
has been given. Yet this, in substance, is the Court's rea-
soning. If it is saying that a remedy is necessary to redress 
every injury sustained, the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
will have been drained of all meaning. Moreover, "many of 
the federal statutes . . . that expressly provide money dam-
ages as a remedy against the United States in carefully lim-
ited circumstances would be rendered superfluous." Testan, 
424 U. S., at 404. 
III 
The Court has made no effort to demonstrate that Con-
gress intended to render the United States answerable in 
damages upon claims of the kind presented here. The mere 
application by a court of the label "trust" cannot properly jus-
tify disregard of an immunity from damages the Government 
has never waived. I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Claims. 
generally will control and that all defenses to actions on breaches of trust, 
such as consent by the beneficiary and laches, will be fully available to the 
United States. Cf. 664 F. 2d, at 274. 
